PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

REV. J. S. JOHNSTON

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

A STUDY OF THE LOGOS-DOCTRINE: ITS SOURCES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

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PREFACE BY

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PREFACE

To write a Preface for the work of another is a task that requires, on the part of him who essays it, not only a study of what the author has written, but sympathy with his general purpose. In complying with the request of a friend and former pupil that I should write a few words of introduction to his first book, I may claim that at any rate these two conditions have been satisfied.

It fell to my lot to be one of the examiners of Mr. Johnston's Essay on the Logos-doctrine of S. John, which gained the Elrington Theological Prize at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1907; and I have now had the advantage of reading it through once more in its present form. The essay seemed to me likely to be useful to a large class of students when I read it first, as I did not know of any English book on the same scale which covered the ground; and now that it has got into print, I feel with some confidence that his treatment of his great subject will be helpful to many who have neither the leisure nor the opportunity for consulting the larger works which have been laid under contribution.

Mr. Johnston approaches great questions, as any one who handles the Fourth Gospel must do; and he would be forward to recognise that to some of them we must be content, for the present at any rate, with provisional answers. Perhaps we hardly know enough of the habits of thought in Ephesus at the close of the first century to enable us to say with confidence how far the Logos conception was current

in philosophical circles within and without the Church. Nor can it be claimed that the problem of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel is yet solved, although there is not any very wide difference of opinion among scholars as to its approximate date. The tradition of the Church that it is, in essentials, the work of John the Son of Zebedee—the Gospel "according to" S. John—is a tradition which it is rash to set aside without more convincing demonstration than has yet been given that it would have been impossible for a man of his antecedents to have written it. It may be, as some have thought, that while the voice is that of the Apostle, the hand which committed his sacred memories to writing and gave them literary form is that of a disciple imbued with the Greek spirit and familiar with Greek speculation.

But, however such questions may be disposed of, Mr. Johnston has given good reasons for his thesis that the Christology of the Fourth Gospel is no isolated phenomenon or alien to the best thought of the Christian world at the time of its appearance. It was inevitable that the doctrine of Christ should be translated into terms of Greek philosophy; and in the Prologue to the Gospel we have the first clear and conscious expression of this necessity, although S. Paul had already implied it. That the Prologue is no hasty or loosely written preface, but that it contains the pith and marrow of the message which the Evangelist set himself to deliver, seems to be at once the view most probable *à priori*, and most nearly in accordance with the characteristics and contents of the Gospel itself. In this point of view, Mr. Johnston's detailed examination of the Prologue is a valuable piece of exegesis. Without the Prologue, the Gospel would be not easier but harder to explain. The writer views the sacred history *sub specie æternitatis*, and this he makes clear at the outset.

For such a presentation of the earthly life of our

Lord there was need of a careful selection of incidents which might exhibit in Him the manifestation of the Eternal Logos. With other incidents the Evangelist has less concern. In Jesus of Nazareth the son of Zebedee saw Him Whom the Greeks sought to see, and the deeds and words of the wonderful ministry which came most vividly before his memory were those which revealed Who He was and is. It is, however, to go far beyond this—to go beyond the evidence, as it seems to many students who try to approach the problem with an open mind—to say that the Evangelist is careless of historical fact, and that he has given us a highly idealised picture, true perhaps in regard to the impression which it produces, but painted with entire freedom in details. His report of the words of Jesus cannot, indeed, as Mr. Johnston points out (p. 119), be taken as verbally exact; or at least we are not warranted in assuming that it must be so. The discourses have shaped themselves in the memory of an old man, and their literary form may be, to some extent, due to a scribe or disciple who committed them to paper. But to suppose that the intention of the book is to teach by means of fictitious narrative, introduced because it will serve the writer's purpose of displaying Jesus as the Logos Incarnate, is, I venture to think, to miss the mark. Everywhere the idea of "witness"—of *evidence*, as a modern would say—is prominent; and those who issued the book and who knew best of its origin and its claim to authenticity, believed that its "witness" was true. For the Evangelist, the narrative of the loaves and fishes, or of Lazarus, is just as historical as is the narrative of the Crucifixion or the Resurrection. That he sees an inner meaning in these scenes of the great drama which had not been clearly expressed before is not inconsistent with this, as Mr. Johnston points out elsewhere (p. 156). We may think the writer to have misinterpreted the facts —this seems to be the opinion of some critics—but

that he conceived himself to be *an interpreter of facts* is written large upon every page of the Gospel. The Logos, for him, was not an idea but a Person, whether it were from Hebrew or Greek sources that he learnt that pregnant title.

Mr. Johnston's last chapter shows how potent the Logos conception still is to control the vagaries of speculation as to the mysteries of God and man, of life and love and sin. Where it has been neglected, the Christian faith has assumed strange and unworthy forms. The doctrine of the Divine Immanence was forgotten in the eighteenth century, and Deism was the issue. The doctrine of the Divine Transcendence seems to have been forgotten by some exponents of the religion of Christ in our own time, and a vague Pantheism has displaced for their disciples the Gospel of Redemption. Deism and Pantheism alike, in refusing to accept the Incarnation as a fact of history, can find no reconciliation between the fear of God, as *above* man, and the love of God as exhibited *in* man. The Johannine teaching supplies the link we need—*Verbum caro factum est.* To suggest what this meant for thoughtful men in the first century, and what it still means for them in the twentieth, is the object of this little book.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE Author wishes to express his indebtedness to several friends who have helped him. The Lord Bishop of Salisbury has read through the proofs and made many valuable criticisms and suggestions. Dr. Gwynn, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin, has kindly looked through the work in MS. The Rev. Arthur Carr, Vicar of Addington, has given much useful advice and guidance. Mr. C. A. Miles has very kindly helped in getting the work ready for the Press.

The Author's indebtedness to other writers has been acknowledged where possible. In the latter part of the book a special acknowledgment is due to the writings of Professor Inge, who has done so much to interpret Johannine theology for the thought of to-day. The references (very numerous they are) to Bishop Westcott's "S. John" are to the recent edition issued last year (1908), in two volumes, with a revised Greek text.

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"Sumtis pennis aquilæ et ad altiora festinans de Verbo Dei disputat."—S. JEROME.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

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INTRODUCTION

"THE Fourth Gospel opens with a peal of thunder."[1] This happy saying of S. Augustine seems fitly to describe the simple grandeur of the Proem of the Fourth Evangelist. The opening sentences roll forth with a majestic rhythm: their very iteration, their bareness and simplicity are strangely impressive as they fall upon the ear with their "solemn weight of measured monotony." These introductory verses strike the keynote of the Gospel, and we seem at once to breathe the lofty spirit of the writer.

The Prologue (i. vv. 1–18) illustrates one of the Evangelist's leading characteristics. His method is deductive rather than inductive. He does not rise slowly step by step to the height of his great argument. He starts rather from his highest point, his loftiest generalisation, and works downwards into the concrete sphere of practical detail. Christian art has represented the Fourth Evangelist under the figure of an eagle; and in keeping with that fitting symbolism one might describe his method as a swooping down into the common world of human experience from some mountain peak of universal truth. Thus the first scene of this human-divine drama is laid in Heaven, before the world was. "In the beginning"—it is the greater Genesis of the New Dispensation

[1] S. Augustine, Tract. 36, in Johan.

that the Evangelist assays to write—"In the beginning was the *Word*." Here on the threshold of the Gospel we are brought face to face with a great ruling conception which is at once a revelation and an enigma—a conception which equally illumines and mystifies. The Prologue, in which the doctrine of the Word or Logos is set forth, is from one point of view a key which unlocks the meaning of the Gospel; but the key is itself a mystery, for which in turn we must seek a solution.

It may be well to start with a general *definition of the Logos-doctrine.* It is, that Jesus Christ who lived among men and under human conditions is in very truth the incarnation of a Divine Being, who exists eternally in personal communion with God, and is the Agent through whom God manifests Himself in the world in His manifold activities, creation, revelation, redemption.[1] This God-man is called the Logos or Word because He is the perfect utterance of the Mind of God, the true expression of His Will and Nature. The Logos-doctrine, in brief, gives a cosmological significance to a historical person. It builds a Christology out of the personality of Jesus of Nazareth.

This Logos-doctrine is found to be *explicitly set forth in three passages of the New Testament,* though clearly implied in many other places. The first and main passage is the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel (i. vv. 1–18); the other two passages are of subordinate importance; they are 1 John i. 1.—"The Word of Life," and Rev. xix. 13, "The Word of God."

Relation of the Prologue to the rest of the Gospel.—Before beginning our examination into the doctrine, it will be necessary to deal with a preliminary question of considerable importance, namely, what is the relation of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel to the rest of the

[1] *Vide* Hastings' "Dictionary of the Bible," art. "Logos," by G. T. Purves.

book? For it is evident that our attitude on this question must affect our whole field of view, since it will determine how far the Gospel may be expected to afford material for studying either the origin or the meaning of the doctrine.

It has been happily said that the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel is like a vestibule which admits us to a stately temple.[1] But the question at once arises, Is the vestibule in this case an integral part of the structure of the temple; or is it an afterthought merely, a later addition wrought in a different style of theological architecture, having no real unity with the main fabric?

In a pamphlet[2] written in 1892, Harnack put forward the view that the Prologue is no organic part of the Gospel, and that it is rather a postscript than a preface. He held that it is not so much "the statement of a programme to be worked out, as a sort of 'covering letter' intended to commend the work to cultivated Gentile or Hellenistic readers" (Sanday).[3] It was written, in fact, to break the Gospel gently to the Greeks, to smooth the way by preparing their minds for the paradox which the Evangelist had to communicate. Harnack has, in another place,[4] aptly pointed out how time has reversed the conditions of the case. To *us* the Prologue is the mysterious part, while the narrative which follows seems simple and natural. But to the readers of the Gospel the Prologue, at any rate the first part of the Prologue, must have seemed fairly familiar ground, while the narrative would be thought unworthy of so philosophic a preface.

A view somewhat similar to that of Harnack has been very ingeniously put into the mouth of one of the characters in Dr. Edwin Abbott's theological romance, "Silanus the Christian." Scaurus, a pagan

[1] Sanday, "The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," ch. vi.

[2] "Über das Verhältniss des Prologs des vierten Evgl. zum ganzen Werk."

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

[4] Harnack, "History of Dogma," i. 329 (E.T.).

thinker, but one of the *animæ naturaliter Christianæ*, is represented as giving his opinion as to the purpose of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. He calls the Evangelist a Christian *retiarius*; he is like one of those gladiators whose chief weapon was the net which he tried to throw over his opponent, when once he had enticed him near enough. "The innocent reader unrolling the book and reading the first words prepares himself for a Platonic treatise, in which he is to 'follow the Logos' in accordance with Socratic precept. Then step by step he is lured on into regions of non-logic and sentiment, till the net suddenly descends, and he finds himself repeating, 'the Logos was made flesh.'"[1] This ingenious idea is not altogether fanciful. It surely cannot have been without a touch of the sanctified wisdom of the serpent that the Evangelist kept that philosophic stumbling-block, the Incarnation, till he had come near the end of the Prologue. Scaurus in another place describes the Fourth Evangelist as a "decoy-bird" for the philosophic minds of the Greek world; he is supposed to be trying to lure on the Greek thinkers by dressing up Christianity in his Prologue to look as much like Greek philosophy as possible. Such an idea is by no means improbable. The Evangelist was clearly adapting himself to his readers, with what amount of conscious strategy there is no need for us to inquire. But it certainly would not have been unbefitting those who had been trained to be fishers of men, if they were to bestow considerable care on the baiting of the hook or the skilful casting of the net. As regards the *form and phraseology* of the Prologue, there seems little doubt that they were determined by the fact that the Evangelist was writing for educated people. The language has a certain philosophic flavour; it is tinged with speculation in a way that we do not find in any other part of the New Testament. Thus far we may reasonably go. But Harnack's view

[1] "Silanus the Christian," p. 326.

appears to be rather different. He does not merely hold that the *form* of the Evangelist's message as set forth in the Prologue was affected by the character of the people for whom he was writing. He holds that the Prologue, contents no less than form, was an afterthought; an ornamental frontispiece put in for show. The Prologue is thus, in Harnack's view, nothing more than an intellectual flourish to catch the ear of a philosophic public.

In support of the view that the Prologue is independent of the Gospel, it is pointed out that the term Logos, in its special theological sense, occurs nowhere in the body of the Gospel, the word having always its ordinary and familiar sense. This fact is not, however, so serious as it appears at first sight. It is quite true that the actual term Logos does not recur, but the *idea*, for which the term only acts as a convenient *label*, is woven into the whole tissue of the work, and is always present as a background and a setting.

The Abbé Loisy, who differs from Harnack on this as on most other points, has ascribed a sufficient reason for the suppression of the term Logos in the body of the Gospel. His actual words may be quoted :—

"On a vainement essayé d'isoler le prologue . . . le prologue et l'Evangile présentent le même mysticisme transcendant, la même métaphysique toute pénétrée de mysticisme. Il est vrai que le mot 'Logos' n'est employé au sens métaphysique et personel que dans le prologue, et que la parole de Dieu, ou la parole du Christ dans le corps de l'Evangile, s'entendent selon la signification commune du mot 'parole.' Mais c'est que l'évangéliste a eu le tact de ne pas violer toute vraisemblance historique et de ne pas trop altérer la forme de l'enseignement synoptique, en faisant dire à Jésus lui-même qu'il était le Logos. Cette réserve est facile à comprendre, surtout si l'auteur, comme il est probable, se rendait compte, en quelque façon que l'idée du Logos n'était pas de

tradition évangélique et qu'elle tenait, au moins par un côté, à la philosophie hellénique."[1]

Without endorsing any very definite view as to the extent of the Evangelist's indebtedness to Greek philosophy, one can readily see that his sense of historical fitness would in itself be sufficient to account for his confining this phrase of the schools to the Prologue, and for his not inserting it in the actual narrative of our Lord's life and words. The Logos-doctrine was obviously the Evangelist's own deduction, his interpretation of the significance of Christ's person, and it is naturally confined to the Introduction.

Loisy has also some criticism to make on Harnack's famous *dictum* that the Prologue is not a key but an enigma.[2] It is true, he admits, that the Logos, when one meets it *at the beginning* of the Gospel, may appear to be an enigma ; but after *having read the Gospel*, one perceives that this enigma is the only true key to the right understanding of it. The Prologue and the book are meant to explain one another ; and, according to Loisy, they are unintelligible without one another. With this critic, the Logos is to be regarded as a kind of compendious title for the whole Johannine theology of the Incarnation.

On the whole, it may be said that the general voice of criticism has gone against Harnack's view of the relation of the Gospel to its Prologue.[3] Critics may differ very seriously as to the exact nature of this relation, but almost all are agreed that there is an organic connection, a real unity of spirit binding the one to the other. The Gospel, as a whole, is like the seamless coat, it cannot be rent asunder. Réville goes so far as to say that the attempt to explain the Gospel without the Prologue would be as absurd as to try to interpret a text in a foreign language

[1] Loisy, "Le Quatrième Évangile," p. 97.

[2] Loisy, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[3] Schmiedel, in "Encyclopædia Biblica" (art. "John the son of Zebedee"), goes very strongly against Harnack's theory. *Vide* also Schmiedel, "The Johannine Writings," pp. 154, 155.

without taking account of the grammar of the language. There can be little doubt that the Prologue is intended to present the point of view from which the Gospel is written; it is the natural coefficient to every part of it.[1]

But we must cry halt at this point. The admission of an organic connection between Gospel and Prologue must not be held to imply that the Logos-conception is an *a priori* assumption, a preconceived metaphysical theory which determines the whole character of the Gospel. The Logos is really only a *convenient formula* under which the Evangelist summarizes his ideas and convictions about the person and work of Christ. These fundamental convictions do assuredly determine the character of the Gospel; they constitute the thesis, which the Gospel professes to set forth. "These (signs) have been written that ye may believe (πιστεύσητε) that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" (xx. 30 f.). But the Logos is only an appropriate label for these convictions. The Logos-doctrine *describes*, but *does not determine* the contents of the Gospel.

Whether the Prologue was *written* before or after the Gospel is a question of little importance. Very probably, like most prefaces, it was written when the Gospel was finished, and was intended to sum up and crystallize into a definite statement the guiding and inspiring conceptions which underlay the whole work. Thus *what is implicit in the Gospel is explicit in the Prologue.*

We may therefore assume that the Prologue and the Gospel are parts of a single whole, and that the one may be expected to interpret and elucidate the other.

There are other important questions connected with the relation of the Prologue to the Gospel, but these cannot be dealt with in the present inquiry.

[1] The way in which the Logos-nature of Christ pervades the Gospel is succinctly dealt with by E. F. Scott in an excellent article on the Logos in Hastings' "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels" (1908), where a convenient list of apposite passages is given.

The great questions relating to the authorship of the Gospel must, of course, affect our view of the Prologue by determining its literary and historical setting. An interpretation of the Prologue which is based on some particular theory of authorship must share the fortunes of the theory on which it is founded. The Logos-conception is thus only a chapter in a very much larger problem. Under these circumstances it does not indeed seem a very hopeful task to set about framing theories of the Logos-doctrine; for the very foundation on which we build may at any moment give way; even as it is, the ominous rumblings of criticism may be continually heard beneath one's feet. In the present state of criticism one must regard the authorship of the Fourth Gospel as an open question, though the traditional view has been well championed in recent years, notably by Professor James Drummond. The verdict of this scholar cannot have been prompted by any dogmatic prepossessions, so often a disturbing factor in this field of study, and he may be regarded as a unique example of that rare phenomenon, an entirely disinterested critic, one who has no dogmatic axe to grind in any results that may be arrived at.[1]

In the following investigation into the Logos-doctrine, the traditional view of authorship has been provisionally adopted as seeming to the present writer the most reasonable hypothesis, though, of course, it must be admitted the evidence is far from being conclusive. In this study of the Logos we must be content to work like the builders of Jerusalem, with a trowel in one hand and a sword in the other, always prepared, while constructing our own edifice, to repel any unexpected assaults from the wider zone of warfare.

[1] Against the traditional view of authorship, there are, among recent writers, Professor Burkitt, "The Gospel History and its Transmission" (1906), and Dr. Abbott, "Johannine Vocabulary" and "Johannine Grammar."

CHAPTER I

THE EXPOSITION OF THE JOHANNINE LOGOS-DOCTRINE

BEFORE we set about inquiring into the origin of the Logos-doctrine we must first find out exactly from the Johannine writings *what the Logos-doctrine is*, in its various aspects. The materials for our investigation have been already indicated. We find specific reference to the Logos in the Prologue of the Gospel, in the opening verse of the first Epistle of S. John, and in one verse of the Apocalypse.

We shall begin with a study of the Prologue of the Gospel, looking at it in its general bearings as well as in its details. "The Golden Proem," as Chrysostom calls it, is the primary source for our Logos-material.

The Prologue of the Fourth Gospel.—A word or two must first be said about the "setting" of the Prologue. Its abrupt beginning has often been remarked. Some think that the sudden introduction of the Logos is sufficiently explained by the fact that this term was already a familiar one in contemporary speculation. But this explanation is not adequate, and the mode of introduction seems undoubtedly to imply as a background the oral teaching of the Evangelist with which most of his readers were already acquainted. It is likely that before this he had taken account of the popular philosophy in its bearings on the truth of Christianity; but he was now to throw his ideas into more definite shape.

Tradition appears to give us the right clue in this

matter. The account given in the Muratorian Fragment suggests the transition from oral teaching to written testimony, in view, it may be, of the Apostle's declining years and growing feebleness: "The Fourth Gospel [was written by] John, one of the disciples (*i.e.* Apostles). When his fellow disciples and bishops urgently pressed (*cohortantibus*) him, he said, 'Fast with me [from] to-day, for three days, and let us tell one another any revelation which may be made to us, either for or against [the plan of writing]. On the same night it was revealed to Andrew, one of the Apostles, that John should relate all in his own name, and that all should review [his writing]."[1] There is no need to press the details of this account, but if we may suppose that the Apostle was now growing very old, we seem to have a sufficient reason for the pressure brought to bear on the aged S. John to write down his memoirs.

Much has been said to prove how unlikely it is that an erstwhile Galilean fisherman could ever have written the Prologue. Matthew Arnold waxes merry over the view that either the matter or the form of the Prologue could have come from the Apostle John—"To suppose them his," he says, "we must place ourselves in the world of miracle—in the world where one is transported from Bagdad to Cairo by clapping one's hands, or in which one falls asleep, and wakes understanding the language of birds and hearing the grass grow."[2] Yet one may reasonably ask, Where is the miracle? What is the antecedent improbability as to the Apostle's authorship? Simply the fact that the Apostle was at one time a Galilean fisherman, and that he was called a "simple and unlettered man"[3] when he appeared before the

[1] *Vide* Westcott, "Gospel according to S. John" (1908), vol. i. p. lxxiii.

[2] "God and the Bible," ch. v.

[3] Acts iv. 13.

Sanhedrin. As to the latter fact, we need find no insuperable difficulty. Most probably the term used was *àm-haarets*, a technical expression which might be applied to any one who had not passed through the Rabbinical schools. A man might be called by this name, even if he had studied the Scriptures and the Mishna, but yet had never sat at the feet of one of the doctors.[1] It is very much as if in our own day a group of college dons were confronted with the learning of some self-taught genius, and dismissed his claims by saying: "Why, this man has no *degree*; he has never been to a university." S. John may well have been a profound and thoughtful student of religious problems even though he had never attended lectures. Then again, as to the fact of his having been a fisherman by calling, there is nothing in this to make his authorship of the Gospel and its Prologue an impossibility. There are many hints in the Gospel record to show that the Apostle was in fairly prosperous circumstances, and would be to some extent a man of leisure. In any case his trade need not have incapacitated him for the study of religion or even of philosophy. Ammonius Saccas, the founder of the Neoplatonist philosophy, had been a porter on the quays of Alexandria; Jacob Boehme, the mystical philosopher, remained a shoemaker all his life. The author of the Fourth Gospel is admittedly a unique writer; surely there is nothing miraculous in thinking that he may have had an unusual course of religious and intellectual development. We shall see later that there is no reason to suppose that the Evangelist was a philosopher in the technical sense. The Prologue is simply the work of a thoughtful man, with a bent for philosophy.

If we assume the traditional view of authorship we seem to get an impressive as well as a natural setting for the Gospel and more particularly for the Prologue. Hitherto, we may suppose, the Apostle

[1] *Cf.* Wagenseil, "Sota," p. 517.

has been content to give oral teaching on the truths of the Gospel. But he is growing old; the living voice is becoming feeble; soon it may be heard no more. Urged by his companions, as one can well imagine, the aged teacher decides to leave a permanent record of his teaching, a record which was not to *introduce* his views to the Church—that had been done already in his oral teaching—but to leave them enshrined in a written Gospel. He does not need to explain himself or his terms to his disciples. He can therefore plunge at once into his subject and take much for granted on the part of the reader. Thus he can introduce the Logos without further explanation. Again, the solemn, measured style gives the appearance of a last will and testament. The Apostle is not arguing or pleading; he is speaking with authority. The opening clauses read more like a creed than a personal confession of faith. Their simplicity is not that of one who skims lightly over the surface of a subject. It is the simplicity that is born of long brooding and reflection. The "bosom disciple" had kept all the words and acts of Jesus and had pondered them in his heart. But the "glorified remembrance" that lay in the Apostle's mind was something more than a far-off echo from days long gone by. We are not listening merely to an old man's recollections of deeds and words that he had lost sight of for many years. The Apostle has no need to strain his eyes backward through the mist of years to recall one by one events and utterances that belong only to the far-distant past. As a recent writer has well said, "They are not memories which have lain dormant for half a century, to wake like the sleepers of Ephesus, unchanged as they fell asleep. They are living memories, never long absent from heart and mind; memories which in a sense have grown with the man's growth, and have ripened from the seed into the fruit."[1] Every word and deed has been patiently held up

[1] Dean of Westminster, "The Study of the Gospels," p. 153.

to the light till its inner meaning has shone through. Thought at length breaks into speech, and speech in turn crystallizes into written words. No one indeed with any sympathy or imagination can mistake the atmosphere of the Prologue. We feel that behind every clause is a lifetime's thought. We have only the *results* of the Apostle's reflection given us, but through the results we can almost read the life-long process which produced them. The stream of thought has at length run clear when it reaches us, but we can imagine that its earlier course may have been sometimes troubled and turbid. The clearness of the Prologue is apt indeed to belie its depth; it is the clearness of deep tranquil water.

This is not a reading of the Gospel dictated by mere impression. It is, as we have seen, the view suggested by tradition, which must, after all, be allowed to count for something. Tradition certainly seems in this case to give a setting which fits in admirably with the facts of the case. There is a deliberation and a finality about the style, a calmness as of the evening-time of life, which make us feel that tradition is not far astray in ascribing the Gospel to the "sunset of the Apostolic age"—the last years of S. John at Ephesus. In the Apostle's case, it was truly "light at evening-time." It is this reading of the facts which has been presented in so profound and sympathetic a manner in Browning's "A Death in the Desert."

> "Since much that at the first, in deed and word,
> Lay simply and sufficiently exposed,
> Had grown (or else my soul was grown to match,
> Fed through such years, familiar with such light,
> Guarded and guided still to see and speak)
> Of new significance and fresh result;
> What first were guessed as points, I now knew stars,
> And named them in the Gospel I have writ."

All this is, of course, a following of tradition, but it is not necessarily wrong on that account.

But we must hasten back to a more critical atmosphere. It is difficult to understand how Beyschlag [1] can hold the view that the Prologue is written in quite an informal style without any great deliberation in its phraseology. The style is rather loose, in Beyschlag's opinion. Thus, it is held that the words ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν do not imply any inner divine relations. We might as well have had παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ. Beyschlag thinks that λόγος is only one of a circle of interchangeable terms such as ζωή and φῶς, any of which might have taken the place of λόγος in the forefront of the Gospel, and the choice of λόγος is not to be regarded as the result of any very mature reflection. It is true that the Logos is, in the Prologue and in the Gospel, translated into its component elements of Light and Life, and through them, rather than directly, makes its influence felt in the Gospel. They are not, however, synonyms for, but components of, the Logos. The style of the Prologue certainly leads us to think that every word in it was carefully selected and deliberately used.

The Exegesis of the Prologue of the Gospel.—We shall now examine the Prologue in detail, dealing only with those aspects of it which throw light on the Logos-doctrine. The Prologue has three main divisions. The first (vv. 1–5) deals with the Logos in His own being and nature; the second (vv. 6–13) with His manifestation to the world and its rejection of Him; the third part (vv. 14–18) with His manifestation of the Father. It is not easy, however to analyse the Prologue; the different parts seem to blend frequently with one another. Some commentators have drawn attention to what has been called the *spiral movement* of the Prologue. "An idea comes to the front like the strand of a rope, retires again, and then reappears later on for development and definition. Meanwhile another idea, like another strand, comes before us and

[1] "New Testament Theology" (E. T.), II. 433.

retires to reappear in like manner."[1] Thus the Logos is introduced in vv. 1–5, and then giving way to the illustration of Light is withdrawn to reappear in v. 14. Similarly the Light seems to *revolve*, and we catch its flash in vv. 4, 5, and again in vv. 8, 9. In like manner the rejection of the Logos appears in v. 5, and again in vv. 10, 11; the testimony of John comes into view in vv. 6, 7, later on in v. 15, and is again taken up in the two subsequent sections of the chapter. This peculiar structure of the Prologue gives to it a combined unity and variety. The parts are only varied aspects of one great theme; and each must therefore be always viewed in its relation to the Prologue as a whole.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him; and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness; and the darkness apprehended it not. There came a man, sent from God, whose name was John. The same came for witness, that he might bear witness of the light, that all might believe through him. He was not the light, but came that he might bear witness of the light. There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man, coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not. But as many as received Him, to them gave He the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on His name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. And the Word became flesh, and tabernacled among us (and we beheld His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth. John beareth witness of Him, and crieth, saying, This was He of whom I said, He that cometh after me is become before me: for He was before me. For of His fulness we all received, and grace for grace. For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."

V. 1, "In the beginning" (ἐν ἀρχῇ) is probably meant to recall the opening words of Genesis; the reference is more than a literary reminiscence: it

[1] Plummer, Cambridge Greek Test., S. John, p. 75. Others have described the same characteristic of style as the incoming and receding of successive *waves* of thought.

suggests that the writer is undertaking the Genesis of the New Dispensation; ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεός is the way the Septuagint of Genesis begins. We shall find that there are many echoes of the Old Testament in the Prologue.

"In the beginning was the Word" (ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος). This is meant to imply eternal or pre-temporal existence. The same fact is repeated in v. 2, οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. It is also stated in the words of Jesus, "Now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own self with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was" (πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι), xvii., 5. The same assertion is made in viii. 58, "Before Abraham was, I am" (πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγώ εἰμι). Here, in the Greek, the aorist γενέσθαι, "was," or rather "was born," is contrasted with the eternal present of εἰμί, "I am."

These statements have been regarded by some as implying only relative pre-existence and not eternal being. Reuss,[1] pointing to the fact that the opening words of the Prologue are intended to recall the first verse of Genesis, goes on to say that if we are to infer from the words of the Prologue the *eternity* of the Logos we shall be obliged, in consistency, to infer from the opening words of Genesis the eternity of the world. There is no force in this criticism. To begin with, there is no reason why we should make ἐν ἀρχῇ have exactly the same meaning as בְּרֵאשִׁית. The following verses in the Prologue make it clear that ἐν ἀρχῇ means virtually "before the beginning" of time. But, apart from this, even the grammar of the clause forbids us to take the view of Reuss. For the word is not ἐγένετο, but ἦν, the meaning being that "in the beginning" the Logos *did not come into existence* (aor. ἐγένετο), but *was already in being* (imperf. ἦν). This at once makes a difference between the opening of Genesis and that of the Fourth Gospel; for in Genesis we start with an *act*—creation,

[1] Reuss, "Théol. Chrét.," II. 438.

which is represented as taking place at a point in time. In the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel we have presented to us an existence which is already in process. And we may note that when the Evangelist has occasion in v. 3 to speak of creation (*πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*), he uses a different mode of speech—a different verb and a different tense. The *ἐγένετο* of v. 3 suggests a contrast, conscious or otherwise, to the *ἦν* of v. 1. In the beginning the Logos already *was*, and then at a point of time all things *came into being* through Him. Thus eternal existence seems to be implied, though not directly asserted. The statement contained an answer to the Arian tenet that there was a time when the Son was not (*ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*). With the words of the Prologue may be compared the description of the origin of the personified Wisdom in Prov. viii. 23 (LXX), *ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι.*

"The Word" (*Λόγος*). The use of the term here may suggest an echo of Gen. i. 3, "And God *said*." Such a recollection might make the Evangelist feel that in introducing a word of Greek aspect he was not breaking with old traditions and memories. Westcott thinks that the Evangelist prefers to use "Word" rather than "Son" here, because he wishes to lead the mind of the reader to the most absolute conceptions of the nature of God. The title "Logos" is used *absolutely* only in vv. 1, 14 of the Prologue; in the other two places where the same idea is supposed to occur, a descriptive genitive is added, "Word of God" (Rev. xix. 13), "Word of Life" (1 John i. 1). Commentators have also pointed out that *ὁ λόγος* must not be explained as if it were equivalent to *ῥῆμα*, "the thing uttered," since the Logos is not a thing, but a living Voice; nor is it the same as *ὁ λέγων*, "He who speaks," since it denotes not so much the Speaker as that which is spoken; nor yet has it the meaning of *ὁ λέγομενος*, "He who is spoken of," or the Promised One. The Logos is then at once the Speaker and the Message spoken.

The meaning and the antecedents of the term "Logos" will be dealt with later on, but a few observations may be made on the subject in this connection. The word labours under a disadvantage in having no exact equivalent in any other language. Logos, in its Greek sense, meant, on its inner side, partly thought and partly will; on its outward side it meant the expression of thought in words and the expression of will in law. The Logos was therefore a many-sided term, the exact meaning of which it might not always be easy to determine. One can well understand the perplexity of Goethe's Faust in his attempt to translate the term aright—

> "'In the beginning was the *Word*'—alas!
> The first line stops me—how shall I proceed?
> 'The Word' cannot express the meaning here—
> I must translate the passage differently,
> If by the Spirit I am rightly guided.
> Once more—'In the beginning was the *Thought*,'—
> Consider the first line attentively,
> Lest hurrying on too fast you lose the meaning.
> Was it then *Thought* that has created all things?
> Can Thought make Matter? Let us try the line
> Once once,—'In the beginning was the *Power*'—
> This will not do—even while I write the phrase
> I feel its faults—oh, help me, Holy Spirit,
> I'll weigh the passage once again, and write
> Boldly,—'In the beginning was the *Act*.'"[1]

So in the same way the Latins wavered between *Verbum*, *Sermo*, and *Ratio*.

In the Greek conception of the Logos, Thought is much more prominent than Word; on the other hand, the Evangelist's Logos starts from the idea of Revelation rather than Reason, of Word rather than Thought. The idea of Word may, however, be made to include by implication the idea of Thought; for Word is a concrete embodiment, a communication or expression of Thought. Word may also take in the idea of Will, the concept of an activity which has not rested in the potentiality of thought, but translated

[1] Faust, Anster's translation.

the potentiality into actuality. The historical fact of the life of Christ, from which the Evangelist starts, is no mere idea in the mind of God: it is the visible expression of the Divine Will. Thus the Evangelist's idea of the Logos may comprehend all its other aspects—not merely Word, but Thought and Will. Self-communication is the essential attribute of the Evangelist's Logos, and this self-communication is shown in three phases—creation, revelation, and Incarnation.

As the first clause, "In the beginning was the Word," implies the eternity or pre-existence of the Logos, so the second clause, "the Word was with God" (*πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*), may be taken to imply His *personality*. "The idea conveyed is not simple co-existence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (*μετά*) or united under a common conception (*σύν*), or, so to speak, in local relation (*παρά*), but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed. The personal being of the Word was realized in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God."[1] The same idea as we find in this clause is to be found also in 1 John i, 2, "The eternal life, which *was with the Father* (*ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*) and was manifested unto us." The thought underlying both these expressions is the great ruling principle of the Evangelist's theology, "God is Love" (1 John iv. 16), and both statements may be regarded as the *metaphysical* aspect of the truth declared by Jesus in His address to the Father: "Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world" (xvii. 24). The unity of the Divine Life is not represented by the Evangelist as the unreal unity of mere sameness and identity; it is not the barren unity of the desert, an eternal monotony; it is the higher unity that admits of inner differentiation, the life that implies relationship and intercommunion. The same pregnant sense is given to the preposition

[1] Westcott, *in loco*.

εἰς in v. 18 in describing the relationship of Father and Son: "The only begotten Son which is *in* the bosom of the Father" (ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός). The πρός in v. 1 seems thus to imply not merely distinct personality but intimate fellowship. Some have brought out this relationship by paraphrasing: "The face of the Everlasting Word was ever directed towards the face of the Everlasting Father."[1]

The pre-temporal personality of the Logos, though it seems to be very clearly indicated here, was afterwards misunderstood and obscured for a time by the early Christian apologists, who elaborated the philosophy of the Logos doctrine.[2] Thus Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Theophilus do not appear to have clearly conceived of a hypostatic distinction in the Godhead. Justin seems to imply in some of his phrases that before the creation the Logos existed with God potentially, and that He only came into actuality at the creating of the world. The distinction between God and the Logos was thus apt to be viewed as only relative to the world: the hypostasis of the Logos is not essential. Theophilus developed the rather dangerous distinction between the Logos ἐνδιάθετος, or "immanent," and the Logos προφορικός, or "proceeding." In the Defence of Christianity *ad Autolycum* (ii. 10, 22) he describes the Logos as having before creation a potential existence as the mind or intelligence of God; only before the act of creation God begat the Logos, "vomiting him forth." Irenæus and Athenagoras recalled the Logos-speculation to its original Johannine principles. The disturbing influence in the Logos-theology of the Apologists, which had led them away from the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, was the natural emphasising of the Greek element in the Logos at the expense of its Hebrew side.

[1] Liddon, Bampton Lectures, p. 231.

[2] *Vide* Bethune-Baker, "Early History of Christian Doctrine," p. 119.

Logos had come with the Apologists to mean Reason rather than Word, and its cosmological aspect had become specially prominent. The personality of the historical Jesus was almost lost in the thought of the Logos as a cosmic force, and the Gospel was in danger of being turned into a system of natural theology.

In the third clause of v. 1 another attribute is ascribed to the Logos; the clauses have been rising to a climax—pre-existence, personality, and now in "The Word was God" (Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος) we have *deity* added as a corollary to the preceding statements. It is not easy to determine the exact significance of this clause. The term Θεός was apt to be a word of rather fluid meaning. There are several possible interpretations here. Drummond[1] has brought them together. "Did the writer use Θεός in its highest acceptation and mean to assert that the Logos who was in one sense an eternal attribute of God, was in another aspect God Himself regarded in His relation to the universe and to man? Or did he intend to affirm the distinct personality of the Logos, and in doing so to ascribe to him a divine nature? Both these views may be and have been maintained. If the second be accepted then the question arises, what is implied by Θεός? Is it merely a figurative expression designed to convey the idea of exalted dignity, as 'I said, ye are Gods' (x. 34); or does it denote special divine nature such as could not be predicated of angels or of men?"

It is to be observed that the Logos is called Θεός, not ὁ Θεός; and the thought is rather of the *nature* of the Logos than of His *personality*.[2] To identify λόγος and ὁ Θεός would, in Westcott's opinion, have virtually amounted to what was afterwards known as Sabellianism, and would have implied that the terms were co-extensive; thus the Logos would exhaust

[1] Drummond, *op. cit.* p. 109.
[2] Θεός marks *nature*, like σάρξ, v. 14.

the category of Godhead; but we observe that in the preceding clause—"the Word was with God"—a distinction is indicated between ὁ λόγος and ὁ Θεός. The Evangelist, as we have seen, reserves the designation ὁ Θεός for the Father—the source of divinity; while Θεός without the article is used to denote the category of divine nature or essence which the Son shares with the Father.[1] Thus there is a unity of substance but a distinction of persons. Some critics object to this interpretation of the passage. Thus Lücke [2] says that if this clause (Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος) were meant to assert the unity of substance in contrast to the distinction of persons implied in ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, an adversative particle and not the simple connective καί would have been used. But this is in the first place to forget the characteristic style of the writer, who is so fond of stringing sentences together in Hebrew fashion, with only the simple connective as copula. And apart from this consideration of style the Evangelist's train of thought leads him to regard this clause not as a contrast to, but as a development of the preceding clause. Lücke's further statement that the accepted view would require ὁ Θεός instead of Θεός, to correspond with πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, leaves out of account the clear distinction between Θεός and ὁ Θεός. Lücke seems to make Θεός mean something equivalent to Philo's ὁ δεύτερος Θεός. Thus in this view Θεός means practically the same as θεῖος; but such an interpretation must be the outcome of the critic's theological presuppositions rather than his examination of the text on its own merits. The total impression of the Evangelist's teaching, both in the Prologue and throughout the Gospel, leads one to believe that he attributes Deity to the Logos.

The next step in the unfolding of the Logos-doctrine is the ascribing of *creation* to the Logos:

[1] Tholuck, "The Gospel of S. John," *in loco*.

[2] Lücke, Commentary, *in loco*. His argument is dealt with by Stevens, "Johannine Theol.," p. 92.

πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ. The Evangelist passes from the contemplation of the Logos in Himself, in His absolute being, to the thought of His revelation to the world. The repetition of thought in the clause "the same was in the beginning with God" just before the statement attributing creation to the Logos, appears to have a special purpose; it suggests a subtle connexion between the two propositions which made the Evangelist feel a certain fitness in placing them side by side. The connecting thread seems to be the thought that the same impulse which realized itself in the eternal relationship of love between the persons of the Godhead was that which prompted creation. There is the same self-giving and forth-going in both relationships. We catch a glimpse of that noble idea which is a constant undercurrent in the Evangelist's thought, namely, that creation is no arbitrary act on the part of God, but an inevitable consequence of His nature. Thus, granted that the Godhead is a Trinity, in other words, that God is Love, we may *deduce* Creation and Incarnation. The God-with-God naturally becomes a God-with-man.

The preposition *διά* indicates that creation was a mediate function. "All things came into being *through* Him." The affirmative statement is emphasised by repetition in a negative form. "Apart from (*χωρὶς αὐτοῦ*) nothing came into being." As has been already noticed, the aorist *ἐγένετο* suggests a contrast to *ἦν* in v. 1, the imperfect *ἦν* denoting continual or eternal existence; the aorist *ἐγένετο*, the definite act at a point in time. The former is a "being," the latter a "becoming." The Evangelist's statements about creation are substantially those which we find in S. Paul's Epistles, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, *e.g.* "All things have been created through Him (*δι' αὐτοῦ*) and unto Him (*εἰς αὐτόν*), and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist" (Col. i. 16, 17); and in Heb. i. 2, 3, the writer speaks of

the Son "through whom (δι' οὗ) God made the worlds," and who "upholdeth all things by the word of His power" (τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ). In these passages and in many others which might be adduced, God the Father (ὁ Θεός) is represented as the Creator in the ultimate and absolute sense. He is the πηγή—the Fountain of all being. But the Absolute God works through the Logos as agent in creating, sustaining, enlightening, and redeeming the world. Creation can thus in different senses be attributed to both. The cosmic function of the Word set forth by the Evangelist is therefore no new theology, but is simply the generally accepted teaching of the New Testament.

It is worth noting that πάντα and not τὰ πάντα is the wording of the Greek. It gives a suggestion of the "individuality" of creation. Things are not created in a mass, in their totality (τὰ πάντα), but each separate thing is the handiwork of the Divine Logos. This is emphasised in the pendant clause, "without Him was not even one single thing (οὐδὲ ἕν) created." There is no room here for a dualistic theory of the world. Even gross matter must come within the sphere of the Divine activity: it also was created. Philo could hardly have written such a statement, except with some mental reservation. The Logos is no Divine Potter, no 'carpenter' God, fashioning the world out of pre-existing materials. It has been well observed that these sentences of the Evangelist give a Divine charter to the researches of physical science. If not even one single thing, however minute, was made apart from the Divine Logos, we have surely a fine incentive to study the science of the infinitely little as well as of the infinitely great. Such a thought is the hallowing of microscope as well as telescope. It makes the world a temple and science a sacrament.

The fifth leading thought in the Prologue is that the Logos is the *Life-giver* and the *Enlightener* of

the world. Life (ζωή) and Light (φῶς) are leading terms with the Evangelist. It may be that this combination of Light and Life was suggested by the language of Ps. xxxvi. 9, "With Thee is the fountain of life: and in Thy light shall we see light."[1] In the Evangelist's idea Light is a higher form of Life. It is the same Divine activity which manifests itself in both, but the Life which has created and which sustains *all things*, reaches a higher level in *man:* it becomes self-conconscious intelligence: "The Life was the *light of men.*"

Life is used in its broadest sense here. There is only one Life in all things, but this Life manifests itself variously in the physical, the moral and the spiritual spheres: yet it is one Life, and it all emanates from one Life-giver. There is here no dualistic division between the spiritual and the material; all things, visible and invisible, are instinct with the presence and power of the Logos.

There is progress in the Evangelist's thought; creation is incomplete without life: for the world is not a machine but an organism; life in turn leads up to the thought of light: for man is not only an organism, he is also an intelligence; and thus man can become the recipient of a divine revelation, and the medium of a divine Incarnation. *Creation, Life, Light*—these are the steps which ascend in ordered sequence to the crowning of humanity in Jesus Christ, the God-man. But the Light, while it is the prerogative of men, is the possession of *all men.* If it is limited to men, it is not limited to any one section of humanity. The Light is diffused everywhere. It shineth in the darkness. The Evangelist has a very comprehensive view of the Divine illumination. The Light has from the first been coming into the world. It is unceasingly active; it may be noted that the Greek is the active, φαίνει, "shineth," not the middle,

[1] Cf. also "the light of the living" (or, better, "light of life"), Ps. lvi. 13. *Vide* Sanday, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

φαίνεται, "appears." "This action of the Light is not to be limited to any one point. It is continuous from the creation to the consummation of things, though there have been times when it has flashed forth with peculiar splendour" (Westcott). The Light has come to man through nature, that "other Bible"; it has come in the inner light of conscience; it has shone in theophany and in vision; angel-visitings have brought gleams of it to the pure in heart. The Light has shed itself too on the face of history; it has shone on the chaos of events, and revealed the increasing purpose which is slowly unfolding itself and changing the confusion into an ordered process. The Light has been growing ever since that first "Let there be Light"; but all the scattered gleams that are shed on nature and conscience and history have been focussed in the glory of the Only-begotten Son of God, the Word made Flesh. The ideas of the Prologue—Word, Life, Light—have a grand comprehensiveness; they embrace all nature and all history. All that is best and noblest in the thought and action of mankind finds its fulfilment in such conceptions as these.

"And the light shineth in *the* darkness" (ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ). Westcott thinks that the use of the article here implies a reference to the Fall of Man which has produced a definite state of darkness. "Man has made for himself an atmosphere of darkness by seeking to sever his life from the Source of Life." It seems more likely, however, that the description of the creation in the first chapter of Genesis is still before the Evangelist's mind. The darkness that was upon the face of the deep, and the Divine Word which said, "Let there be light"—this is the picture that is floating in the background of these opening verses of the Prologue. This fact has hardly been sufficiently emphasised; it is certainly a key to the right appreciation of the Prologue. Behind the words with which this new Genesis opens, we

can, as in a palimpsest, read the Genesis of the Old Dispensation. But if the Evangelist has taken a suggestion from the Hebrew Genesis, he has put a new construction upon what he has received. The darkness in Genesis is physical, the darkness in the Gospel is moral.

In this use of the metaphor of darkness to describe the condition of sin and unbelief we come upon one of the most characteristic features of the Fourth Gospel. It is essential to see clearly the drift of the Evangelist's thought on this subject. Schmiedel has endeavoured to prove the Alexandrian or Gnostic character of the Fourth Gospel by adducing those passages which seem to imply dualism, and especially by laying stress on the Evangelist's characteristic contrast of light and darkness. He has sought to read into such contrasts the Gnostic separation of men into pneumatic and psychic (or sarkic).[1] What, then, is the dualism implied in the Evangelist's teaching? Is it physical or metaphysical or ethical?

The dualism is not physical. Flesh and spirit are often contrasted. but the contrast is not that between opposed principles like good and evil; it is merely that between natural and spiritual, lower and higher. That is clearly the teaching of our Lord's conversation with Nicodemus, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh: and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (iii. 6). The two orders, natural and spiritual, are not opposed; they represent different levels. The "flesh" may be the organ of sin, but is not inherently sinful.[2]

Nor is the Evangelist's dualism metaphysical. It is not inherent in the constitution of the universe. The contrast of light and darkness is not that of eternal principles grounded in the make and order

[1] *Vide* "The Johannine Writings," pp. 158–166, and "Encycl. Biblica," art. "John the Son of Zebedee."

[2] A full discussion of this in Stevens, *op. cit.* p. 127 *sqq.* Schmiedel's comment on this passage should be noted, "The Johannine Writings," p. 160.

of the world. This is clearly shown by the place which the *free volition* of man is assigned in this conflict. Man is free to choose either light or darkness. Thus we read, "And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil. For every one that doeth ill hateth the light, and cometh not to the light lest his works should be reproved. But he that doeth the truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, that they have been wrought in God" (iii. 19–21). Again, in the Prologue we read, "He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not" (i. 10, 11). This may be regarded as a paraphrase or a more concrete expression of v. 5, "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness apprehended (or overcame) it not." These passages will show how largely the element of moral choice entered into the Evangelist's conceptions of good and evil.

It is quite clear that *the Evangelist's dualism is not metaphysical, but ethical.* The separation of the world from God is not the result of any inherent law of the universe, but the result of sin, the moral choice of human free will. The divine order of the universe is that in which the Logos-life and the Logos-light should everywhere be present and potent. But it is in the power of man's free will, as we shall see in vv. 10, 11, to violate and oppose this divine order. The activity of the Logos is thwarted, though it is not defeated, by the sinfulness and selfishness of man. Sin is a deliberate shutting out of the Logos-light, and a remaining in the darkness and isolation of self.

As to the translation of *κατέλαβεν*, it is difficult to decide. Either 'apprehended' or 'overcame' makes good sense. The former is perhaps the better, especially if we may suppose that v. 5 is repeated in

an amplified form in vv. 10, 11, as has been suggested above. "Overtook" is another translation which has been proposed (cf. xii. 35).

The Evangelist then proceeds to give a *specific instance of the shining of the Logos-light* in the world, namely, the light of prophecy as it revealed itself in the last and greatest of the Hebrew prophets—John the Baptist. The Baptist is set in contrast to the Word, whose messenger he was. The Baptist was "a man" (ἄνθρωπος). The Word was "God." The Baptist was born, came into being (ἐγένετο). The Word "was," (ἦν), already existed at the beginning of time. The Baptist was *a* light, but not *the* Light; he was only a satellite revolving round a greater luminary.

In v. 9, Westcott's rendering is the most satisfactory, since it gives ἦν and ἐρχόμενον their full separate force and does not regard them as a mere periphrasis for an imperfect tense. "There was the Light, the true Light which lighteth every man; that Light was, and yet more, that Light was coming into the world" —a coming, and yet a permanent being.

In v. 9, two facts are stated concerning the Light: 1st, its absolute truth, 2nd, its universality.

As to the first of these two attributes, the Evangelist in describing the Light as the *true* Light is thinking not so much of the contrast of truth and falsehood, as of that of partiality and perfection, type and fulfilment. The true Light is not opposed to other lights. He gathers up, fulfils, and concentrates in Himself all the broken lights which have been shining at sundry times and in divers manners. They were transitory, partial, inadequate. But this Light is perfect and eternal. The Baptist was one of these partial and transitory lights. He was a "burning and a shining lamp" (v. 35), but he was not the true Light. A fine illustration of the relation of the true Light to the fading lights of the world is to be found in a striking passage of the Gospel (viii. 12)

where our Lord speaks of Himself as the Light of the world. The occasion was the Feast of Tabernacles. In the Court of the Women, where our Lord was speaking, the great golden candelabra were lighted on the first night of the feast, possibly also on the other nights. These lights were emblems of that pillar of light which had led the children of Israel through the wilderness. They were a memorial of the nation's history; they recalled the most critical period in the nation's past, when Israel was delivered out of the darkness and bondage of Egypt. These same lights might in another aspect be regarded as an image of the Divine revelation which had been vouchsafed to Israel as a nation. And as the great lights shone through the dusk of the temple-courts,[1] they might well be taken to symbolise what Israel's religion had done and what it had failed to do. Its light had illuminated one sacred spot; but this had served to intensify rather than dispel the surrounding darkness. Christ recognised the function of Israel's light; but the time had come to remove its limitations. There had now come "a Light to lighten the Gentiles." Just as a candle is useless when the sun arises, so Christ, thinking of those golden candelabra in the women's court, the image of a national and exclusive revelation, could say, "I am THE LIGHT, not *a* light; and I am the Light, not of one nation, but of the world." The national lights had their temporary function to fulfil, but they were lights that failed. This striking passage in our Lord's discourse may have inspired the Evangelist's language in the Prologue; and in any case it certainly forms a fine comment on the "true Light" and its relation to the fragmentary lights which have from time to time glimmered upon the pathway of the race.

[1] Many scholars think that, on the last evening of the feast, the evening of Christ's discourse, these lamps were not lighted. If this was so, it would add point to our Lord's saying. The empty candelabra were thus unconscious prophets of the passing of Israel's dispensation.

The second attribute of the Light is *universality*. Here again we see the splendid comprehensiveness of the Evangelist's conceptions. "The Light, which lighteth every man, coming into the world." It was such a noble thought as this that inspired Clement of Alexandria to assert that Greek philosophy was a divine preparation for the Gospel, fulfilling for the Greeks the same function as the Law had fulfilled for the Jews. With such a view of the operation of the Logos-light in all men, it is not difficult to rise to the fine conception of the *anima naturaliter Christiana*. The Evangelist's words concerning the universal light of the Logos find an echo in the description of the Divine Wisdom which "in all ages entering into holy souls, maketh them friends of God and prophets" (Wisd. vii. 27). The Gospel is the fulfilment of all the best and noblest aspirations and achievements that have ever inspired and uplifted humanity.

"Every man." Not all men in the mass, but every individual receives his own share of the Logos-light.

"Lighteth." It is a present, a perpetual fact. The Baptist, a transitory light, *arose* once on a time (ἐγένετο) and then passed away. The true Light is eternal, and is for ever illumining the souls of men.

The course of the argument after verse 9 is thus summed up by Westcott: "Verse 9 . . . presents a comprehensive view of the action of the Light. This action is now divided into two parts. The first part (verse 10) gathers up the facts and issues of the manifestation of the Light as immanent. The second part (verse 11) contains an account of the special personal manifestation of the Light to a chosen race. The two parts are contrasted throughout as to mode (was, came), the scene (the world, His own home), the recipients (the world, His own people) the end (not know, not receive) of the manifestation. The world failed to recognise Him who was doubly shown as its Creator and Preserver. The people of God failed to welcome Him whom they had been prepared to receive." From

verse 10 the argument runs in a minor key. A shadow falls across the glory. An element of tragedy enters into the story of God and man. A new fact now emerges, the will of man obstructing the activity of the Logos.

"He was (ἦν) in the world" (verse 10). He did not *enter* into the world at a particular point in its history. He was already there from the beginning. His continuous activity, His universal immanence was revealed not merely in His historical advent, which is not the only thought here, but in history, in nature, in all ages and in all places. "The world" is the "sum of created being." But in spite of the universality and the activity of this Divine Logos, the world which He had made, which he sustained and illumined—the world did not know, or rather did not recognise, the source from which its life and light were streaming forth. The tragic failure to recognise the presence of the Divine in the world does not apply exclusively to the Incarnation: that was only the culminating instance of an ignorance of the Divine, which is apparent throughout history. Men have been always failing to recognise the Logos when He comes in His manifold revelations to the world. The clauses seem to rise to a tragic climax. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him—and the world knew Him not. The Logos had given man the best opportunities to recognise Him. In ever-narrowing circles of growing intensity, He comes nearer and nearer. He does not rest in His absolute and transcendent being, apart from the world (In the beginning was the Word); He is in living contact with the world (He was in the world); finally He comes to His own home and to those whom He had prepared by the light of conscience and of prophecy to receive Him, and they received Him not.

"He came (ἦλθε) unto His own." Does this refer to the Incarnation? Westcott thinks so; and the aorist seems to suggest it. But there is no need to limit the reference to the Incarnation. That was

indeed the final coming to His own, and the crowning instance of His rejection. Some are inclined to think that the Evangelist is still speaking in generalisations, and that there is no explicit reference to the Incarnation till it comes with almost dramatic suddenness in verse 14. Certainly the wider reference must have been in the Evangelist's mind. He is one of those who regard historical events as merely illustrations of eternal facts. Thus, in something like the Platonic mode of thought, the larger background is constantly behind the shifting scenes of history. The rejection of the Logos is still happening; even yet His own know Him not and receive Him not. We need not, therefore, try to draw any sharp line in the Prologue, at which we are to think that reference to the Incarnation is first made; the eternal and the historic cannot be separated in the Evangelist's thought.

"His own received (παρέλαβον) Him not." The force of the preposition παρά in the verb is to bring out the idea of receiving something which had been handed down from bygone generations.[1] Even their own *tradition* rightly interpreted might have prepared the Jews to receive Christ.

"But as many as received Him to them gave He the right (ἐξουσίαν) to become children of God" (verse 12). In verses 12 and 13 the writer brings out the twofold nature, the human and the divine aspects of faith; it is a co-operation of wills. "As far as we can conceive of this 'right to become children,' it lies in the potential union with the Son, whereby those who receive Him are enabled to realise their divine fellowship. They are adopted —placed, if we may so speak, in the position of sons—that they may become children actually. . . . The fruit is not given at once, but the seed. It is of God to give, but man must use His gift, which faith appropriates. It is thus important to observe how,

[1] *Vide* Westcott *in loco.*

throughout the passage, the divine and human sides of the realisation of Sonship are harmoniously united. The initial act is at once a 'begetting' (ἐγεννήθησαν), and a 'reception' (ἔλαβον). The growth follows from the use of a gift. The issue is complete on the part of God, but man must bring it to pass by continuous exertion (γενέσθαι τέκνα, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν)" (Westcott). Thus the Logos does not supersede human personality, but combines with it; and in so doing transforms it. Yet while man co-operates with the Logos in realising this Divine Sonship, its source and origin are in God alone. It is, as verse 13 tells us, no mere natural process; it is a supernatural birth from above—"which were born (or begotten) not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."[1]

The last section of the Prologue (verses 14–18), according to some commentators, introduces nothing which is not implied already. But whether or not we are to see an allusion to the Incarnation in the earlier part of the Prologue (verse 11), at any rate this bold categorical statement, "And the Word became flesh," comes with the effect of a new revelation. If a Greek philosopher or a Jewish Rabbi could have walked thus far with the Evangelist, here they must certainly have come to the parting of the ways. The Incarnation of the Divine Logos in a historical person, Jesus Christ—this was the essential divergence of Christianity from Hellenism and Judaism. From the standpoint of contemporary philosophy and religion this was a revolutionary doctrine; it was a union of eternal incompatibles. This is the distinctive Gospel which the Evangelist has to proclaim. This new Gospel is not that the Logos is immanent, but that the Logos is incarnate. "The Word became

[1] On this idea of the Divine begetting of the believer, *cf.* 1 John iii. 9; iv. 7; v. 1, 4, 18. S. John loves to dwell on this thought of the implantation of a new life. We find the same thought of a Divine begetting in S. Peter (1 Pet. i. 3, 23) and in S. James (i. 18).

flesh" is, indeed, the most concise statement ever made of the essence of Christianity.

"*And* the Word"—the copulative seems to connect this verse with verse 1. What has intervened is in the nature of a parenthesis. Thus the train of thought is—"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God . . . and the Word became flesh." Westcott points out the parallelism between verses 1 and 14. (*a*) "He was God;" "He became flesh." Thus the Divine and the Human are united in Him. (*b*) "He was with God;" "He tabernacled among us." Heaven and earth are thus set side by side. The Logos dwells in both. (*c*) He "was in the beginning;" "we beheld His glory." He who "was" before all worlds is revealed at a point in history to the eyes of men. Eternity is thus revealed in time.

"The Word became flesh" (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο). This is the greatest synthesis of which man can conceive. God and man, the finite and the infinite, are made one. In the use of ἐγένετο, "became," there may be traced a parallelism with verse 3, just as we saw a similar parallelism between verses 1 and 14. "All things came into being (ἐγένετο) through the Word" (verse 3), and then He Himself "became (ἐγένετο) flesh." Thus the first and the second creations alike centre in Him. As Westcott puts it, "By His own will He 'became' that which first 'became' through and in Him." In this connection of Creation with Incarnation one may see a hint of that noble thought which we find in S. Paul, and which was afterwards developed by Irenaeus, namely, that the Incarnation was no mere expedient to recover a fallen humanity, but that in the Divine plan Incarnation was simply the consummation of creation.

As to the exact force of ἐγένετο, it is clear that in the light of the Evangelist's whole teaching it cannot be held to mean that the Logos *became* flesh, in such a way that by becoming human He ceased to be divine.

"Flesh" (σάρξ) is a very comprehensive term. It here denotes human nature as a whole, and not a human body (σῶμα) merely. The Apollinarians, misinterpreting this statement, tried to prove from it that the Logos assumed only a human body, but not a rational human soul. Flesh here denotes man regarded under his present earthly limitations, and having respect particularly to human infirmity and mortality. "In this respect 'flesh' expresses here human nature as a whole, regarded under the aspect of its present corporeal embodiment, including of necessity the 'soul' (xii. 27) and the 'spirit' (xi. 33, xiii. 21) as belonging to the totality of man" (Westcott). Some of the Fathers take the statement to signify the ultimate union of the spiritual and the material—the Word becoming flesh. This is certainly one of the many inferences which may be drawn from the great synthesis.

Beyschlag objects to the traditional interpretation of this verse. His views are best put in his own words. "Apart from the fact that this proposition only appears in verse 14, while mention is made of the historical Christ in verse 9, it does not really contain the incarnation which orthodox expositors seek in it. The conception σάρξ, that is, the sensuous living substance, cannot possibly represent here the concept man where the point is that the historical personality of Jesus reached its climax in the human πνεῦμα. But even a proposition partially expressing the orthodox idea, 'He took upon Him a sensuous nature,' is not here; ἐγένετο does not mean *assumpsit*, but *exstitit*, *factus est*. The only idea which the words, when pressed in the interests of dogmatism, can yield, that the personal Logos transformed Himself into flesh, into sensuous substance, is simply absurd, even in the sense of the Evangelist himself, for 'it is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing' (vi. 63). We must accommodate ourselves to the absolutely undogmatic, unscholastic, and popular mode of expression of the

Evangelist which here reveals the fisherman of the Sea of Galilee. What he means to say is simply this: the eternal self-revelation of God became [in Jesus] an object of sensuous perception, so that we disciples could see it with our eyes and handle it with our hands. There is no mention here of an 'incarnation' or 'kenosis;' these ideas are imported into the text."[1]

Beyschlag's view of the Logos-theology will be dealt with later on. But with regard to his rendering of the sentence in question, it may be pointed out that, so far as the language is concerned, the sentence does not imply, in the author's usage, any transubstantiation of λόγος into σάρξ, so that the λόγος ceases to exist.[2] An interesting parallel may be found in ii. 9, where a precisely similar expression is used to describe "the water which had become wine." "As the water took up elements which were not previously in it, so the eternal Logos took up human nature into Himself; and this is enough for the humiliation of the Infinite Love."[3]

"And dwelt (or 'tabernacled') among us." The word "tabernacled" (ἐσκήνωσεν), though it strictly describes a temporary habitation, is here rather intended to convey the idea that the Logos was actually and visibly present on the earth; it was no mere vision or evanescent theophany. There is also a suggestion in the word which connects the Personal Presence of the Logos in the Incarnation with the Presence in the Tabernacle in the olden days. This is one of the many instances in this Gospel where a Christian event is set in the light of a Jewish background. It has been said, and not without a good deal of truth,

[1] Beyschlag, *op. cit.* II. p. 424. (E. T.)

[2] The meaning may be illustrated from 1 John iv. 2, "Jesus Christ is come *in the flesh*" not "into flesh;" in other words, as the next clause in the Prologue indicates, the Logos was not transformed into flesh, but tabernacled in, or was clothed, with flesh," *vide* Schmiedel, "The Johannine Writings," p. 152.

[3] Reynolds, Hastings' Dictionary, art, "Gospel of S. John."

that though the author is (in his First Epistle) vehemently anti-docetic, yet the words ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν express his general conception of the life of the God-man better than do the words σὰρξ ἐγένετο. Yet there is a wonderful blending of the human and the divine in this Gospel. The same Divine Word which was in the beginning with God is the same who was weary at the well, who wept at the grave of Lazarus. Still, on the whole, the λόγος predominates over the σάρξ in this Evangelist's presentation of the life of Christ.

"We beheld His glory." This is the true starting-point of the Evangelist's theology. He builds on a personal witness and impression of the historical life of Christ. This personal knowledge of the Lord as He lived among men, is the fundamental fact; the Logos-theology is only an after-thought and a deduction. It is essential to note that it is from definite historical facts that the Evangelist sets out, and not from any *à priori* metaphysical ideas about the being of God or the Divine Logos.

In the term "only-begotten" (μονογενής) as applied to the Logos we have a new aspect of the Evangelist's doctrine brought before us. The word μονογενής means rather *unicus* than *unigenitus*; not so much "only-begotten" as "unique," "the only one of its kind." The emphasis is on the μονο- rather than on the γενής. Thus in the Epistle of Clement of Rome[1] the word is applied to the Phœnix, that mythical bird which was supposed to be the only one of its kind; there could never be more than one Phœnix at a time.

[1] *Vide* Lightfoot on Clement of Rome, Ad Cor., i. 25'; and Rashdall, "Doctrine and Development," p. 77. The word is used in the sense of "only" in various places. *E.g.* it is used of the widow's son (Luke vii. 12); Jairus' daughter (viii. 42); the demoniac boy (ix. 38); Isaac (Heb. xi. 17). Schmiedel ("Johannine Writings," p. 153), is of opinion that the second part of the phrase "only-begotten" is meant to be emphasized as well as the first. "Since, in John's Gospel, by the side of Jesus as the Son of God, there appear very many children of God among men, the second part of the expression acquires a special sense: Jesus is the only Son of God Who was begotten by Him; all others have been produced by Him in another way."

Thus when the Evangelist applies the term to Christ, he means that Christ is the "Son of God" in a sense in which the term can be applied to no other. Christ is the "unique" Son of God: His sonship does not differ from the divine sonship of all men in degree, but in kind. The term "only-begotten" may be regarded as complementary to the idea of the Logos. The Logos might in itself stand for nothing more than a diffused impersonal essence, dwelling in all men as in Christ. But the phrase "only-begotten" gives a personal and a unique character to the Logos incarnate in Jesus Christ. Thus "Logos" and "only-begotten" are terms explanatory of one another.

"Full of grace and truth." Grace suggests the idea of God revealed as Love (1 John iv. 8, 16), truth gives the notion of God revealed as Light (1 John i. 5). The words taken together imply that both redemption and revelation come through Jesus Christ.

In verse 16, we meet the term "fulness" (πλήρωμα), which, like the λόγος, is an echo from the schools of Greek philosophy. The term became better known later in the speculations of the Gnostics. It occurs only once in the Fourth Gospel, but it is used five times in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians.[1] The word used in reference to Jesus Christ means that in Him was concentrated the totality of the Divine power and attributes.

In verse 17 we meet with the title Jesus Christ for the first time. Now that He is described as having entered upon a human life on earth the absolute title "Logos" gives place to the historical term Jesus Christ, and under these conditions it is not surprising that the "Logos" as a title does not recur in the narrative of the earthly life of the Son of God.

Verse 18 brings the Prologue to a conclusion, and gathers up the meaning of the Incarnation into a

[1] Eph. i. 23; iii. 19; iv. 13; Col. i. 19; ii. 9.

comprehensive summary: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." God in His absolute Being cannot become a direct object to the sensuous or cognitive faculties of man. Such knowledge is too great for us; since God transcends our thought-forms of time and space. Yet God has revealed Himself in a manner that is quite within the reach of human comprehension. The knowledge of God is communicated through the only-begotten Son who, being at once God and Man, bridges the gulf between time and eternity and reveals the Absolute in a form fitted to the limitations of human thought.

"No man hath seen God" (*Θεόν*, not *τὸν Θεόν*). Attention is directed rather to the Divine nature than to the Divine Person. No man has seen God as God.

"The only-begotten Son" (*ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*). A strongly attested reading is "God, only begotten" (*μονογενὴς Θεός*). But the difference of reading makes no radical change in the general sense.[1] The familiar text seems to the present writer to be on the whole the more likely one.

"Who is in the bosom of the Father." This relationship implies "a state rather than a place" (Westcott). The Greek *ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον* has a special force. The preposition *εἰς* suggests here the idea of movement in the eternal relationship of the divine persons; there is a union of rest and motion. The current of the Son's life is set towards the Father; there is an active living relation which is eternally being realised. The phrase finds an apt parallel in the pregnant meaning of *ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* in verse 1. Some writers take the words "who is in the bosom of the Father" as spoken from the standpoint of the Evangelist at the time of writing, and the words are therefore thought to refer to the present *exaltation* of Jesus (so Meyer and Weiss). But as Stevens rightly argues, the whole point of

[1] *Vide* note at end of this chapter.

the verse is to "show how the Son is fitted to reveal God to mankind, and it is His essential and eternal relation to the Father that would constitute the ground of that fitness." [1] It is this eternal and supra-temporal relationship to the Father, more especially in its pre-incarnate aspect, which qualifies Him to declare or interpret the Father in the Incarnation.

"Of the Father." Westcott brings out the significance of this title as used here. It is to indicate the limitations of the revelation made through Christ. This revelation was not of the totality of the Divine Being; it was of *one aspect* of Godhead, namely, God as the Father. "In this connexion the description of the relation of the Word to God (verse 1, ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν) is seen to be complementary to that of the relation of the Son to the Father. The one marks an absolute relation in the Godhead. The other a relation apprehended in regard to creation. Hence in the latter the form of expression is borrowed from human affection."

"He declared (ἐξηγήσατο) Him." The Greek word was one constantly used in reference to the revelation of Divine mysteries. The function of the ἐξηγητής, or Interpreter, was one with which the Greek world was quite familiar, and possibly this fact may have suggested the use of this significant word here.

Summary of the Prologue.—The teaching of the Prologue may now be summarised:—

The Logos possesses the attributes of eternity, personality, deity. He is the Divine agent of creation. All things—not even gross matter being excluded—were made by Him. He is the Source of Life, the principle of all movement spiritual and physical; the germ of all vitality; the Logos is the "driving force" of the universe. But this Life that is in the Logos is not merely Force—blind movement. It

[1] Stevens' "Johannine Theology," p. 90.

is also, in another aspect, Light. The Logos dwelling in man makes him rational, self-determining, self-conscious. "The Life was the Light of men." It is the essential nature of the Logos-light to diffuse itself, and to shine everywhere throughout the cosmos. But this tendency of the Logos-light is resisted by another power—that of sin, isolation, stagnation, or darkness. This darkness, which obstructs the Logos, emanates from the self-will of man. Yet the Light of the Logos sends glimmerings and flashes through the darkness; and the darkness cannot overwhelm and engulf the Light. From time to time the Light has sent out more vivid rays in the lives of holy men. Prophetic voices have reinforced the inner light of the human soul. A representative of such prophetic light was John the Baptist. He was not *the* Light; but such illuminations as his were heralds of sunrise, reflections of the Perfect Light which had not yet appeared in full lustre above the horizon. This Perfect Light, though it had not yet risen in the personal life of Jesus Christ, had been ever from the beginning secretly illuminating the minds of men. Every man had his gleam; no conscience was unvisited by this Heavenly Light. But the world did not recognise the Light and whence it flowed. It was misunderstood, ignored, quenched. Age after age He came to His own. His Light shone through vision, and through holy lives. He came to His own, those who were prepared by conscience, providence, and prophecy; and His own received Him not, and still receive Him not. He was *and is* despised and rejected. The few that did receive Him were given the right to become sons of God. But man's rejection of the Logos-light has not changed the eternal purpose of God, nor exhausted the resources of the Divine Love. Thus, in the fulness of time the Sun no longer shone through refracting media, but appeared with undimmed glory in the zenith of history. The Word became flesh. Men beheld the glory and recognised it as of the

Only-begotten, full of grace and truth. The Logos no longer came into contact with human nature merely through indirect and impersonal channels. Revelation becomes personal. The Word becomes flesh. The Creator becomes part of His own creation. The Logos is visibly manifested and embodied in a historical person, Jesus Christ. He is the fulfiller of all the divine preparation in human history. In Him all the scattered gleams are focussed. The law, represented by Moses; prophecy, represented by the Baptist—these disappear before the Incarnate Logos as candle-lights before the rising sun. The Logos, moreover, reveals the character of the Supreme God. God, in Himself, is invisible and inscrutable; but the Only-begotten, appearing in space and time, under the conditions of human life, and yet still in the bosom of the Father, never abandoning that eternal relationship, He who is at once Divine and human, at once in the bosom of the Father and tabernacling among men, He declares God.

In connection with the exposition of the Prologue, it only remains to point out *the method* by which *the argument has proceeded.* It has already been shown how the Evangelist starts with his highest generalisation and works down into concrete facts. Thus, unlike the other Evangelists, he does not begin by describing the human birth of Jesus; he does not start by saying, "Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise." He begins with the eternal nature of the Logos; and all the rest seems to unfold itself from His inner and essential being. Once granted the essential nature of the Logos, each fresh step seems to be but the natural development of a process implicit in the Logos from the first. At the same time, it is most vital to a right appreciation of the Evangelist's position, to point out that, while his argument starts from the highest point and descends into the field of actual observation and

experience, the original progress of his own thought was exactly the opposite way, starting out from a personal observation of the historical Jesus and finally arriving at the grand inference that this Jesus Christ was the Incarnate Logos. Thus the argument of the Prologue commences with "In the beginning was the Word;" the history of the Evangelist's own thought starts with "*We beheld* His glory."

The First Epistle of S. John, i. 1, 2:—

"That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life (and the life was manifested, and we have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us)."

It has been a much-disputed question whether we are to find in the opening verses of the First Epistle of S. John a contribution to the distinctive Logos-theology. It must, however, be admitted that even if this question be answered in the affirmative, the passage will not *add any new* element to the doctrine set forth in the Prologue of the Gospel. Still, it cannot fail to be of interest and value in a study of the Logos-doctrine.

The character and purpose of the Epistle forbid us to look in it for the doctrinal precision which so eminently marks the Prologue of the Gospel. Both Gospel and Epistle are, indeed, preceded by what one may regard as a stately overture. The first four verses form a Prologue to the Epistle, just as the first eighteen verses fulfil a similar function for the Gospel. The two passages open in somewhat the same manner. "In each the main subject is described first (John i. 1–5; I John i. 1); then the historical manifestation of it (John i. 6–13; 1 John i. 2); then its personal apprehension (John i. 14–18; 1 John i. 3 f.)." (Westcott.)

Yet the two passages exhibit a contrast as well as a similarity. From their respective prologues we can see that the Gospel deals more with doctrine, the Epistle more with conduct ; the Gospel presents rather the person of Christ, the Epistle the Life which flows out from that person.

For a student of the Logos-doctrine, the main question which must here be discussed is whether the subject of these opening verses of the Epistle is *a person* or *a thing*. It may be taken for granted that the subject of the relative clauses is the same that is alluded to in the summarising expression περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς (v. 2). Westcott accepts the impersonal rendering of the passage, and holds that the Word of Life means here simply *the message or revelation of life*. In favour of this is the fourfold neuter ὅ ; also the fact that in the other passages where ὁ λόγος is personal (John i. 1, 14), the term is used absolutely (Rev. xix. 13 is, however, an exception to this). To these reasons may be added the fact of the use of such expressions as ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ in John x. 35 and in other passages, where the meaning is clearly impersonal. In support of the personal interpretation there are many arguments. There is the use of the phrase ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ in Rev. xix. 13, where the meaning is clearly personal ; there is the probability that λόγος has the same meaning here as in the Prologue to the Gospel, of which this introduction seems to be an echo. Again, the verbs "heard," "seen with our eyes," "beheld," "handled" —these seem certainly to refer to the historic life of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word. Again, περί (in περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς) is generally used of testimony concerning *persons*.[1]

The most satisfactory exposition of this passage and its difficulties is that given by Haupt,[2] whose

[1] *Vide* Plummer, Epistles of S. John, Cambridge Greek Testament, *in loco*.

[2] Haupt, First Epistle of S. John.

exegesis is, indeed, always profound and searching. He holds a view which reconciles the personal and the impersonal interpretation of the passage. In dealing with the question why it is, if a person is referred to, we yet have the neuter ὅ, Haupt suggests that we shall find the true answer when we seek for the solution of another and an easier question, namely, why does not the writer, in summing up the object of his announcement, use the simple accusative τὸν λόγον τῆς ζωῆς ἀπαγγέλλομεν, instead of the indirect expression περὶ τοῦ λόγου κ.τ.λ. The two modes of expression are by no means equivalent. The reason for the writer's preference for the indirect rather than the direct form of speech is to be found in the fact that the subject of the Epistle is not, like the subject of the Gospel, simply the person of the Logos *per se*. The theme of the Epistle is *not the person regarded in itself, but rather in its effects*, in the life-giving influences which flow out from it. It is for this reason that the writer announces his purpose of declaring not directly τὸν λόγον, but rather περὶ τοῦ λόγου, things pertaining to the Logos.

If we keep this point of view clearly before us, we shall be able to see the true meaning of the composite expression, "the Word of Life." The idea of "Life" is the dominant thought in this phrase, as we can see from the fact that it is the "Life" rather than the Word, which is carried on into verse 2, and "Life," indeed, forms the main theme of the whole Epistle. The exact meaning of the phrase will depend on the precise force we give to the genitive τῆς ζωῆς. Some (*e.g.* Plummer) prefer to regard the genitive as virtually one of apposition—"the Word *which is* the Life." This view, they think, is confirmed by verse 2, where ζωή is taken to be a directly personal name for the Christ. This view finds most favour with those who regard the subject of the passage as definitely and directly personal. But a much more satisfactory rendering will be obtained if we compare the phrase

with such Johannine expressions as ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς (John vi.) and φῶς τῆς ζωῆς (viii. 12). The force of these expressions lies in the fact that the bread and the light are not merely living in themselves; they are also *life-giving*. The same interpretation will apply excellently to the "Word of Life"; it is the *life-giving power* of the Logos that is being accentuated here and throughout the Epistle. "Thus, when the Apostle says that he would make his record περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς, he indicates, by means of the genitive, that element on account of which he speaks generally of the Logos—that is, of the Logos in as far as He is life, and, according to what follows, life become manifest and communicable. Thus, while it is the Logos which certainly is present to his view, it is not the Person in Himself, and as such, that is the matter of this announcement; not His acts nor His process, but only that quality in Him which is life—life in His person and flowing from it. Fundamentally, therefore, it is a *quid*, and not a *quis* of which the apostle would speak; hence he is justified in saying that he declares not τόν λόγον, but more generally περὶ τοῦ λόγου, and he is right in defining the object of his announcement not as masculine but as neuter." [1]

This conclusion seems to do justice to all the elements of the case. But in forming an opinion it is well to keep in mind the dominant characteristics of the writer. Words must not be tied down too strictly; in the Johannine mode of thought every particular is constantly merging in a larger background. Words are used as symbols to suggest rather than to define; so we must beware of importing an over-precision into the Apostle's language. In the passage before us we have undoubtedly *an interfusion of person and thing;* there is no need to apply an over-subtle analysis, which would be quite

[1] Haupt, p. 6 (E.T.)

alien to the apostle's mode of thought. It is the personal Logos that the writer has in his mind, yet the Logos regarded *not as a person*, but considered rather under one of the great constitutive attributes of His personality. This broad interpretation will be found the most satisfactory rendering of the passage.

"And the life was manifested." It is not the Logos that is taken up and carried on, but the more dominant theme, the Life. Here again the question occurs, how far ἡ ζωή is to be regarded as personal. Plummer takes it to be simply a title for the personal Christ, as in John xiv. 6. "I am the Way and the Truth and the *Life*." The personal rendering might also seem to be suggested by the clause which follows, "the eternal life which was with the Father" (ἥν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα). Westcott takes the impersonal view, "Looking to Him we see under the conditions of present human being the *embodied ideal of life* which is fellowship with God and with man in God." Here, again, it is possible to combine the divergent interpretations. The ζωή is not simply a personal name for the Logos; "it is rather that quality or characteristic of the Logos which the writer would by means of his Epistle implant in us. The ζωή is a potency constituting the personality, but not the person himself" (Haupt). The Gospel naturally began with ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο for it treats directly of the person of the Logos; the Epistle begins with ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη, since it deals not so much with the person as with the life-giving influences which flow from the person. It has been pointed out by several commentators how much would be lost if the predicates were transferred in these two statements. To say, "The Word *was manifested*" would not declare the full reality of the Incarnation; while to say, "the Life became flesh" would be "to circumscribe the manifoldness of the operations of life" (Westcott).

The passage in the beginning of the Epistle does not, as has been already said, add much to the Logos-doctrine which has been set forth in the Gospel. It shows, however, the close association of Logos with Life, and thus enlarges on the brief statement in the Gospel, "in Him was Life."

Apocalypse XIX. 13. "His name is called the Word of God" (*καὶ κέκληται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*).

Only a brief mention need be made of the passage in the Apocalypse (XIX. 13), in which Christ is described as the "Word of God." This is probably the earliest instance in the New Testament of the *personal* use of the title "The Word of God." "The relative use of the term would naturally precede the absolute, and the relation of the Word to God would be the first to present itself."[1] The title has a Jewish ancestry, and it occurs frequently in the Old Testament to describe prophetic utterance. The idea gradually grew up that the revelation of God had in these last days been embodied in a Divine Incarnate Person, who was the final "Word of God." It is impossible to say how far a passage like this is an anticipation of the Logos-doctrine of the Fourth Gospel; at any rate, the application of the title to the personal Christ throws an interesting light on the development of the Logos-conception. It has been thought that this passage is a reminiscence of the Alexandrine Book of Wisdom, xviii. 15, "Thine Almighty Word (*ὁ παντοδύναμός σου λόγος*) leaped down from heaven out of thy royal throne, as a fierce man of war into the midst of a land of destruction, and brought thine unfeigned commandment as a sharp sword."

This passage may thus be a link connecting the

[1] Swete, "Apocalypse" (1907), p. 252.

Word of the Old Testament with the Logos of the Fourth Gospel.[1]

NOTE

On the reading of S. John i. 18.

The readings *μονογενὴς Θεός* and *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός* are pretty evenly balanced. A full discussion of the evidence on both sides is given in one of Dr. Ezra Abbot's "Critical Essays" (p. 241). Dr. Abbot pronounces in favour of *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*; Westcott and Hort prefer *μονογενὴς Θεός*. The external testimony is in favour of the latter, but internal probability seems to point more clearly to the former. The expression "God only-begotten" is without parallel elsewhere, and the fact that the Logos is called *Θεός* in verse 1 may possibly account for the copyists' change of *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός* into *μονογενὴς Θεός*. It is difficult to decide, but the familiar reading seems to the present writer the more likely one.

[1] The Logos in the Apocalypse will form no such connecting link if Schmiedel's view of the passage (*vide* "Encycl. Biblica," art. "John, son of Zebedee") be accepted. "Scholars," he says, "ought long ago to have perceived that Apoc. xix. 13*b* ('His name is called the Word of God') is a gloss. Immediately before we are told (xix. 12) that no one knoweth His name but He Himself. How could the author proceed immediately to give His name? But nothing could have been more natural than that a reader who believed himself to be in possession of the name (possibly from the Fourth Gospel) should have written the answer to the riddle in the margin; the next copyist took it for an integral part of the text that had been accidentally omitted, and accordingly inserted it." This theory of Schmiedel's is quite gratuitous. If we are simply to cut out passages for no other reason than that we think them illogical or inconsistent, it is hard to say where we shall end, and surely the laws of logic must not be pressed too closely in the Apocalypse. Besides, from a textual point of view, the inconsistency of the verse with the one that precedes it makes rather a presumption in favour of its being genuine.

CHAPTER II

THE RITSCHLIAN VIEW OF THE LOGOS-DOCTRINE

THE exposition of the Logos-doctrine which has been adopted throughout these pages is more or less in keeping with the traditional view; it is that which seems best to cover the whole facts of the case. A different interpretation of the Logos and its significance has been adopted by writers of the Ritschlian trend of thought; and of these Beyschlag may be taken as a fair representative. His view has been very forcibly put forward in his "New Testament Theology."[1] According to this theologian and his school, the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is not a person nor was the term ever intended to denote a person. It simply denotes a pre-existent principle of revelation, a pre-temporal impulse in God to reveal Himself in a person. *The Logos is thus not a person but a principle.*

Beyschlag's view may be summarised in its main features. He holds that S. John employed one of the many forms in which the conception of a hypostatised principle of divine revelation is to be found in the Old Testament Hagiographa, Apocrypha, and Targums. Just as Philo found the idea a useful one to employ in its Hellenised form, so in like manner, but not under the direct influence of Philo, the Evangelist also took it from the common tradition

[1] *Vide*, vol. ii. 414 *sqq.* (E. T.). Wendt also belongs, to a great extent, to this theological school, *vide* Wendt, "Teaching of Jesus" (E. T.), vol. ii. 169 *sqq.* Harnack is also very much of this way of thinking, *vide* "Hist. of Dogma," i. 102, 318 *sqq.*

of Jewish theology in a much more informal way and for a very different purpose. To the Evangelist's mind this current theological idea of a self-revelation of God seemed to have a certain affinity with the historical personality of Jesus Christ ; the person and the principle attracted one another.[1] The Evangelist determined to connect them definitely. So he linked the Logos-idea to Jesus Christ, and thus gave to a historical person a supra-historical and a cosmic significance. It was the same divine Thought of Love which at the beginning issued in the creation of the world and which now again manifested itself in Jesus Christ, and through Him poured its fulness over the world. "It was the same eternal light of God's revelation which sends a ray of light into every human heart by nature, and which finally arose in Christ as the Sun in the heaven of history in order to kindle what was only a spark into a strong light in the soul and thus overcome the indwelling darkness."

Beyschlag goes on to affirm that the Logos-conception is not the basis of the Evangelist's Christology. This is to be found in his ἐθεασάμεθα, his personal impression of the human and historical Jesus. The Logos is a "help which he takes from the theology of his time to interpret that personal impression for his own thought and that of his contemporaries."[2] The Evangelist does not overrate the value of this formula which he borrowed merely for his convenience. Though he begins his Gospel with the Logos-conception, it is not an integral part of the structure, and at the close of the Gospel he states that his real purpose is to show that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.

Again, when the Evangelist is thinking of Jesus as the personal embodiment of the eternal self-revelation of God, he can express his meaning equally well by the *impersonal neuter*, as in ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (1 John i. 1). The idea of the Logos is so elastic a conception

[1] *Op. cit.*, II. p. 423 (E. T.). [2] *Op. cit.*, II. p. 424 (E. T.).

in the Evangelist's hands that he can exchange it even in the Prologue of the Gospel for τὸ φῶς, and in the First Epistle (i. 2) for ἡ ζωή; again, in the Prologue (i. 4), the ζωή is said to be in the λόγος, and to be τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. The Logos itself is, in vv. 8, 9, τὸ φῶς, and the statement virtually made concerning the Logos in the Prologue, namely, that He "was with the Father and was manifested unto us" is applied in 1 John i. 2, to the ζωή (αἰώνιος). Beyschlag seems to conclude from all this that in the Evangelist's usage the λόγος was simply one of a circle of interchangeable terms, such as φῶς and ζωή. Any one of these might be exchanged for any other; no stress is to be laid on the special use of λόγος; its choice must not be taken to indicate any great deliberation; it was convenient, that was all. Beyschlag is emphatically of opinion that the phraseology of the Prologue is not carefully or deliberately chosen; on the contrary, it is loose and informal. He thinks we must not seek for any distinct dogmatic in the Evangelist's Logos-conception, and the fact that the idea is formulated now one way and now another clearly indicates, in his opinion, that the Evangelist's thought is not so much of any idea of a personal Logos as of the eternal content of the historical appearance of Jesus, the divine self-revelation (φῶς) and self-communication (ζωή). "Those will come nearest the Christological meaning of the Apostle who, in taking into account the awkwardness of an unskilled thinker who makes use of a theological idea of his time, understand him thus: In Jesus of Nazareth there appeared personally the self-revelation and self-communication of God; in Him it entered into a human life, so that we may certainly speak of its Godlike character, though we do not mean that a divine was added to a human or a human to a divine personality, but the divine character more closely describes the peculiarity of the human personality."

Speaking in general of this type of theological

speculation, Beyschlag is of opinion that "the permanent value of the speculative theology of the apostolic period is that through it the temporal appearance of Jesus is traced back to its eternal basis. Jesus is recognised as the self-revelation of God in its absolute sense, and the unity of God's thought in creation and redemption is insisted on." Yet this, he holds, is merely a fragment of apostolic theology, useful as a mode of thought in its time, but open to serious objections. The most serious fault is to be found in the fact "that when the Logos-idea and the person of Jesus are identified, the distinction which remains between an idea and a person is overlooked; and in consequence of this, the idea itself is conceived as a person existing eternally before the birth of the actual historical person. Even we, in expressing the profoundly true statement that Christ is the self-revelation of God, do not at first think that thus we are identifying an idea and a person; an idea can never be a living person, but can only find in a person its manifestation or realisation." The tendency of the apostolic age to hypostatise abstract ideas ought to be recognised in our view of the Evangelist's doctrine. The Church, according to Beyschlag, made the mistake of building her Christology on the Logos-idea, thus perpetuating what was only a transitory phase of thought, and "by conceiving the Logos more and more as the second eternal personality beside God the Father, through confusion of the concepts *hypostasis*, *persona*, *personality*, and by seeking to construct the historical Christ out of the Godhead, the Church was forced to add a historical to a pre-temporal person, whereby neither the unity of Christ's person nor the truth of His human development could be preserved."[1]

This view of the Logos-doctrine is to a large extent a protest against, and a corrective to, a dogmatism which has imported into our ideas of the Absolute and Eternal Godhead a conception of personality

[1] Beyschlag, *op. cit.*, II. 79 *sqq.* (E. T.).

which has almost turned Trinity into Tritheism. When we speak of the personality of the Logos before the finite universe came into being, and before He connected Himself with it in creation and in Incarnation, we are, strictly speaking, using the language of accommodation. To our human way of thinking, personality essentially implies limitation and determination, or in other words, finiteness. When, therefore, we predicate such a term as personality of the infinite God, we are only trying in our human forms of thought to give some kind of distinctness to our ideas. No one was more ready than S. Augustine to admit the tentative and provisional character of our language in reference to the personality which may be predicated of the Trinity. We speak of three "persons" simply because we are driven to it by the poverty of human language; we are forced to use such language "for the sake of speaking of things which are ineffable, that we may be able to say in some way what we can in no way say fully."[1] We must also remember that when the Creeds of the Church were framed, the concept of personality had not the same sharply defined and clear-cut meaning that it has now acquired.[2] We are inclined now to think of three persons as three distinct beings, three consciousnesses, three minds, three wills.[3] Our tendency towards individualism, both in philosophy and in practical life, has so altered the conception of personality that we are apt unconsciously to read into the doctrinal language of the early Church on this subject meanings which it was never intended to convey.

[1] S. Augustine, "De Trin." vii. §§ 7–10. "Itaque loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo possemus, quod effari nullo modo possumus . . . et dum intelligatur saltem in ænigmate quod dicitur, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid cum quæreretur quid tria sint, quæ tria esse fides vera pronuntiat."

[2] Illingworth, "Personality, Human and Divine," Lect. I.

[3] *Vide* Rashdall, "Doctrine and Development," sermon on "The Holy Trinity."

In his protest against an unwise application of human concepts of personality to the pre-incarnate Logos, one must in a large measure agree with Beyschlag. But it is another thing to hold, as Beyschlag does, that the Evangelist regards the Logos as merely a pre-existent principle of revelation, an impersonal impulse in the nature of God. Whatever may be said for this as an independent interpretation of the Logos-doctrine, it certainly cannot be regarded as the Evangelist's meaning. Nothing can appear more certain than that his Logos, whether pre-incarnate or incarnate, was regarded as personal. Beyschlag can only escape the obvious meaning of the Evangelist's language by saying that he writes in a loose and unpremeditated way, and that no special importance must be attached to his precise phraseology. It has been already pointed out how difficult it is to take this view of the style and phrasing of the Prologue, which is characterised throughout by a measured and deliberate tone.[1]

But again, Beyschlag overlooks the fact that the Evangelist makes the term Logos interchangeable with the phrase "only-begotten Son." This latter title seems to explain and define the less personal Logos. "The Word became flesh" must be balanced and interpreted by the other proposition, "The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." If the Logos were, in the Evangelist's mind, nothing more than a pre-existent principle of revelation inherent in the nature of God, it would be impossible for him to exchange the term so easily for that of "only-begotten Son," which is clearly meant to imply personality.

Beyschlag's view has value as a corrective to an over-precise dogmatism; but it is inadequate when studied as an interpretation of the language of the Prologue, and it is not without good reason that

[1] The meaning of ver. 1, and its implied assertion of the personality of the Logos has been dealt with above, pp. 25 *sqq*.

Schmiedel summarily rejects the attempt to prove that the Fourth Evangelist conceived of the pre-existence of the Logos as ideal rather than metaphysical and personal.[1]

[1] *Vide* "Encycl. Biblica," art. "John the Son of Zebedee."

CHAPTER III

THE GENESIS OF THE LOGOS-DOCTRINE

WE come now to deal with the question of the origin of the Logos-doctrine. But before beginning to examine into the possible sources it may be well to remind ourselves of one important *caveat*. To discover the origin of a *term* is not necessarily to discover the origin of the *doctrine* which the term is used to describe. The name and the thing may really have separate histories, and their connection may be in a manner accidental. A living truth may, so to speak, shed its names according to the changes in its intellectual environment and yet remain substantially the same through all its transformations. Thus the Logos-doctrine might conceivably be a characteristically Jewish product, and yet its name might have come from a Greek source. The name would, in fact, be nothing more than an article of intellectual clothing in which the truth was apparelled to suit the fashion of the times. It is well to bear this distinction in mind, namely, that a doctrine and the phraseology in which it is expressed may be drawn from different sources.

Those who have investigated the origin of the Logos-doctrine have, broadly speaking, divided themselves into two rival camps. The one side has claimed a Hebrew, the other a Hellenic, parentage for the conception. It will be the simplest method to consider these two lines of argument separately at first, and then afterwards to look at them in relation to one another.

Growth of a Hebrew Logos-doctrine

Word of God.—Those who hold that the Logos is a product of Jewish thought claim to have found the germs of the conception in the Old Testament. In the books of the Old Testament we frequently meet with the phrase, "*the Word of God* (Yahwe)," as a symbol of the *power* of God. In the first chapter of Genesis creation is attributed to the Word of God. "And *God said*, Let there be light; and there was light" (Gen. i. 3). The same idea is found in a more explicit form in Ps. xxxiii. 6, 9—

> "By the *Word of the Lord* were the heavens made;
> And all the host of them by the breath of His mouth.
> . . . . .
> For He *spake*, and it was done.
> He commanded, and it stood fast."

In these passages the purpose of the author is rather to emphasise the *direct* Divine action which needed no mediation or instrument whatever. But gradually as the idea of God became more spiritualised and transcendent, the same tendency which substituted *Adhōnai* for the sacred name of *Yahwe* also gave rise to an inclination to ascribe divine acts not directly to God, but to some personification of one of His attributes, sometimes His wisdom, sometimes His Word. The tendency was very gradual in its growth. The "Word of God" is often poetically described as a power or agent who carries out the purposes of God in the world. Thus in a description of God's activity in nature, we read—

> "He sendeth out His *commandment* upon earth; His *word* runneth very swiftly" (Ps. cxlvii. 15).

Something similar is found in Isa. lv. 11—

> "So shall My *word* be that goeth forth out of My mouth: it shall not return unto Me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it."

Again, the voice of *revelation* is described as the Word of God: *e.g.* "The Word of the Lord came to" the prophet. In one place it is described more vividly as the Word which Isaiah *saw* (Isa. ii. 1).

Angel of Yahwe, etc.—Such passages tend to represent the divine activity or the divine utterance as a kind of independent quasi-personal being. This tendency to personify the Word was fostered by the language of the *theophanies*, and by such kindred conceptions as the "angel of Yahwe" or "of the covenant" or "of the presence." These beings in which God manifests Himself are sometimes identified with Him (Gen. xvi. 11, 13, xxxii. 29, 30; Exod. iii. 2, xiii. 21, etc.); sometimes distinguished from Him (Gen. xxii. 15, xxiv. 7, xxviii. 12, 13, etc.), and sometimes presented under both aspects (Judges ii., vi., Zech. i.) This same circle of ideas included also the apparent personification of the divine "Name" (Exod. xxiii. 21; 1 Kings viii. 29, etc.) and of the "Glory" (Exod. xxxiii. 18, xl. 34, etc.)

The tendency to personify such divine agencies was steadily growing in Hebrew thought. It may be also observed in passages where attributes of God are predicated of His Word, when, *e.g.*, it is described as being powerful (Jer. xxiii. 29 "Is not my word like as fire?"), as right (Ps. xxxiii. 4), as unchangeable. (Ps. cxix. 89 "For ever, O Lord, Thy word is settled in heaven.")

These personifications are of course poetical, but they serve to show the growth of a tendency which was to assume more definite form in its later developments.

The Doctrine of Wisdom.—A new stage in the development of this mode of thought is to be found in the doctrine of *Wisdom* (חָכְמָה) which first emerges in the Books of Job and Proverbs. As the Word of God is represented in the theocratic parts of the Old Testament as the creative and regulative principle of the world, so the Divine Wisdom appears with somewhat similar functions in the Sapiential literature.

In Job the term Wisdom is a poetical title for the wise purpose of God which reveals itself in the wonders of nature, its law and harmony, as well as in the due ordering of human life. Job xxviii. is a noble panegyric of this Wisdom which is everywhere active in the natural order, and yet is itself of supernatural origin.

"Man knoweth not the price thereof; neither is it found in the land of the living. The depth saith, It is not in me: and the sea saith, It is not with me (vv. 13, 14).

This Wisdom is of infinite value; the most precious stones and jewels are not to be compared to it (vv. 15–19). Though it is "hid from the eyes of all living" yet "God understandeth the way thereof and He knoweth the place thereof" (vv. 21, 23). This Wisdom governs the *moral* as well as the natural order. "Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding" (v. 28).

Wisdom is still more vividly personified in the Book of Proverbs (viii.). Wisdom speaks thus of herself:—

"The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His way, before His works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. . . . When He prepared the heavens, I was there. . . . When He appointed the foundations of the earth: then I was by Him, as a master workman (R.V.): and I was daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him; rejoicing in His habitable earth; and my delight was with the sons of men" (viii. 22–31).

Stevens[1] points out the advance which this Wisdom-doctrine has made on the earlier idea of the Word of God. "It will be seen," he says, "that the conception represented by the *Word of God* in Hebrew thought relates more to the divine activity: that represented by *Wisdom* relates more to the divine attributes. Both terms are means of expressing the idea of the living, self-revealing God. The manifestations of Jehovah's power, especially in nature, are the operations of His Word; the revelation of His ethical nature,

[1] Stevens, "Johannine Theology," p. 79.

and of the moral requirements which God makes of men, is the voice of His *Wisdom*." The personification is, however, so far probably only poetical; but the conception is on the way to become hypostatised.

A new chapter in the development of the Wisdom doctrine is unfolded in the *post-canonical writings*, especially in the Apocryphal books Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon. These books are the product of a mingling of Greek and Hebrew modes of thought. The confluence of these two streams which had been flowing in parallel courses took place at Alexandria in the second century B.C., and resulted in a syncretism of religious philosophy. Ecclesiasticus is modelled on the canonical Book of Proverbs. In chapter xxiv. Wisdom is represented as soliloquising on her own origin and history :—

"I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and covered the earth as a mist. I dwelt in high places and my throne is in a cloudy pillar. I alone compassed the circuit of heaven, and walked in the bottom of the deep. In the waves of the sea, and in all the earth, and in every people and nation I got a possession. With all these I sought rest; and in whose inheritance shall I lodge? Then the Creator of all things gave me a commandment and He that made me caused my tabernacle to rest, and said, 'Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob, and thine inheritance in Israel.' He created me from the beginning, before the world, and I shall never fail" (xxiv. 3–9).

The passage which follows is interesting in view of the fact that the order of thought throughout this chapter has been supposed to bear some resemblance to the working out of the Logos-doctrine in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel.[1] After the words that have been quoted, the author goes on, "Likewise in the beloved city He gave me rest, and in Jerusalem was my power." Then after a somewhat rhetorical description of the beauty of the Divine Wisdom, he adds, "All these things are the book of the covenant of the most high God, even the Law which Moses commanded for an heritage unto the congregations of Jacob." The sequence of thought in this chapter

[1] Drummond, "Via, Veritas, Vita," p. 305.

is noteworthy. We see that side by side with the more philosophical conception of the Word or Wisdom of God as a cosmic power which gives order and life to the world of matter and enlightenment to the mind of man, there is also a tendency to circumscribe and harden the meaning of the Word, to make it signify the written Law, the concrete deposit of the Divine Wisdom. The author of Ecclesiasticus clearly does not consider that this identification of the Divine Wisdom with the Mosaic Law is a lowering of its majesty; he seems to regard this identification as the crowning glory of the Eternal Wisdom. It will be observed that in this chapter there is a progressive limiting of the scope of Wisdom. First we see it as a cosmic power permeating and ordering the material universe, from "the circuit of the heaven" to the "bottom of the deep." Then we find Wisdom working in the human sphere, "getting a possession in every people and nation." But finding no true dwelling-place among the nations of the earth, Wisdom comes to "tabernacle"[1] in Israel; and in Israel Jerusalem is singled out as the abode of Wisdom; finally, Wisdom is explicitly identified with the Law.

The order of thought in this chapter certainly presents a similarity to the argument of S. John's Prologue. There is the same gradual limitation of the sphere of Wisdom or the Word. There is, however, in S. John, this difference, that not merely did the world give no resting-place to the Divine Word —"He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not;" but likewise the chosen people, among whom he "tabernacled," gave Him no welcome—"He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not." Again, the Law given by Moses is displaced in S. John by the "grace and truth" which have come by Jesus Christ. The Divine Wisdom is for the Evangelist

[1] The word κατασκήνωσον in Eccles. xxiv. 8, recalls ἐσκήνωσεν (S. John i. 14).

no longer a Book, but a Person. Dr. Drummond thinks that "one cannot help conjecturing that the later writer, though using such different language and marching to such a different conclusion, was influenced by a reminiscence of the earlier; and, indeed, it is possible that his doctrine is set forth in conscious opposition to the older teaching." It is impossible to say how much truth there is in this conjecture; still it is an interesting suggestion.

But to return to the history of the Divine Wisdom, the description which has been quoted from Ecclesiasticus hardly amounts to hypostatising; it is still only a poetical personification of God's self-revelation. Yet the tendency is becoming more marked.

The Book of Wisdom represents the high-water mark of the Wisdom speculation. The work shows very clear signs of the influence of Greek speculation, and already heralds that union of Hebrew and Hellenic thought which was consummated by Philo. In this book Wisdom is like one of Plato's Archetypal Ideas, wavering between ideal and hypostatic existence. The most interesting descriptions of Wisdom are to be found in chaps. vii. and viii. Solomon is speaking—

"For Wisdom, which is the worker of all things, taught me: for in her is an understanding spirit, holy, one only (or only-begotten, *μονογενής*), manifold, subtil, lively, clear, undefiled, plain, not subject to hurt, . . . For Wisdom is more moving than any motion; she passeth and goeth through all things by reason of her pureness. For she is the breath of the power of God, and a pure effluence (*ἀπόῤῥοια*) from the glory of the Almighty. . . . For she is the brightness of the everlasting Light (*ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀϊδίου*), the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of His goodness. And being but one, she can do all things: and remaining in herself, she maketh all things new: and in all ages entering into holy souls, she maketh them friends of God, and prophets" (vii. 22–27).

It is difficult to say how far actual personality is here ascribed to Wisdom. The description may be still only poetic or figurative; but the poetry is certainly crystallising into theology. The Book of Wisdom stands as a connecting link between the Wisdom books of the Old Testament and the Logos-doctrine of Philo; it has points of affinity with both.

Wisdom also appears in connection with the Word of God, which is the more active form of divine revelation. Thus in Wisdom xviii. 15, "Thine Almighty *Word* leaped down from heaven out of Thy royal throne, as a fierce man of war into the midst of a land of destruction" (cf. also xvi. 12, 26). The Word tends to be the medium of Divine *action*, as Wisdom tends to be the medium of Divine *thought*. The two are different aspects of the same intermediate agency.

The same tendency to personify Wisdom is to be found in the Book of Baruch (iii. 30 ff.).[1]

In the Wisdom-doctrine we can observe *progressive stages of development*. Thus in Proverbs viii. (*vide* ver. 30), and Job xxviii., Wisdom is personified as a being distinct from God. In later books she is represented as at once emanating from God (Wisd. vii. 23–25), and immanent in nature (viii. 1 (*b*)). Personification is on the way to pass into personality, though the process is very gradual, and consistency is not always maintained.[2]

Septuagint.—The translation of the LXX, which belongs to the Judæo-Alexandrian period, also throws an interesting sidelight on the development of religious thought along the line we have been studying. There was a growing tendency to conceive of the being of God as transcendent in the most absolute sense. This movement of thought naturally gave a stimulus to the framing of ideas concerning the agents

[1] *Vide* Schultz, "Old Testam. Theol." (E. T.), vol. ii. p. 163.
[2] *Vide* Ottley, "Doctrine of the Incarnation," vol. i. p. 44.

and powers which were to fill the vacuum left by the gradual withdrawal of the Supreme God into transcendent isolation. Thus there were the two tendencies side by side, the one of which was to give back in a measure what the other was taking away. The tendencies were complementary to one another. On the one hand there was the wish to push God farther and farther away, to remove Him completely from the stage of the finite universe into dim and vague infinitude, while on the other hand the new school of thought set itself to elaborate a complicated system of messengers, intermediaries, and deputies which this Absentee God had commissioned to act for Him in the material world. The Alexandrian translators of the Old Testament belonged to this way of thinking, and therefore set themselves to tone down the anthropomorphism of the Hebrew Scriptures. Thus they change the self-revealing God into the "angel of God," or into the "glory of God," etc., *e.g.* LXX of Lev. xxiv. 16; Deut. xxxii. 8, 43; Ex. xxiv. 10, etc.[1]

Memra.—The third great stage in the development of the Jewish doctrine of the Word is to be observed in the *Targums* or Aramaic paraphrases of the Old Testament. These were probably not committed to writing till some time after the Christian era, but the interpretations which they contain were current in oral form very much earlier. Here we meet with the conception of the Memra (מֵימְרָא) or Word. In the Memra all the earlier conceptions of the "Angel," "the Word," and "Wisdom" may be said to converge. Against the background of the transcendent God, the conception of a personal intermediary now takes definite shape. The Memra (or Dibbura) is a hypostasis which takes the place of God when direct activity in the world is to be predicated of Him; and in the many passages of the Old Testament which savour of anthropomorphism, the

[1] *Vide* Schultz, ii. p. 115 (E. T.).

Memra is substituted for the name of God. It is said that in a single Targum the title of Memra occurs one hundred and fifty times.

In the Targum of Onkelos on Gen. iii. 8, Adam and Eve are described as hearing the voice of the *Word* of the Lord walking in the garden. This mode of attributing the action of God to His Memra is of constant occurrence.

A distinct hypostasis is ascribed to the Memra, though it cannot be severed from the Divine Being, from whom it proceeds. A man's "word" was sometimes used as a periphrasis for *himself*, but the Memra was apparently very much more than a periphrasis; it was a personality, though a personality inseparable from its Divine Source. It is hardly to be expected, however, that strict consistency should be maintained in the use of so elastic a term as the Memra. Maybaum[1] holds that in the Targum of Onkelos the Memra does not possess personality, and is only used as a periphrasis for God. But the consensus of opinion ascribes a relative hypostasis to the Memra. It has been pointed out that when the Targums wish to speak of mere utterance or ῥῆμα, they use, not Memra, but *pithgama*: sometimes the two words occur in the same context with their distinction clearly marked, *e.g.* "The word (pithgama) of the Lord came to Abram in prophecy, saying, Fear not, Abram, My Word (Memra) shall be thy strength" (Gen. xv. 1); again, "I stood between the Word (Memra) of the Lord and you to announce to you at that time the word (pithgama) of the Lord" (Deut. v. 5).[2]

The Memra is described as proceeding out of the mouth of God and becoming an active personal agent whom the angels obey. The Memra is the executive of a Divine Monarch who reigns, but does not rule.

[1] "Die Anthropomorphien und Anthropathien bei Onkelos," 1870; Edersheim, "Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," i. pp. 45, 56.

[2] Plummer, "Cambridge Greek Test.," p. 63.

Creation, preservation, and redemption, these are the operations of the Memra.

The Targums apparently do not identify the Memra with the Messiah, though such an identification would seem a natural one.

It is essential to understand that the *doctrine of the Divine transcendence* was the root of this Memra-conception. There was a growing unwillingness to bring the holy God into immediate contact with the material world. And it was in consequence of this tendency that Hebrew thought was led to represent the self-revelation of God as mediated by an Agent who is more or less definitely conceived as personal, though this personality is sometimes represented as blending with that of the Divine Being.

Book of Enoch.—This account of Hebrew speculation on the doctrine of the Word would be incomplete without some reference to the apocalyptic Book of Enoch. We can readily perceive the importance of this book for the study of the New Testament, when we are told by a competent critic that "the influence of Enoch in the New Testament has been greater than that of all the other apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books taken together."[1] The same critic has pointed out a number of phrases and passages in the Fourth Gospel which certainly have all the appearance of being echoes from the Book of Enoch.[2] It may be taken as proved that the Book of Enoch, like all apocalypses, is of composite structure; indeed, in some parts interpolations have been worked in so as to look almost like a mosaic. It is the opinion put forward by Ewald, and now generally accepted, that the Book of Enoch is "a precipitate of a literature once very active which revolved round Enoch."[3] Many different views have been held as to the date of the book, but Professor Charles,

[1] Charles, "Book of Enoch," p. 41.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[3] Ewald, "Hist. of Israel" (E. T.), v. 349.

working on Ewald's most probable hypothesis of a composite structure, finds three distinct strata, ranging in date from about 170 B.C. down to 79 or 64 B.C.

It was thought at one time by some students [1] of the Logos-doctrine that they had discovered a valuable piece of evidence in the Book of Enoch (c. xc. 38 (Charles' ed.), which is one of the earlier portions of the book). In the elaborate description there given of the Messiah in His symbolic aspect it was believed that the title of "the Word" was applied to Him. Such an identification of the Messiah with the Word would indeed have been interesting, but it must have come as a painful disillusionment when these enterprising scholars learnt that this interpretation was based on a mistake made by the Ethiopic translator, and that the term which had been rendered as "Word" ought properly to mean "buffalo." [2] The underlying Hebrew of the Ethiopic word was probably רְאֵם, according to Dillmann. This was transliterated by the Greek translator into ῥημ, and this, again, was taken by the Ethiopic translator as ῥῆμα, and as a result we had got the mistaken rendering "Word." One has, therefore, reluctantly to part with this attractive but imaginary light on the evolution of the Logos-doctrine. The Book of Enoch has, however, some other less striking points of interest in connection with this subject. Thus we find in it a well-developed doctrine of the personified Wisdom, a conception which has been shown to be closely allied to that of the Word. Thus in Enoch lxxxiv. 3 (belonging to a portion assigned by Charles to a date about 166 B.C.), Wisdom is described as the Assessor of God. "She (Wisdom) departs not from her throne, Thy throne, nor from Thy presence." [3] The thought here may be traced to the

[1] *E.g.* Gloag, "Introduction to Johannine Writings," p. 187.
[2] Charles, *op. cit.*, *in loco*.
[3] *Vide* Charles, *in loco*.

LXX of Proverbs viii. 30, ἤμην παρ' αὐτῷ. With this passage we may also compare Wisdom ix. 4, and Ecclus. i. 1. But the most interesting specimen of the Wisdom-doctrine in Enoch is to be found in the allegory of Wisdom xlii. 1, 2. This belongs to the part of the book known as the Similitudes, and assigned by Charles to a date 94–64 B.C. This particular passage, is, however, of uncertain date.[1] "Wisdom found no place where she might dwell; then a dwelling-place was assigned her in the heavens. Wisdom came to make her dwelling among the children of men, and found no dwelling-place; then Wisdom returned, and took her seat among the angels." [2]

The thoughts here remind one of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. The Logos of the Gospel and the Wisdom of Enoch are both of heavenly origin: their true home is with God. They come down to earth and dwell among men: but they are both rejected: men receive them not. The points of comparison are extremely interesting, but they must not be pressed too far. It is probable that we have here a case of parallelism in thought rather than of direct literary indebtedness. In any event, the Book of Enoch sheds an interesting light on the development of the Logos doctrine.[3]

The foregoing sketch of the Jewish doctrine of the Word will show how deeply rooted it was in Hebrew thought, and how gradual had been its evolution from its tentative beginnings to its ultimate elaboration as a highly developed doctrine.

Growth of a Greek Logos-Doctrine

Those who claim to have traced the Logos-doctrine of the Fourth Gospel back to a Hellenic ancestry

[1] *Vide* Charles, *in loco.*
[2] Charles' translation.
[3] *Vide* Schultz, "O.T. Theol." (E. T.), ii. 163, 599.

generally point to the philosophy of Philo as the immediate source from which the Evangelist drew his materials.

Philo of Alexandria (*floruit* 40–50 A.D.) occupies a unique position in the history of religious thought. Philo's system is highly syncretistic. It is a meeting of the waters, where streams from East and West flow together, though they can hardly be said to unite. To understand Philo's position one must go behind him and consider the factors which went to produce his philosophy. No one was more truly "the heir of all the ages": he had gathered in many fields and his spoils were of a somewhat miscellaneous character. Philo's system was a blending of Greek and Hebrew thought. He was permeated with the spirit of the Old Testament, though Greek philosophy gave a new bent to the faith of his fathers and added a distinctive note to his system. It will therefore be necessary to take a brief retrospect of the *history of the Logos in Greek philosophy.* The growth of the conception can be traced through well-defined stages.

The Logos-conception took its origin in the early physical philosophy of the Ionic school, and gradually extended its categories of thought over the fields of ethics and theology. The Greeks had at an early stage arrived at the idea of the world as a rational order (κοσμός). The working out of this great conception passes through three leading phases, represented successively by (*a*) Heracleitus, (*b*) the Stoics, (*c*) Philo.

(*a*) With Heracleitus the Logos is simply a name for the unifying principle of the world-process. It is not conceived as personal. It is rather like our modern idea of a Law of Nature regarded as something quasi-personal. The Logos is represented as objective in the world. It gives order and rationality to the universe. It keeps the sun and the stars in their courses. It is the principle of unity amid the

fluctuating and striving world of phenomena. Heracleitus's two familiar *dicta*, "All things are in a state of flux" (*πάντα ῥεῖ*), and "Strife is the father of all things" (*πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων*), express his idea of the phenomenal process.

The writings of Heracleitus are unfortunately only extant in scattered fragments; and if he was known to his contemporaries as Heracleitus the Obscure, he is doubly obscure to us. Even Socrates admitted that Heracleitus' book "required a tough swimmer." It is clear, however, that he was a man of profound and original genius, who left a permanent mark on the history of Greek philosophy. "At a time when science was in its infancy, and to the popular imagination capricious gods appeared to lurk in grove and stream, and to direct the affairs of earth and sky by a changeful and lawless fancy, he clearly perceived that the universe was one, and that all its multifarious changes were governed by a rational and unalterable law. To this law he gave the very name which is translated 'Word' in our Gospel. To him, too, the Word or Thought was in the beginning."[1] It is the great merit of Heracleitus that he tried to reconcile the two conflicting elements of experience, unity and multiplicity, identity and variety. What most philosophies had put asunder, Heracleitus has joined together. Unlike the Eleatics, he has taken full account of the flux of phenomena. In one of his paradoxes he says that no one can enter twice into the same river—for every moment its waters roll past and the river, as we knew it, is no more. Yet in another very real sense it is the same river, in spite of all its changes. We feel that there is some abiding identity in the river, though we watch its whirling eddies, its everlasting and unresting currents. How can we reconcile this restless change with this unchanging identity? Heracleitus clearly saw that the sameness

[1] Drummond, "Via, Veritas, Vita," p. 298, where there is an excellent though brief account of Heracleitus.

we find in the river is not to be found in the actual particles of water, but in "the permanence of ideal relations." It is our *idea* of a river that abides; that is the centre of unity and identity amid the ceaseless play of atoms. What is true of the river is true of the universe. In the perpetual permutations and combinations of phenomena, it is the Logos, the Divine Thought, that gives permanence and unity. Again, Heracleitus has grasped the relation of the Universal Reason to the reason of the individual. By participation in the Logos the human mind finds itself and reaches truth. "To those who are awake," he says, "there is one common world, but sleepers have each a world of their own."

Opinion has been always divided as to the exact significance of the rational principle of Heracleitus. Some have regarded his philosophy as pantheistic materialism. Certainly his Logos is entirely immanent in the world; it is not above nature nor prior to it, but simply part of it. There is no suggestion of an Intelligence active in the world and yet transcending the world. It would seem, then, on the whole that the Logos of Heracleitus is merely the rational self-evolution of the world, which is an impersonal process attaining only to self-consciousness in man.

(*b*) After Heracleitus the doctrine of the Logos is merged for a time in that of a kindred conception—the Νοῦς or Mind. A new chapter in the history of philosophy was opened by Anaxagoras, who introduced a conception which was to absorb and transcend the Pantheism of Heracleitus. This was the conception of the Νοῦς, a supreme intellectual principle, active in the world, yet rising above it. This was a most important step, for in conceiving of the ruling principle of the universe, it clearly added the idea of transcendence to that of immanence. Anaxagoras did not, however, grasp the full significance of this idea of a world-forming intelligence, and he seems to

have used it rather as a *deus ex machina* to meet the philosophic exigencies of his system.[1] Still, his Νοῦς, conceived as an immaterial principle, was the first hint of philosophical idealism.

With Plato the leading term is Νοῦς, rather than Logos. Yet the Logos-idea was so closely allied that its development went hand in hand with that of its twin-conception, the Νοῦς. Plato's views on the Logos are set forth mainly in the *Timæus*. The world is represented as "a living and rational organism," the "only-begotten" (μονογενής) Son of God, itself a God and the express image (εἰκών) of the supreme God.

But with the Stoics the Logos emerges again into the daylight of history, and it becomes the most fundamental element in Stoic philosophy. The Stoics, holding strongly to the idea of the Divine immanence in the world, gave great attention to the subject of teleology. They conceived of an active organic principle of life, dwelling in the world, informing, sustaining, and guiding it—a Divine Force or Intelligence at the centre of the universe—some such power as the Anima Mundi of Virgil (*Æneid*, vi. 724):

> "totamque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet."

This Power is, according to the Stoics, ultimately resolvable into Divine matter. The Logos is the Stoic God, and is represented as dwelling both in the physical world and in the soul of man. The Stoics, however, recognised some kind of ascending scale in the nature of this Divine indwelling. It is only in man that the Logos is immanent in the fullest sense. In the physical world, the Logos is represented as the λόγος σπερματικός or "Seminal Logos." This is the immanent Reason which animates dead matter. This λόγος σπερματικός is divided

[1] Schwegler, "History of Philosophy," p. 29.

into a number of λόγοι σπερματικοί, which are active in the various departments of nature. But in a higher sense the Logos is immanent in man; and it is by virtue of his participation in the Logos that man is a rational being. The Logos which is without him is in a fuller sense within him.

Again, it is to the Stoics that we owe a distinction between two aspects of the Logos which played a very important part in the Christian doctrine of the Logos. But the distinction is of more immediate importance in that it presents side by side the two forms which the Logos speculation had tended to assume in Greek and Hebrew thought respectively. The distinction I refer to is that between the Logos ἐνδίαθετος and the Logos προφορικός. The former is the unspoken thought, the indwelling Reason the latter is the thought expressed in word and act. It is something like the difference between the Latin *ratio* and *oratio*. The Stoics seem to have been the first to distinguish clearly between these two meanings of the Logos—Reason and Word; and this distinction is of vital importance when we come to examine the Christian doctrine of the Logos.

(*c*) The third stage in the history of the Greek Logos is to be found in the philosophy of the Alexandrian Philo. If one may use a modern illustration, Philo's position in the history of human thought is that of a great junction into which lines run from every quarter. But his philosophy is only a junction: there is no real union or amalgamation. Just as Philo joined the Hellenic and Jewish trends of thought, so he also brought together the two great lines of Greek philosophy, the Platonic philosophy of transcendence and the Stoic philosophy of immanence, though in this union it was clear that Platonism had the lion's share.

Thus Philo's system was a blending of Hebrew religion, Platonic Transcendentalism, and Stoic

Pantheism. But Philo's philosophic "coat of many colours" was not patched together at random, and it will be necessary to see how these elements were combined in his system.

To understand the position of Philo aright, one must clearly grasp the fact that the fundamental tenet in his system is his idea of the transcendence of God; that is his starting point and the one constant factor in his system. God gradually disappears over the horizon of the world: He shrinks to vanishing point amid the "infinite azure" of distant eternities and immensities. Two influences combined to shape Philo's views concerning the relation of God to the world. First, there was the extreme view of the Divine transcendence taught by the later Platonism, which Philo seems to have assimilated in a large measure; and, in the second place, there was the Rabbinical school of thought which had pressed the prophetic teaching as to the spirituality of God to its farthest point. The Rabbinical school was active both in Alexandria, as we may see from the Wisdom literature, and in Palestine, where we can trace its influence in the Memra doctrine and in the veneration of the Sacred Name. This school set its face against all forms of anthropomorphism in conceiving of the Deity. The language of the Old Testament might have seemed fatal to any extreme views on this subject. But the barrier was transformed into a buttress by Philo's marvellous allegorism, that "biblical alchemy" which could make *anything* mean *anything*, which could transform Moses into an Attic philosopher, and extract from the primitive stories of Genesis new lights on the problems of Greek philosophy. No anthropomorphism could stand before the magic touch of this talisman. In one place (*Quod Deus Immutabilis*, 5 (i. 275)), commenting on the words "it repented God that He had made man," Philo says that to accept such language in its literal sense is impiety greater than any that

was drowned in the flood.[1] In Philo's system God is a metaphysical abstraction. He is incomprehensible, inaccessible, unchangeable, transcendent, absolute. His nature can only be shadowed forth in negatives. Even the highest names that man can give to God are only metaphors. The names which Philo himself prefers are such colourless titles as "The One," "He that is," and such like. "Thus in the extravagance of his recoil from materialism Philo transformed the good Father and Lord of the Bible into the Eternal Negation of dialectics."[2] Dähne regards Philo's conception of God as practically amounting to atheism.[3]

But the farther this God was removed into cold abstraction and transcendence, the wider became the gulf which yawned between God and the world, and the more imperative it became to people this growing interspace with some sort of spiritual entities. A ladder must be stretched between earth and heaven, on which the angels may ascend and descend. These intermediate essences were to be found in abundance in the systems of the time. Platonism, Stoicism, and Judaism, all had ample store of them. First there were the Platonic Ideas, the thoughts of God, the heavenly models of earthly things, the seals which were impressed on matter as on wax, and determined its form and character. These ideas tended to be hypostasised, and are sometimes represented as dæmonia. They are identified in a mythical sense with the dethroned gods of Olympus, with the heroes and demigods. Stoicism, again, had its λόγοι σπερματικοί, the germs and principles of life and force, the particles of divinity inherent in material things. And then there were the Jewish Angels and Powers, which run into endless varieties and divisions. This

[1] Bigg, "Christian Platonists of Alexandria," pp. 8 *sqq.*; to which work the present writer is much indebted for his account of Philo.

[2] Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[3] Dähne, "Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religions-philosophie" (Halle, 1834), i. pp. 127 *sqq.*

was the miscellaneous collection which lay at Philo's disposal; and he seems, like the net in the parable, to have gathered of every kind. It is useless to attempt to look for consistency in Philo's classification of these Proteus-like essences; for he was unable to assimilate and digest all that he had gathered. He had "eaten too much honey" and had become "intoxicated by the sweets of which he had rifled the hives of the Greeks."

The question as to the *personality* of these entities is not easy to settle. "If it be asked whether the Powers are persons or not, it is difficult to find a satisfactory reply. In one point of view they are mere abstractions. But in the mind of the few these scholastic entities tend inevitably to become things, living beings. The Powers are ideas; but then, again, they are God's agents, which create the ideas and stamp them on matter. They are the two Cherubim [*de Cherub.* 9 (i. 144)], the two Angels who entered Sodom [*de Abr.* 24, 25 (ii. 19)]. . . . A point which makes against the personality of the Powers is the way in which they can be broken up and combined. . . . The fact is that Philo wavers between the one mode of conception and the other."[1]

But the one certain light in this disordered firmament is the *Logos*, the resultant or epitome of these various agencies. The Logos is the pivot on which Philo's system turns. Doubtless the term appealed to Philo's Hebrew instincts and memories, recalling as it did the Word of God, which fills so prominent a place in the Old Testament. On the conception of the Logos Philo lavished all his miscellaneous lore, ransacking heaven and earth to find new metaphors and illustrations for its expression. This Divine Logos is sometimes represented as an impersonal abstraction, sometimes as a definite personality: between these two poles Philo's thought continually oscillates.

On his more *personal side* the Logos is "Son of

[1] Bigg, p. 13.

God," "first-born Son" (πρωτόγονος i. 414), "image of God" (εἰκὼν Θεοῦ, i. 6), "God" (i. 655, *de Somniis*, Θεὸς, not ὁ Θεός), "second God" (ὁ δεύτερος Θεός, *Fragments* II. 625), "high priest" (ἀρχιερεύς, i. 653), "archetypal man" (ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος, i. 427).

On his *impersonal side* he is the Intelligible World, the sum of the thoughts of God, the Idea of Ideas, giving reality to all subordinate ideas (*De Mundi Opif.* 6 (i. 5)). He is the Glory of God, or again, he is the Shadow of God, since the created world half veils and half reveals the Deity.

In his *relation to the other intermediate Beings*, there is continual wavering between the personal and the impersonal. The Word is the Sum of the Powers, He is the Book of Creation in which all the subordinate beings are words. But in other places he grows more personal. He is the King's Architect, in whose mind the plan of the royal city is formed. He is the Archangel, the Captain, the Charioteer of the Angels, Physician, Umpire.

In his *relation to the world*, the Logos is the Archetypal Seal, the great Pattern upon which all creation is fashioned. He is the Creator, Helmsman, Pilot of the world.

As regards the *relation of the Logos to humanity* in particular, he is the Mediator between God and man, sharing the nature of both. For man, in his reason, is the image of the Logos, as the Logos is the image of God. The Logos is thus the High Priest, the Mediator who represents in the eyes of God the whole family of mankind.

The distinction between the two aspects of the Logos, indwelling (ἐνδίαθετος) and expressed (προφορικός), does not seem to have been actually used by Philo, though it was afterwards employed by some of the exponents of the Christian doctrine of the Logos (Theophilus, *Ad. Aut.* ii. 10, 22).[1]

[1] Irenæus rejected the terms as Gnostic, ii. 28, 6. *Cf.* Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

Such was the doctrine of the Logos which had been wrought out by Philo after its long and varied history in the course of Greek philosophy.

It will be evident that the two lines along which the development of the Logos doctrine has been traced cannot be kept apart. Greek and Hebrew modes of thought definitely intersect in Philo, and they touch at other points. Yet, on the whole, they do represent two great and distinct streams flowing down from sources far apart in history. These streams have been followed here in some detail, not merely because they have a direct importance as possible sources of the Logos doctrine, but because, in a wider interest, a study and appreciation of them is essential to our understanding the "psychological climate" out of which all early Christian speculation in the Greek-speaking world must inevitably have grown. These two lines of Logos-speculation must have been important factors in the intellectual environment of a Christian theologian like the author of the Fourth Gospel.

Scholars have generally chosen *one or other* of these two tendencies of thought as the source from which the Fourth Evangelist drew his Logos doctrine. The choice of the one has usually meant the exclusion of the other.

Argument for the Hebrew origin.—On the one side Westcott has confidently affirmed that the Old Testament and the Targums were the formative influences which moulded the Logos of the Fourth Gospel.[1] The Evangelist is certainly saturated with the spirit of the Old Testament. His very language is Hebrew in a Greek dress. His speech bewrayeth him at every point. Even his anti-Judaism cannot change the Jewish convictions and modes of thought which have taken such deep root in his mind. Again and again

[1] "Gospel according to S. John," vol. i. pp. xxxii. *sqq.*

incidental allusions to Jewish ideas and customs slip out in such a way as to convince us that the writer was a Jew by birth and training, whatever elements of thought and culture he may have acquired in after-life. If, then, he was brought up as a devout and well-instructed Jew, it seems certain that he was familiar with the Targums and the type of doctrine which they set forth; the Memra could hardly have escaped his notice. Again, the Evangelist's use of the term Logos is clearly in the Hebrew sense of Word rather than in the Greek sense of Reason. "The conception of a divine Word, that is, of a divine Will sensibly manifested in personal action, is not naturally derived from that of a divine Reason, but is rather complementary to it, and characteristic of a different school of thought."[1] It has also been pointed out that if the Book of Revelation is written by the same author as the Fourth Gospel, one might find an additional argument for the Hebrew origin of the Logos doctrine; for in Rev. xix. 13 the name "Word of God" is clearly drawn from a Jewish and not a Greek source.[2]

Dr. Sanday, who inclines rather to the Hebrew origin of the Logos, has adduced some interesting evidence of an indirect nature. Alluding to the view held by several critics, that the Logos-doctrine influences the rest of the Gospel not directly, but rather through its two great constituent conceptions Life and Light, Sanday goes on to show how these two conceptions, which form the content of the Evangelist's Logos, are most clearly of Hebrew origin. "The antecedents of these two conceptions are to be sought far more in the Old Testament and on the direct line of Christian development than in any language of Philo's. . . . 'The *living* God' is not only a strictly Hebraic and Old Testament idea, but one of the most fundamental of all the ideas of which the Hebrew mind and the

[1] Westcott, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. xxxiv.
[2] Hastings' Dict. of Bible, art. "Logos."

Old Testament have been the vehicle. The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel is essentially based on this idea, and works it out in a form that is also determined by the Old Testament."[1] Sanday thinks that the Evangelist's striking combination of Life and Light, which we find in the Gospel as well as in the Prologue, is derived ultimately from the language of Ps. xxxvi. 9, "With Thee is the fountain of life; and in Thy light shall we see light." This view is not seriously affected by the fact that the reference in the Old Testament is directly to Yahwe, while in the Gospel the idea is transferred to the Logos; for such a transference is not out of keeping with the Evangelist's mode of thought. Sanday also suggests, with good reason, that the use which Philo makes of the metaphors of Light and Life in the "literary embroidery" of his Logos-philosophy was probably called forth by the same Old Testament passages as the Evangelist had in his mind.

That the source of the Johannine Logos-doctrine is mainly Hebrew, is the opinion held by Westcott, Sanday, Stevens, Plummer, Weiss, and many others; though this view is held with many shades and variations by different scholars.

Argument for Greek Origin.—On the other side, among those who assert the direct Alexandrian origin of the Logos-doctrine, Jülicher occupies perhaps the most extreme position. This critic holds that the Evangelist derived his doctrine directly from Greek philosophy, Philo being his immediate source. "With a free hand and with great skill has he [the Evangelist] borrowed and adapted from the Philonian account of the Logos those features which seemed serviceable towards the great end he had in view—the Christianising of the Logos-conception. In spite, however, of the majestic originality of the verses in question (i. 1–5, 9 ff.), suggestions of Philo have been traced in

[1] Sanday, "Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," p. 194.

almost every word."[1] Jülicher dismisses the Old Testament and the Targums as out of the question, so far as the origin of the Logos is concerned.

The same view is held by Réville,[2] and less uncompromisingly by Holtzmann.[3] Wernle thinks that "dependence on Philo's writings is possible, yet it is not even absolutely necessary to presuppose it. The cosmological character of the opening sentences clearly points to a philosophic source."[4]

Points of Similarity between Philo and Fourth Gospel.—It will be evident, from the review of Philo's system given a few pages back, that there are many features in common between Philo and the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. Sanday has concisely summed them up.[5]

Philo has placed by the side of the Supreme God another Being whom he describes as a "second God" (*πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον Θεόν, ὅς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος*); this "second God" is named the Divine Word. The Word is God (*καλεῖ δὲ Θεὸν τὸν πρεσβύτατον αὐτοῦ νυνὶ λόγον*). In both Philo and the Fourth Gospel the Word is described as Light, and there are also passages in Philo where Light and Life are combined in a manner not unlike that of the Fourth Gospel. Again, Philo has some passages in which the Word is apparently represented as coming to His own and being rejected; also it is the Word that gives to the human mind a receptivity for truth, and there are some who can be rightly described as "sons of God." The idea contained in John i. 18, of the Logos as the Interpreter, seems also to recall Philo's phraseology and mode of thought. There are many resemblances in detail. Philo's Logos is described as "existing in heaven, as

[1] Art. "Logos," "Encycl. Biblica."

[2] "La Doctrine du Logos dans le quatrième Evangile et dans les œuvres de Philon."

[3] "Einleit. in das N. T.," p. 430.

[4] "Beginnings of Christianity" (E. T.), p. 149, vol. ii.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

revealing the name of God, as possessing supernatural knowledge and power, as continually at work, as eternal, as free from sin, as instructing and convincing, as dwelling in the souls of men, as high priest towards God, as the source of unity, of joy and of peace, as imparting eternal life; as bridegroom, father, guide, steersman, shepherd, physician; as imparting manna, the food of the soul."[1]

Literary indebtedness to Philo has been suggested in reference to the Evangelist's mention of the "seamless robe." But the resemblance is only superficial. In Philo (*De Ebrietate*, 21; *De Profugis*, 20) this figure is intended to symbolise the indissoluble texture of the universe. But in the symbolism of the Fourth Gospel it has no such abstract or philosophical suggestion. Some have tried to find an echo of Philo in the Evangelist's words about the "living water." There is a passage in Philo (*De Somn.*, ii. 37) which runs as follows: "The Divine Word, like a river, flows forth from Wisdom as from a spring in order to irrigate and fertilise the celestial and heavenly shoots and plants of such souls as love virtue." The miracle of turning the water into wine has been thought to come from another passage in Philo (*Leg. All.*, iii. 26): "And Melchisedek shall bring forth wine instead of water, and shall give your souls to drink, and shall cheer them with unmixed wine, in order that they may be wholly filled with a divine intoxication more sober than sobriety itself."

Again, some have seen in Christ's discourse on the Bread of Life a reminiscence of the title "Heavenly Bread" which Philo applies to the Logos. Loisy[2] deals in detail with several of these verbal resemblances, and is of opinion that no proof of literary connection can be based on them.

[1] Sanday, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[2] Loisy, *op. cit.*, pp. 283, 876. On the term Paraclete, its different meaning in Philo and the Fourth Gospel, *vide* Drummond, "Philo-Judæus," ii. 237–239.

Generally speaking, the similarities between the Fourth Gospel and Philo are rather those of language and terminology than of thought and doctrine.

Points of Difference between Philo and the Fourth Gospel.—The points of difference between Philo's Logos and that of the Gospel are not so evident at first sight, but they will be found very serious when they are carefully examined. It is worth while to look at these points of dissimilarity in some detail.

1. *Word and Reason.*—The most obvious difference has been already noticed, namely, that the Logos of Philo means Reason, while that of the Evangelist means Word. Westcott has dealt with this point very carefully and clearly. Bigg, however, takes exception to his conclusion. This writer inclines to the Philonic derivation of the Evangelist's Logos, and he argues that the Logos in Philo's view is not the Spirit only or the Mind, but also the Will of God. He says "Westcott maintains that the Logos of S. John is derived from the Palestinian schools mainly on the ground that in Philo Logos is Reason and not Will. But to a Platonist like Philo there is no difference between Reason and Will."[1] But on the whole Westcott's view is unshaken, and if Philo sees no difference between Reason and Will, it is because the Will *disappears* in the Reason, whereas in the Fourth Gospel the idea of Word or Will made objective is the prevailing note of the Logos.

2. *Personality.*—In the second place, it appears fairly certain that Philo's Logos is impersonal, and so differs from the Evangelist's idea of the Logos. About this point there is considerable difference of opinion. Philo's Logos is, indeed, constantly personified, but personification does not imply personality.

Thus Philo speaks of the Logos who, as the Angel of the Lord, brought back Hagar to Sarah.

[1] Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 18, footnote.

This might, at first sight, seem to attribute personality to the Logos; but the complexion of the case is altered when we recollect that Hagar is to Philo only an abstraction. By Hagar he does not mean the woman Hagar; the name only stands as the symbol for "human arts and sciences, brought back to the true virtue." We may see Philo's excessive love of personification in other instances than that of the Logos, as when he calls Laughter the ideal son of God and the Graces His virgin daughters.

The Logos is generally identified by Philo with the impersonal rationality immanent in creation. Thus we read, "The intelligible cosmos (*νοητὸς κοσμός*) is nothing else than God's Logos when He is already engaged in making a cosmos; neither is the intelligible city anything else than the reflection (*λογισμός*) of the Architect when He is already intending to create the city" (*De Mundi Op.* 6 [1. 5]). Again the Logos is represented as the totality of many *logoi* (ideas) that dwell in the world.[1] This composite character of the Logos is a point which tells against its personality. It is often represented as an aggregate of inferior powers which can be broken up and combined in other ways. Thus the Logos is the Sum of the Powers, the Book of Creation in which all the subordinate essences are words.[2]

One's verdict on this question must be a matter of impression, for there is ample evidence for both views in Philo and only a kind of instinct will tell us what weight we are to attach to any given case. Philo continually fluctuates between the personal and the impersonal. He does not seem to have made up his own mind on the subject, and the content of his thought alone determines which mode of representation he will select for the Logos. The distinct personality of the Logos, His separation and relative independence, are most evident when the writer is

[1] Hastings, "Dict. of Bible," art. "Logos."
[2] Bigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 17.

dealing with the creation of man. Sometimes the language used of the Logos suggests a recollection of the Angels of the Old Testament, sometimes again the Logos resembles a Platonic Idea.

It is the opinion of so close a student of Philo as Drummond that all ascription of personality to the Logos in Philo is only figurative.[1] On the other hand, Stevens thinks that when all allowance has been made for vague and metaphorical language, there is still sufficient evidence to show that Philo regarded his Logos as a "real person, an hypostasis distinct from God."[2]

Philo's ambiguity and vagueness on this point may be explained to some extent by the fact that the category of personality had not in Greek thought the sharply defined content which it has for the modern mind. The personal seemed to shade off very gradually into the impersonal, as we can see in such an instance as that of the Ideas of Plato, which are at one time regarded as hypostases, at another time as abstractions.

On the whole, the Logos of Philo can at most be regarded as a World-Soul, to which personality is not essential, though it may be ascribed: while the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is a distinct hypostasis, and can be conceived as assuming an individual human life.

3. *Incarnation.*—The idea of Incarnation, however, marks the sharpest contrast between Philo and the Evangelist. Nothing could be farther from Philo's whole point of view. In the first place, the two writers had fundamentally different notions about the function and significance of *matter*. "All things were made by Him" could not have been said by Philo in the same sense as it was said by the Evangelist.[3] For Philo starts from the idea of matter as

[1] Drummond, "Philo-Judaeus," II. 273.
[2] Stevens, "Johannine Theology," p. 84.
[3] This is dealt with at length in Loisy, *op. cit.* p. 156.

being pre-existent as well as evil. The Logos was only an Artist working on given materials, or a Seal impressing itself on matter as on wax. The world is created or rather moulded out of pre-existing matter. This is a postulate in Philo's system. Matter was to him "lifeless, erroneous, divisible, unequal." In his comment on Gen. i. 31, "God saw everything that He had made and behold it was very good," Philo is careful to point out that God had not created matter, and His praise could in no way refer to *it*. With such views it was impossible for Philo to bring the Supreme God into direct contact with gross, corruptible, and evil matter. And when Philo speaks of the Providence of God, His Fatherly care over the world, he is generally referring not to the direct activity of God Himself, but to His delegated power, vested in His ministers and especially in His vicegerent the Logos. "Though He be far off, yet is He ever near, keeping touch by means of His creative and regulative Powers, who are close to all, though He has banished the things that have birth far away from His essential nature"[1] (*De Post. Caini*, 5 (i. 229)).

Philo's system is essentially based on a dualistic view of the world; and matter being inherently evil, God must be put away as far as possible from the finite universe. But the theology of the Fourth Evangelist involves no dualism, at least, no metaphysical dualism; his moral dualism belongs to a different circle of thought. The Evangelist represents matter as permeated and instinct with the Divine. Not only the Word but also the Supreme God is active in the material order. There is no great gulf fixed between matter and spirit such as we find in Philo. Thus the physical and the moral "quickening" can be set side by side without any sense of incongruity. "As the Father raiseth the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son also quickeneth whom He will" (v. 21); and again, "As the Father

[1] Bigg, *op. cit.* p. 10.

hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself" (v. 26). Sanday sums up well the significance of such passages: "Both Father and Son are a principle of life which takes possession at once of soul and body, which imparts alike ethical and spiritual vitality to the disciple of Christ on earth and that eternal life which is not something distinct from this but really a continuation of it in the world to come. No one can fail to see the powerful comprehensiveness of this idea which incorporates and assimilates with ease such Jewish notions as that of the resurrection of the body where Philo's dualism makes a break."[1]

It will be evident, then, how far apart are the ideas of Philo and of the Evangelist in their relation to the material world, and how different, therefore, must be the attitude of the two writers to such a doctrine as that of Divine Incarnation. Philo could have found room in his system for a Theophany, but certainly not for an Incarnation. His influence, indeed, afterwards proved one of the most subtle foes of the Catholic beliefs in the early Church. The Docetism of the Gnostics was in a large measure an obstinate recrudescence of the philosophy of such thinkers as Philo. The Incarnation was one of the stumbling-blocks of Greek thought, as the whole course of the early Christological controversies will show; and the Evangelist, in proclaiming such a fact about the Logos as that "the Word became flesh," was revolutionising the philosophic thought on that subject and "flinging defiance at the schools." The *Incarnate* Christ is, indeed, the all-pervading theme of the Fourth Gospel, just as the Glorified Christ is the dominant subject with S. Paul.

On the question of Incarnation, therefore, Philo and the Fourth Gospel are the poles asunder.

4. *Messiah.*—Again, in Philo the Logos is never identified with the Messiah. As Dorner says, "Philo

[1] Sanday, *op. cit.* p. 194.

did not participate in the warm desires which filled the heart of a believing Jew. The idea of the Messiah has become to him a dead coal." But it must be obvious to every reader of the Fourth Gospel that its writer has constantly before his mind, implied far more often than expressed, the conviction that Jesus is the complete fulfilment of the Messianic Hope. It is expressly stated in the very purpose of the Gospel—"These have been written that ye may believe that Jesus is the *Christ*, the Son of God" (xx. 31). This conviction is "writ large" upon the whole face of the book; it is the inspiration of many an apparently unimportant detail. It is unnecessary to enlarge on this point of difference between the Alexandrian philosopher and the Christian teacher.

5. *Redemption.*—Another point of dissimilarity may be found in the fact that the function of Philo's Logos is the creation of the world; whereas the Evangelist's Logos is the agent not only of creation but also of redemption. The difference is again a question of presuppositions. The two writers started out with different conceptions of the place and meaning of moral evil. "Philo is everywhere too little alive to the presence and consequences of moral evil. The history of Israel instead of displaying a long earnest struggle between the goodness of God and the wickedness of men, interests Philo only as a complex allegory which by a versatile exposition may be made to illustrate various ontological problems. The priesthood and the sacrificial systems, instead of pointing to man's profound need of pardon and expiation, are resolved by him into the symbols of certain cosmical facts or theosophic theories."[1]

This argument can, however, be pressed too far. There are elements in Philo which seem to indicate a sense of the need and the reality of redemption. The Logos is the Saviour, the Giver of Divine Light, since, in the Platonic view, sin is darkness. It is not

[1] Liddon, "Bampton Lectures," p. 69.

sufficient, according to Philo, merely to have our eyes opened; we must recover the faculty of sight, which has been enfeebled, or even extinguished, by sin; our selfishness and disobedience have incapacitated us for communion with God. Man needs an Atonement.[1] The Logos is, therefore, a Redeemer as well as a Revealer. For the atoning office of the Logos, Philo finds a symbol in the High Priest, who had now, in post-exilic days, become invested with sanctity and dignity even greater than that of the anointed kings of olden time. Philo gives varied expression to this idea of Mediatorship. The Logos reveals, atones, feeds, sustains. He is the Mystic Bread which falls upon every soul like manna. The Word is, again, the Supplicator, the Paraclete, the great High Priest who presents the soul of man with head uncovered before God (*De Cher.* 5 (1. 141)).

Yet these approximations to the idea of a moral Redemption are more apparent than real. With Philo the metaphysical element in the Logos completely swallows up the moral. Religion is the emancipation of the intellect from the influence of the material world. Enlightenment is salvation. Faith is only an immature stage on the way to "gnosis." Vicarious suffering and Forgiveness cannot play any part in this purely intellectual system. Words like Atonement, High-priest, Mediator, etc., are only convenient metaphors for expressing cosmological theories.

Philo's motive in seeking for a Mediator is totally unlike that of the Evangelist. He approaches the subject with very different presuppositions. Philo's motive is metaphysical. His need of a Mediator arose from a certain philosophic view which he took of the relation of God and the universe. The material world is gross and evil, and the transcendent God cannot be brought into direct contact with it. The Logos fills the gap. His primary function is, indeed,

[1] Bigg, *op. cit.* p. 20.

not to connect God and man, but to disconnect them, by making God's interference in the world unnecessary. The Evangelist's idea of a Mediator moves on a different plane. The gulf which his Logos is to bridge over is not the result of a certain inevitable constitution of the world, but the consequence of human sin. Philo's world of ideas is metaphysical, the Evangelist's is ethical. Thus even when their language may seem to agree, their thought may have a totally different significance.

It may be well in this connection to refer to an argument frequently used to support the theory of an Alexandrian or Gnostic origin for the Gospel.[1] The argument is based on the Evangelist's "dualism," which is thought to have close affinity with Alexandrian or Gnostic speculation. But from what has been said above, one can readily see that the dualism of Philo and that of the Evangelist are quite distinct in their character. That of Philo is, as we have seen, metaphysical; it is inherent in the system of things. The dualism of the Evangelist—symbolised by his contrast of light and darkness—is ethical; it is not inherent in the system of the world; it is incidental to it; it is the consequence of sin, which is the moral choice of a free will in man. There is here no trace either of the metaphysical dualism of Philo, or of a Gnostic separation of men into pneumatic and psychic or sarkic. Evil, in the Evangelist's view, is primarily in the *will*, and not in the constitution of the world itself.[2]

It will follow from this that the Logos-doctrine of Philo has no place for such a moral redemption as is included in the functions of the Evangelist's Logos. The two writers are here moving in different worlds of thought.

6. *Relation of the Logos to the Supreme God.*—

[1] *Vide* Schmiedel, "Encyclop. Biblica," art. "John, the Son of Zebedee."

[2] *Vide* Stevens, "Johannine Theology," pp. 97, 132.

Another important difference between the doctrine of Philo and that of the Evangelist is to be observed in their ideas of the relation of the Logos to the Supreme God. Philo's Logos is not truly God. He can only be spoken of as God imperfectly (ἐν καταχρήσει, *De Somn.* i. 39); He is a being very much inferior to the Most High; He may be θεῖος, but not Θεός in the Evangelist's sense of the term. Philo's Logos may be called the Way, but hardly the Truth and the Life. The knowledge which He is represented as bestowing upon men is an inferior type of knowledge; it is merely an indirect knowledge of God in Nature. Our allegiance to the Logos is therefore only a temporary and provisional stage in the progress of the soul. The Logos is only a stepping-stone on which we rise to something higher; He is a means to an end. The Logos is like the usher who conducts us into the presence of the king, and then having discharged his office steps back to a respectful distance. Thus, in a strict sense, the Logos cannot really be the point of union between God and man: for man may rise above the Logos. To know God through the Logos is to be still in the outer court; to know God in Himself is the only true and perfect knowledge. The first stage is the life of Faith, Struggle, and Discipline; the second stage is that of Knowledge, Peace, and Vision. "Those who are still struggling upwards in obedience to the Word are servants, whose proper food is milk; those who have emerged into the full light are grown men, the friends of God, the seeing Israel. The Interpreter Word is the God of those who are imperfect; but of the wise and perfect the first God is King. The knowledge of the Most High is vision, the direct personal communion of a soul that no longer reasons, but feels and knows."[1] The highest knowledge cannot therefore be gained through the Logos, but only through direct ecstatic intuition. Again, in dealing with the Jewish

[1] Bigg, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Law, Philo is of opinion that it ought to be retained, but only as a worship of the Logos, while he shows that on a far higher plane stands the spiritual worship of the Supreme God. Philo is continually showing us how inferior the Logos is to its source. The Divine is represented as being degraded as it approaches the world of matter. The Logos retains the Light, but loses the Fire of God. It is by reason of his infirmity that he can be Demiurge, since God Himself cannot have any direct relations with corruptible matter. It is hardly necessary to show in detail how far removed is all this from the Christian doctrine of the Logos. The knowledge of the Logos is not, according to the Evangelist, an inferior grade of knowledge. The Logos is God. He can say, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life: no man cometh unto the Father but by Me. If *ye had known* (ἐγνώκειτε) *Me*, ye *should have known* (ᾔδειτε V.L. ἐγνώκειτε) *My Father also:* and from henceforth ye know Him and have seen Him. . . . He *that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father*" (xiv. 6–9). Here the knowledge of the Son or Logos is clearly identified with that of the Father: there is no higher or lower grade such we find in Philo. And the function of the Logos as creator is not, in the Evangelist's view, the consequence or sign of any inferiority. Creation is a glory, not a degradation. Incarnation is the crowning of the process. One can perceive, then, that Philo's Logos is only an inferior minister of God, while the Evangelist's Logos is Himself God, and the Evangelist is completely in accord with the doctrine of S. Paul, that in Jesus Christ dwells "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" *πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς* (Col. ii. 9).

Furthermore, the strict requirements of Philo's system demand that the Absolute and Unknowable God should only manifest Himself through the medium of the Logos. It is true that Philo is not always consistent in this respect; his humanity

sometimes overcomes his logic, and he sometimes drops into the Hebrew way of regarding God as a Being who can enter into relations with human-kind. Yet in principle the Logos is the inevitable medium through which alone the Supreme God acts upon the finite universe. But in the Fourth Gospel we find that God, the Father, exercises His beneficent functions in the world independently of the Logos, as well as through His agency.[1] "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (v. 17). "No man can come to Me except the Father which hath sent Me draw him" (vi. 44). "As the Father raiseth the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will" (v. 21). Thus the activities of Father and Son are co-ordinated, and both may be operative in the same sphere. Schmiedel[2] finds a lack of philosophical perspicacity in the Evangelist's ascribing this independent activity to the Father. But whatever may be the inferences we draw, the fact remains that in Philo, the Logos stands between God and the world as the sole and inevitable intermediary, whereas in the Fourth Gospel God is represented as directly active in the world by His own operation, as well as through that of the Logos.

7. *Language.*—In the last place, attention may be drawn to the fact that while there is apparently considerable similarity of language between the two writers, there is an entire absence in the Evangelist of the special Philonian catchwords. These may be mentioned: *πρεσβύτατος*: *πρεσβύτατος υἱός*: *πρωτόγονος*: *μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων*: *λόγος ἀίδιος, ὁ ἐγγυτάτω* (sc. *Θεοῦ*), *εἰκὼν ὑπάρχων Θεοῦ*: *λόγος ἀρχέτυπος, σκιὰ Θεοῦ*: *μεθόριος στάς, μεθόριός τις Θεοῦ* (*καὶ ἀνθρώπου*) *φύσις*: *τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα*: *λόγος ἀόρατος καὶ σπερμα-*

[1] *Vide* Beyschlag, "New Test. Theol." (E. T.) I. 231, Harnack, "History of Dogma," I. 328.

[2] *Vide* "Encyclopædia Biblica," art. "John the son of Zebedee," and also the same author's book, "The Johannine Writings," p. 161.

τικός καὶ τεχνικός καὶ θεῖος.[1] Drummond[2] also draws attention to the "total absence of Philo's special vocabulary, not only in relation to God but also to the Logos."

Summary of the Differences between Philo and the Fourth Gospel.—These points of difference between the Logos of Philo and that of the Fourth Gospel will be sufficient to show that the Evangelist was not a disciple of Philo. The Evangelist certainly did not sit down and transcribe a chapter from the Philonian philosophy. Yet the points of affinity are evident even in the differences that have been traced, and it seems almost certain that the Evangelist was in some degree influenced by the philosophy of which Philo is a leading representative. But this influence must have been of a lateral and indirect character, and was the result of atmosphere rather than of direct literary dependence. In a philosophic centre like Ephesus, the Evangelist would frequently be brought into contact with philosophers of the Alexandrian type. Probably in the Church itself some echoes of the Philonian modes of thought might be found in the teaching of the Alexandrian Jew, Apollos. The Evangelist is clearly not a philosopher: his Gospel has not the air of a scholastic treatise. Yet it is easy to imagine that the Evangelist's original and independent thought may have received some stimulus from the philosophic speculation around him. It is Harnack's opinion that "the elements in the Johannine theology were not Greek Theologoumena—even the Logos has little more in common with that of Philo than the name, and its mention at the beginning of the book is a mystery and not the solution of one."[3] This is true so far as the question of direct dependence is concerned, but it is perhaps minimising

[1] This list is taken from Sanday, "Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," p. 191.

[2] Drummond, "Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel," p. 24.

[3] Harnack, "History of Dogma," (E. T.), I. 96.

the indirect influence of the Evangelist's intellectual atmosphere upon the development of his thought. Drummond sums up the case very satisfactorily. "Some of the terms and ideas remind one, indeed, of the system of Philo, and a careful study of Philo is of great service in enabling us to understand the Gospel as well as the later system which professes to interpret it. But the picture of Jesus Himself has nothing in the least answering to it in Philo, and the very ideas which have most appearance of being derived have been brought under the transfiguring influence of an original and creative mind, and turned out stripped of their philosophic dress and robed with new spiritual beauty to captivate the world. Nothing, indeed, can well be more unlike than Philo and John, the bulky and diffuse rhetoric of talent, and the brief, condensed simplicity of genius."[1] On the whole, it is safe to say that whatever influence the Alexandrian philosophy exercised upon the Evangelist's thought affected the form and phraseology rather than the actual content of his doctrine.

The Genesis of the Logos-doctrine composite.—The development of a Logos-doctrine among both Jews and Greeks has now been traced in some detail, and various points of affinity and contrast have been found in both versions to the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. When we come, then, to consider the question as to which of these lines of development is to be regarded as the formative influence in moulding the Evangelist's doctrine, the nature of the answer will now have become fairly clear. Neither claimant can be regarded as entirely successful; Jew and Greek must be content to divide the honours, for both have undoubtedly united to shape the Logos-doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.

The truth of the matter seems to be this. The Evangelist found the term Logos current among

[1] Drummond, *op. cit.* p. 24.

both Greeks and Jews. It was a mode of thought in which both Greek and Jewish thinkers were striving to body forth their conception of the relation of God to the world. The Logos-doctrine of the Gospel is therefore in the nature of a synthesis, combining the divergent but kindred conceptions of Jew and Greek. The Logos-conception was in the air. It was apparently as fashionable a term in those days as Evolution is now. Its meaning and context were probably as elastic and indefinite as is the case with our leading term "evolution." In adopting such a phrase, the Evangelist was making use of a word which suggested to the minds of his readers a certain familiar circle of ideas and a certain trend of thought; and yet the term had the advantage of being so fluid and undefined that its use committed the Evangelist to no one hard-and-fast school of thought. The Jewish title of the Messiah was found to be unintelligible to a Greek public, as a designation of Jesus Christ. It seemed, moreover, to stamp Christianity as a Jewish religion. It was therefore necessary for Christianity, when it was transplanted to a Gentile soil, to find some mode of expression, some convenient formula which would bring its central truth into touch with the thought of educated Greeks. This translation of the terms of Jewish Christianity into those of the Greek world had already begun in S. Paul's teaching. His identification of the Christian God with the "unknown God" at Athens was a bold step, which must have suggested a new line of tactics to the early Christian teachers. S. Paul had also, in those of his Epistles written during the imprisonment, made use of terms taken from the incipient Gnosticism of the time (*e.g.* πλήρωμα). And at a cosmopolitan city like Ephesus, where all kinds of religions and philosophies seemed to jostle one another, it would have been impossible for any one form of teaching to be impervious to the influences of its environment. Especially difficult would it have been for Christianity to set

itself on an insulator, with its tremendous claim to be a universal religion and its assured belief that in its truths was to be found the clear revelation of all that men had been ignorantly groping for. A religion which made such a claim was bound to speak a world-language, and to set up an international standard of exchange values for its peculiar doctrines.

The laws of biology apply to religions as well as to physical organisms, and the religion that is to live and thrive must adapt itself to its changing environment and assimilate from that environment the food by means of which its own inner life is to develop and expand. There was a fine boldness in the way the early Christian teachers sought for fresh material to assimilate, and adopted new methods of approach to the world they aspired to conquer. They were always watching for a "door to be opened" into some new sphere of activity, and such a door the Evangelist seemed to have found in the Logos which was to admit him into the world of Greek thought. The Logos was then a vague but suggestive term floating in the philosophic language of the day. The Evangelist saw its value and possibilities, and if one may use so bold a phrase, he "commandeered" it. A more perfect formula for missionary and teaching purposes it would have been difficult to find. Though it was perhaps used in the first place to give some kind of exchange value to the Greeks for the peculiarly Jewish doctrine of the Messiah, yet the term itself called up an idea which was equally understood by both Jew and Greek. Drummond has well described this unifying function of the Logos: "In the doctrine of the Logos [the Evangelist] seems to place himself between Jews and Greeks, and to appropriate a common term as the expression of a uniting faith. It is as though he said, 'You Greeks behold in Christ the consummate Reason, that Reason of which I have so often heard you speak, which dwells eternally with God, and in which you have seen the

divine basis of the universe and the indwelling light of man: you Jews behold in Him that Word of God which spake to your fathers, and was handed down in your Scriptures, but for you who believe is no longer inscribed in tables of stone or of parchment but of flesh.'"[1]

It has been thought that even the *current pagan religion* may have been laid under contribution to furnish a hint towards the exposition of the central fact of Christianity. P. Wendland[2] has drawn attention to the tendency to attach the stoical idea of the λόγος to Hermes and the Egyptian Thoth. He quotes from Cornutus, who flourished in Nero's reign, τυγχάνει ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὁ λόγος ὤν, ὃν ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ οἱ θεοί. Hermes is thus represented as the messenger of the gods, sent to reveal the Divine will to men. It is within the bounds of possibility that this identification of the Logos with the pagan messenger-god may have suggested a higher function which the Logos might be made to fulfil in Christian theology. It is, however, at best only a mere conjecture. But in any case this illustration serves to show the prevailing tendency of the thought of the time.

Though the Evangelist may have adopted the term as a convenient title, he did not use it as a catchword. He finds it a rather loose and indefinite term, but he does not leave it such. He gives a perfectly definite content to this floating word, carefully fitting it for his own purpose.[3] No sooner does he introduce the term than he goes on to say in effect: "Now I wish my readers clearly to understand what I mean when I use this word Logos;" and so he goes on to develop his conception of the Logos in clear-cut sentences which are as precise and definite as the

[1] Drummond, *op. cit.* p. 418.

[2] This point is taken from Sanday, *op. cit.* p. 199; who refers to Wendland, "Christentum u. Hellenismus," p. 7.

[3] *Vide* Loisy, *op. cit.* p. 120.

clauses of a creed: at length, having dealt at large with various aspects of the Logos, he predicates of this familiar term a new truth which was revolutionary in the eyes of both Greeks and Jews—"The Word became flesh." *This was a revolution rather than an evolution of the philosophic Logos-idea.* It was to bring the Logos-doctrine into connection with a definite historical event. Plummer has very concisely summed up the significance of the Logos in Hebrew, Greek, and Christian lines of thought. "The personification of the Divine Word in the Old Testament is poetical, in Philo metaphysical, in S. John historical. The Apocrypha and the Targums serve to bridge the chasm between the Old Testament and Philo: history fills the chasm which separates all from S. John. Between Jewish poetry and Alexandrian speculation on the one hand and the Fourth Gospel on the other, lies the historical fact of the life of Jesus Christ, the Incarnation of the Logos." [1]

[1] Plummer, S. John, Cambridge Gk. Test., p. 64.

CHAPTER IV

THE GENESIS OF THE LOGOS-DOCTRINE (*continued*)

LOGOS-Doctrine in the New Testament.—This inquiry into the source of the Logos-conception deals not merely with the origin of the term itself, but also with that of the *doctrine* for which this term was felt to be the most appropriate formula. And in view of this, one must ask whether there were any other formative influences which went to mould the Evangelist's doctrine on this subject, even though they may not have directly contributed to his phraseology. This is a question not merely of words and phrases, but of doctrines. It has been too often taken for granted that the Targums and Philo exhaust the field of inquiry in the Logos problem, and that we must expect to find the object of our search in one or other, or in both, of these sources. As a consequence the fact has been too often overlooked that the writings of the New Testament have something to contribute to this subject: they were almost certainly accessible to the Evangelist, and no originality on his part could completely detach him from their influence. An examination of them in connection with this question would undoubtedly show that the Evangelist was not altogether a pioneer of the Logos doctrine. For as has been already remarked, the Logos is simply a convenient title for a certain circle of ideas, and these ideas may under various names be found in Christian writings which were extant before the issue of the Fourth Gospel.

S. Paul's Epistles must have been perfectly

familiar to the Evangelist if he lived at Ephesus. The Pauline tradition must have been very strong at a city which was practically the Apostle's head-quarters in his missionary campaign. It would surely have been impossible for a Christian to live at Ephesus and escape the influence of Pauline theology. S. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians must have been the text-book of Ephesian Christianity.

Again, it is difficult to imagine that the Evangelist was not acquainted with the Epistle to the Hebrews, especially if we may suppose that it was written by Apollos who had, as we know, a close connection with Ephesus. A book like the Epistle to the Hebrews, with such a decided Alexandrian colouring, would surely have found an appreciative Christian public in Ephesus.

Now the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistles of S. Paul embody a doctrine of Christ's person which virtually contains in different phraseology every element in the Logos-doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.

Moreover, the abrupt introduction of the Logos idea in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel certainly does not give one the impression of its being a new light, which was then for the first time flashed upon the Christian world. It is not enough to explain this abruptness, this plunge *in medias res,* by saying that the Logos was a well-known philosophic term. Its identification with the person of Jesus Christ must also have been known before, and the Evangelist seems now to be giving only a more deliberate and definite expression to this identification. The Evangelist is probably addressing in his Gospel those who were already more or less familiar with his oral teaching. Perhaps the Evangelist was one of a school which busied itself with questions concerning the relationship of Christianity to contemporary thought. Dr. Sanday suggests that there may have been some intermediate school in Syria where such

teaching was first adumbrated. He thinks that even before he came to Ephesus the Evangelist may have come in contact with the idea of the Logos, though not perhaps in its full Philonian form. Philo, as we know, received much from the Stoics, and there were Stoics to be found in Decapolis, and probably in larger numbers at a centre like Antioch ; and here it would doubtless have been also possible to meet with some disciple of Philo. "I have long thought," says Sanday, "that it would facilitate our reconstruction of the history of early Christian thought if we could assume an anticipatory stage of Johannean teaching localised somewhere in Syria before the Apostle reached his final home at Ephesus."[1] Such a hypothesis would account, he adds, for the evidences of this kind of teaching in the Didaché and in Ignatius, and also in some of the earliest Gnostic systems. The suggestion is an attractive one, though it is only a conjecture. But at any rate we have some evidence of the early intersection of Christian thought and Alexandrian philosophy in the Epistle to the Hebrews, possibly also in the Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians.[2]

All the facts of the case seem to show that the Christology of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel is no lonely mountain peak standing up in solitary grandeur from lowlands of mere Ebionism. It is evident rather that the Evangelist *shares* the enlightened Christian thought of his day, to which

[1] Sanday, *op cit.* p. 199. Harnack, "History of Dogma," I. p. 97. "The author's peculiar world of theological ideas is not so entirely isolated in the early Christian literature as appears on the first impression. If, as is probable, the Ignatian Epistles are independent of the Gospel of John, further the supper prayer in the Didaché, finally, certain mystic theological phrases in the Epistle of Barnabas, in the 2nd Epistle of Clement and in Hermes: a complex Theologoumena may be put together which reaches back to the primitive period of the Church, and may be conceived as the general ground for the theology of John."

[2] *Vide* Scott, "Fourth Gospel," (1906), p. 54 ; and also the article on "Logos" in Hastings' "Dict. of Christ and the Gospels" (1908).

no doubt he gives more explicit and authoritative form. The Evangelist and S. Paul simply give each his own characteristic expression to substantially the same body of teaching, and this seems to have been the generally accepted theology of thoughtful Christians.

The distinctive feature of the Evangelist's teaching may have been that he was the first to use the actual term Logos in an authoritative way. The explicit use of the *word itself* may have been the finishing touch to the growth of the Logos doctrine. This is, indeed, the most usual course in such developments of thought. The Logos conception, as a mode of expressing the meaning of Christ's person and work, was no doubt potent in Christian thought some time before it was directly or officially recognised. Logos was a term which savoured too much of the pagan schools of philosophy to be welcomed at once into the bosom of the Church. To have used it at too early a stage might have disturbed the faith of the more simple-minded Christians. But the conception without the title was no doubt increasingly used by Christian teachers as a means of putting their own ideas into shape as well as of communicating them to others; and at length, when the mode of thought has been implicitly embodied and assimilated in the theology of the Church, a writer has boldness to set the actual term itself in the forefront of his Gospel. An atmosphere has gradually been formed which will prevent the imported term from being misunderstood or misapplied. The attitude of Christian thought in the last few generations towards the theory of evolution may furnish a slight parallel.

This view of the Evangelist's process of thought seems to be that held by Sanday.[1] The introduction of the Logos was, he thinks, "the coping-stone of the whole edifice, not the foundation of it. It is a comprehensive synthesis which unites under one head a

[1] Sanday, *op cit.* p. 211.

number of scattered ideas." In this connection he suggests that the Prologue was a true preface, written at the conclusion of the work "to sum up and bind together in one mighty paragraph the ideas that are really leading ideas though scattered up and down through the Gospel." Thus "the philosophic synthesis of the events recorded in the Gospel came to the Evangelist last in the order of his thought." This seems to be highly probable. The ideas which were grouped under the Logos were *implicitly* contained in the Gospel before they were *explicitly* summed up in the Prologue. The difference between the Gospel and its Prologue is that what is implicit in the one is explicit in the other. Thus, as Sanday puts it, "the arch is fully formed before the keystone is dropped into it."

The fact, then, that needs to be emphasised is this: that there was a Logos-doctrine already well-developed in Christian theology before the writing of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel; the Prologue defined the doctrine and added a name.

Logos-doctrine in S. Paul's Epistles.—Let us see what evidence we can find of a Logos-theology in S. Paul. This subject has been very well dealt with in a recent book, Dr. Inge's Paddock Lectures on "Personal Idealism and Mysticism."[1] In a lecture on the "Logos-Christology," this writer goes so far as to maintain that, though S. Paul never uses the term Logos in its special theological sense, the idea of Christ as a cosmic principle, *i.e.* as the Logos, holds a *more* important place in the theology of S. Paul than in that of the Fourth Evangelist, and he thinks that this may be proved, not merely from the later Epistles whose authenticity is disputed, but from the earlier Epistles which are accepted by all. Dr. Inge has collected passages under three heads: Christ in relation to the Father, to the world, and to the human soul.

[1] Inge, "Personal Idealism and Mysticism," (1907), p. 47.

First, in relation to God the Father, Christ is described as the Image (εἰκών) of God (2 Cor. iv. 4). In the Epistle to the Colossians (i. 15), we have a much more elaborate statement—"the image of the invisible God" (εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου).[1] The εἰκών suggested a fairly definite idea, and was much used by Philo; it has the sense not merely of a copy from an original, but of a *representation* or manifestation of its original. The thought may be compared with that of the last verse of the Prologue to the Gospel (i. 18). "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He interpreted (ἐξηγήσατο) Him." Again Christ is described as possessing the *pleroma* of God, the fulness or totality of the Divine attributes: as in Coloss. ii. 9. "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς). Inge points out that the force of this expression is to show that He needs no subordinate "thrones, dominions, or powers" to mediate between Him and the finite universe. "Philo's Logos was polarised, as it were, into various Logoi or δυνάμεις; in Christ there is no such delegation of energy."

In His relation to the world, Christ is represented as the Agent in creation. He is "the first born of all creation (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως); for in Him were all things created . . . all things have been created through (διά) Him and unto (εἰς) Him: He is before all things (ἐστι πρὸ πάντων), and in Him all things consist (συνέστηκεν)" (Coloss. i. 15–17). To the same effect is 1 Cor. viii. 6. Again, Christ is described in Phil. ii. 6, as having a pre-temporal existence. "Being originally (ὑπάρχων) in the form of God" (ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ). God's eternal purpose is "to sum up (ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι) all things in Christ" (Eph. i. 10). "Christ is all and in all" (πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν, Col. iii. 11).

[1] Beyschlag, "New Test. Theol." (E. T.) II. pp. 79 *sqq.*

In His relation to the human soul, Christ, "the last Adam," is a "life-giving Spirit" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*, 1 Cor. xv. 45). He dwells in all believers, "forming Himself" in them (*μορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν*, Gal. iv. 19). He transforms believers into His own image (2 Cor. iii. 18). Christ has an almost hypostatic union with the soul of the believer—"I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20).

These passages are selected from a much larger number scattered through both earlier and later Pauline Epistles. But they are sufficient to show the existence of a well-developed Logos-doctrine in S. Paul.[1] Christ is here set forth most assuredly as a cosmic principle, and these passages go very much beyond any mere representation of Christ as "the heavenly man." We have in S. Paul, though expressed in a somewhat incidental way, all the elements of the doctrine set forth in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. "He is before all things." He is the creating and sustaining force in the world. He is the centre of all life, physical and spiritual. He is the Enlightener. He is in the world from the beginning, though the world had not recognised Him. He was the spiritual rock which had followed the Israelites. He is the Revealer of the invisible God.

The only feature of the Logos-doctrine which we miss in S. Paul is its title. Why did not S. Paul use the word Logos? We do not know for certain; perhaps as has been suggested above, the word had an alien sound, and it was not expedient to use the title until the doctrine had been, so to speak, domesticated.

That a definite Logos-doctrine is to be found in S. Paul is the verdict of Beyschlag, who deals with this subject very thoroughly; it may be well briefly

[1] *Vide* Murray's "Bible Dictionary" (1908), article on "Philosophy" by the Warden of New College; also from a different standpoint, Schmiedel, "Johannine Writings," pp. 144 *sqq*.

to outline his conclusions, though one need not subscribe to them *in toto*. Speaking of the Shechinah (δόξα Θεοῦ ; cf. Rom. ix. 4), the revealed glory of God, and of the phrase "the image of God" (Wisdom vii. 26), Beyschlag goes on to say,[1] "Here we come upon the form in which Paul has appropriated this theological idea ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ (Col. i. 15 ; 2 Cor. iv. 4). We cannot fail to see what his circle of ideas was ; we see it in the addition τοῦ ἀοράτου pointing back to the distinction of the God who is invisible, and the God who reveals Himself in πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, which is unmistakably connected with the saying of Wisdom in Prov. viii. 22 (Κύριος ἔκτισεν με ἀοχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ) as well as in the whole further argument which describes this image, the first-born of creation, as the sum of all that is to be created, as the ideal world. . . . We shall meet with this application of the Logos to the person of Jesus in the doctrinal notions of a later apostolic age . . . but it is highly probable that Paul with his training as a scribe was the first who made it. It suggested itself very readily to a Christian of a speculative turn. He who, on the one hand, was familiar with the idea of a hypostatic self-revelation of God, and on the other was certain that the self-revelation of God had appeared in Jesus could not but recognise in Jesus the pre-existent principle of revelation, the Word made flesh, and thus he would exalt the person of Jesus into eternity, and make Him the Mediator of the creation of the world. This new mode of thought did not contradict the former simple faith of the community, as even the simpler Jewish Christians expected this Messiah as a matter of course to descend from heaven ; and through the paraphrases of the Old Testament, which were read in the synagogues, they were probably not unfamiliar even with the idea of the Eternal Word. On the other hand, that doctrine helped them to look at the person of Christ in a way which

[1] Beyschlag, "New Test. Theol." (E. T.), II. 79.

for the Gentile world of culture in particular was more satisfying than the Jewish Messiah."

Beyschlag holds, therefore, that a Logos-doctrine is clearly to be found in S. Paul's theology, but that S. Paul's Logos is mainly Jewish in its character. The Evangelist carries the process just a step farther, and makes the Logos-doctrine approximate to the Greek type of thought. Perhaps, then, we may take it as the Evangelist's distinction not that he gave a Logos-doctrine to Christianity, but that finding such a doctrine already in existence, he gave it a Greek name and introduced it into the Greek world of culture.

In this connection it may be well to notice a view that is held by many critics (*e.g.* Wernle) about the relation of the Pauline to the Johannine theology. These scholars do not merely think that the Pauline ideas concerning Christ's person lead up to those that are so explicitly presented in the Fourth Gospel; they go much farther than this and maintain that the Fourth Evangelist is a professed disciple of S. Paul. The Evangelist, according to this view, is denied any originality in his Christology; he simply elaborates the theological premises which have been laid down by S. Paul. "In S. Paul's letters," says Wernle, "we look as through a window into the factory where these great thoughts flash forth and are developed; in S. John we see the beginning of their transformation and decay." [1] According to this critic it was the Fourth Evangelist who finally fastened the Pauline Christology on the Church by actually weaving it into the Gospel narrative. Before this the glorified Christ of S. Paul seemed to stand in sharp contrast to the Jesus of the Synoptics. The Fourth Gospel was to bridge the chasm and to complete the victory of the Pauline Christ by finding a historical basis for the conception in the actual story of the Gospel.

[1] Wernle, "Beginnings of Christianity," II. p. 272 (E. T.)

Hitherto we had regarded ourselves as fortunate in possessing two suns to illumine the firmament of primitive theology; this view proposes to turn one of them into a moon, to make it shine only with a borrowed light. S. John, the lesser light, is only to be the reflection of S. Paul. That there is a close relation between Pauline and Johannine Christology, there is little doubt. But surely this underlying unity side by side with such characteristic difference is much more easily explained by thinking that each was giving his own presentation of the accepted theology of the Church, than by supposing that the one was consciously borrowing from the other. Sanday's view is much more true to the facts: "The two great Apostolic cycles stand majestically apart. There may be a connection between them, but it is a connection in the main underground."

Logos-Doctrine in the Epistle to the Hebrews.—A Logos-doctrine is also to be found in the Epistle to the Hebrews (i. 2, 3). Christ is the Son of God: He has been appointed heir of all things. Through Him God made the worlds; pre-existence is therefore implied. He is the "effulgence of God's glory" (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης) and the "very image of His substance" (χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ). He "upholds (φέρων) all things by the word (ῥήματι) of His power." This Epistle shows many undoubted traces of Philonic influence; it is strange that the Logos is not named, for in the first chapter of the Epistle many of the attributes of Philo's Logos are directly transferred to Christ. In the development of a Logos-doctrine the Epistle to the Hebrews stands midway between S. Paul and S. John. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that the Epistle to the Hebrews gives a much better view of the Logos-doctrine than even the Fourth Gospel.[1] However that may be, at any rate it is clear that in the Epistle

[1] Bigg, in a lecture at Oxford, 1904.

to the Hebrews as in S. Paul we have a Logos-doctrine without a Logos.

Apocalypse.—It has been thought by some that, assuming the author of the Fourth Gospel to have been also the author of the Apocalypse, we may find in the latter book a preliminary stage in the development of the writer's thought in general, and of his Logos-doctrine in particular. As we have seen, the Apocalypse contains a reference to the Word; speaking of Christ it says, "His name is called the Word of God."[1] Whether one may find in this an anticipatory suggestion of the Logos-doctrine of the Gospel will, of course, depend on the larger question of the relation which one may suppose to exist between the Gospel and the Apocalypse. Westcott regarding the Apocalypse as earlier than the Gospel finds in it the transition-stage of the Evangelist's theology. "The Apocalypse is doctrinally the uniting link between the Synoptists and the Fourth Gospel. It offers the characteristic thoughts of the Fourth Gospel in that form of development which belongs to the earliest apostolic age. It belongs to different historical circumstances, to a different phase of intellectual progress, to a different theological stage from that of the Fourth Gospel, yet it is the germ out of which the Fourth Gospel proceeded by a process of life."[2]

Under the apparent dissimilarity of the two books a unity of idea can be traced. The main theme of both is the same though presented in very different dress. It is the idea of a supreme conflict between the powers of good and evil. In the Gospel this conflict is presented mainly in moral conceptions, in the Apocalypse mainly in images and visions: in the Gospel in abstract, in the Apocalypse in concrete forms.[3] Side by side with this underlying unity of

[1] XIX. 13.

[2] Westcott, "Gospel according to S. John," vol. i. p. clxx.

[3] Westcott has collected and compared the points of affinity and contrast, *op. cit.* vol. i. pp. clxxii. *sqq.*

idea there are points, especially in the eschatology, which seem to indicate that the Apocalypse is only an early stage in the progressive theology of the Evangelist; the culmination of the process was to be reached in the doctrine of the Gospel.

The fact that there is so marked a dissimilarity in style between the two books need not be a very serious objection to the unity of authorship. Our wider knowledge of the character of Apocalyptic literature puts a different complexion on the case. The style of the Apocalyptic writer was, we know, largely conditioned by the character of the materials upon which he worked.[1] The author is describing his own visions, but he is doing so in a language moulded by Apocalyptic tradition, and he is probably working up for a "Christian purpose some earlier Apocalyptic writing or writings." And further, if we place the composition of the Gospel at a considerably later date than that of the Apocalypse, we should naturally expect (assuming the Apostolic authorship) that the Jew of Galilee had in the mean time acquired a more complete mastery of Greek.

It would be in keeping with this view to point out also that whereas the Logos of the Apocalypse is clearly Jewish, the Logos of the Fourth Gospel has at least some affinity with Hellenic thought. Here we may surely see a distinct development. In the Fourth Gospel the Evangelist has taught his Logos-doctrine to speak Greek.

It would be unwise to build too much on the relation of the Gospel to the Apocalypse, since opinion is almost as much divided about the one as the other; yet it is a point worth consideration whether in the same way that the Apocalypse is thought to be a transition stage between the Synoptists and the Fourth Gospel, so also the designation of Christ as the Word of God may

[1] So Drummond explains the unity of authorship and the dissimilarity of style, *op. cit.* p. 443.

not also be a stage on the way to the Logos-doctrine of the Gospel.

The conclusion that seems to follow from this examination of the Christological teaching of the New Testament writings goes unmistakably to confirm the opinion that the Evangelist added the crowning stroke to a Logos-doctrine which had been steadily growing in the Christian consciousness of his time.

In the face of these facts, it is difficult to see how a theologian like Weiss can reject all idea of the gradual growth of a Logos-doctrine. He says,[1] "It is of decisive importance that one be quite clear that the Johannean expressions about the Divine Being, who was in the beginning with God (so long as one allows the Evangelist to regard the words of Christ in his Gospel to be *bonâ fide* the words of the historical Jesus), cannot possibly be the result of any *à priori* speculations about the nature of God. . . . Only if one regards the Gospel as a conscious invention of a Christian Gnostic of the second century, who puts his philosophical theories into the mouth of Jesus, has one any right to ask where he got the idea of a divine mediatory Being, whose incarnation he believes he finds in Jesus. . . . For him who holds that the words of Christ in the Gospel are trustworthy as regards their essential contents, the inquiry has lost all significance."

This opinion has an element of truth in it, yet it seems to miss the whole point and meaning of the Logos-problem. It is worth while to look at this writer's position for a moment, for it may help to make the points at issue somewhat clearer. There are two answers to be made to the view of Weiss. In the first place, his opinion, as expressed above, rests on a complete misunderstanding of the question involved. Those who find a connection between the

[1] B. Weiss, "Theology of New Test." (E. T.), II. 343.

Fourth Gospel and contemporary thought do not necessarily hold that the Evangelist borrowed his doctrine from some alien source, and interpolated it into the body of Christian truth. The earlier Christian teachers and theologians found themselves face to face with a unique phenomenon—namely, the life and personality of Jesus. The attitude that first expressed itself in instinctive devotion to Christ gradually sought a more reasoned basis for itself; it endeavoured to explain and to understand the person of Christ, and so came in time to formulate a Christology. In this process of shaping a doctrine of Christ's person the Christian teachers used such forms of thought as were most intelligible to them and most likely to be intelligible to their readers and hearers. The category of the Logos was a mode of thought familiar in different aspects to both Greeks and Jews. The vine was in need of a prop, round which it might twine itself as it grew and climbed upwards. The Logos-conception supplied such an aid to the growing Christology of the Church. The Logos then only translated faith into doctrine; and doctrine is simply faith that is become self-conscious.

In the second place, Weiss's opinion is based on a view of the historicity of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel, which it would be difficult to maintain. The discourses attributed to our Lord cannot possibly be regarded as *verbatim* reports of what was said. The Evangelist has clearly put his own style as much on the words of Jesus as on his own. The discourses are interpreted rather than reported. They have passed through the subjective medium of the Evangelist's mind, and he has read them in the light of his own spiritual illumination. This does not so much imply that the Evangelist is unhistorical as that he is supra-historical, interpreting as well as recording. The Evangelist is, in short, not a photographer, but a painter. It is the soul rather than the dry bones of his subject that he is patiently

trying to present. He may have taken many liberties with his material. His treatment of Christ's words and deeds probably went much beyond "dotting the *i*'s and crossing the *t*'s," to use Sanday's phrase.

As to the question whether or not the Evangelist "regards the words of Christ in his Gospel as *bonâ fide* the words of the historical Jesus," it is probable that such a question never occurred to the Evangelist. Weiss is applying to the Gospel historical tests which did not then exist. The Evangelist's representation of Christ is subjective rather than objective history; and yet the picture may be nearer the truth than a bare record of words and events. If we want to understand how a Logos-doctrine gradually took shape in Christian thought, we shall find the key to the process in the history of the Evangelist's development. Christ's life, His words and acts, had in them *potentially* from the first the meaning which the Evangelist gradually, after long brooding and reflection, had educed from them. But these deeper elements were brought to the birth by the help of such conceptions as that of the Logos, whether in Greek or Jewish form. This was the stimulus under which Christology developed, and by means of which it came to formulate its own significance. It was under this influence that for better or for worse convictions crystallised into creeds. By the aid of such conceptions the implicit became explicit; the latent was expressed, and the Christian consciousness found itself.

Conclusion as to the Genesis of the Logos.—The conclusions of this inquiry into the genesis of the Logos-doctrine may now be summed up. Its origin was composite. There was from the beginning the germ of a Logos-doctrine contained in the words, life, and influence of Jesus Christ. The doctrine was not interpolated into Christianity But this doctrine unfolded and developed under the stimulus of

thought-forms, which contemporary religious thought had produced among both Jews and Greeks. These modes of thought supplied media through which Christian conviction came to express itself. They were the architectonic influence which unified and compacted the scattered elements of Christian belief. It seems likely and natural that Jewish conceptions would be the first to come into contact with Christianity in its most primitive stage. S. Paul laid the foundations of the structure of Christian theology, and his building was Hebrew rather than Greek in its character. In the hands of S. Paul and his fellow-teachers a Logos-doctrine was gradually taking shape. This doctrine, though mainly Jewish in its earlier stage, soon found points of affinity with the Greek thought of the day. And finally the Fourth Evangelist put the coping-stone to the edifice, and in the fulness of time made the ultimate synthesis in which the Greek and Jewish elements became integral parts in a larger unity.

CHAPTER V

THE PURPOSE OF THE JOHANNINE LOGOS-DOCTRINE

HAVING now examined the meaning and the genesis of the term "Logos" as used by the Evangelist, let us see in the next place what exactly was his *object* in introducing it into his Gospel. It has been observed in an earlier part of this inquiry that the Logos was a mediating term between Jews and Greeks, but even this was not in itself a justification for importing a foreign element into the simple Christian tradition. The introduction of the Logos idea was indeed to launch the Church on a course of development which was eventually to transform the Galilean Gospel into a vast complicated body of doctrine, a highly organised system of religious philosophy. The Evangelist's use of the word Logos is indeed full of dramatic interest, when we see it from the vantage-point of history. Simple and incidental as the Evangelist's mention of the Logos may appear, it was a tremendously momentous step, perhaps the most momentous in the whole history of Christian theology. It was truly to obey the Divine command to launch out into the deep and with faith to let down the nets for a draught. Perhaps it might be thought that more than once in the history which followed this bold venture the draught proved too great and the nets brake under their load. Could the nets of the Galilean Gospel contain the weight of Hellenism which the Evangelist's enterprise had drawn into them? Many would no doubt hold with

Harnack "that the Gospel was Hellenised out of all recognition"; or, like Hatch, they would consider that the Nicene creed bore no family likeness to its reputed ancestor, the Sermon on the Mount, the latter belonging to a world of Syrian peasants, the former to a world of Greek philosophers.[1] It is only in the light of history that one realises the boldness of the Evangelist's step. The system of Catholic theology is the tree which has grown from the mustard seed planted by the Evangelist. It is not without reason that a living writer has[2] called the Fourth Gospel the "most audacious book in the New Testament."

Conditions under which the Fourth Evangelist wrote.—To understand the Evangelist's motive in Christianising the Logos we must appreciate *the conditions under which he wrote.* It was a time when the din of change was in the air. Jerusalem was in ruins, the Temple was destroyed, all the old landmarks were gone. The Christian Church had now definitely broken with Judaism. The Gospel had left Jewish soil and now boldly flung itself on a strange world. Ephesus had become for a time the headquarters of the Christian Church, and Ephesus was only a stopping-place on the way to Rome. If Christianity was to succeed, or even to survive, it must find some method of making itself understood by the Gentile world. The Judaistic conception of the Messiah could never find a lodgment in Hellenic minds; it was unintelligible, and its Jewish aspect seemed moreover to stamp Christianity as a national and not as a universal religion. What was wanted was a suitable equivalent for Messiah, a formula which would make Christianity not a national but an imperial religion. Such a formula was the Logos.[3]

[1] *Vide* Hatch, "The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church," Hibbert Lectures (1888), p. 1.

[2] Fairbairn, "Philosophy of the Christian Religion," p. 454.

[3] *Vide* Schmiedel, "The Johannine Writings," p. 238.

"The most important step," says Harnack, "that was ever taken in the domain of Christian doctrine was when the Christian apologists at the beginning of the second century drew the equation : the Logos = Jesus Christ. . . . It gave a metaphysical significance to a historical fact : it drew into the domain of cosmology and religious philosoply a person who had appeared in space and time" [1]

The Fourth Gospel is then a *Gospel of transition.* This is the key to the right understanding of it : this fact is the justification and explanation of its method. The transitional character of the Gospel seems to be indicated in the Evangelist's own account of his purpose in writing. "These (signs) have been written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God." [2] Observe how the Messianic title is linked with a higher one ; side by side we have the Jewish and the universal outlook, though the one is destined in time gradually to absorb the other. The one hand still points to Judaism ; the other is stretched out to the world. If the one bears witness to the organic connexion of Christianity with Judaism, the other indicates the liberation of Christianity from Jewish limitations. Thus we may see the process of transition written even on the professed purpose of the Gospel.

It was no mere wish to elaborate a theology which impelled the Evangelist to bring the Gospel under the category of the Logos ; there was a wider motive in the pressing need of reinterpreting the Gospel to a larger world.

A writer [3] has recently suggested that the Fourth Gospel was written to harmonise and unify two divergent conceptions of Christ which were current

[1] Harnack, "What is Christianity" (E. T.), c. xi.

[2] S. John xx. 31. *Vide* Westcott, S. John, Introduction xl. (on the Object of the Gospel).

[3] Menzies, "The Christ of John" in "Lux Hominum." This is to a large extent the view of Wernle.

in the early Church. One was the Christ of the Synoptics, the human Christ, the teacher and worker; the other, the Christ of S. Paul, the heavenly being who had little human life ascribed to Him except the events of crucifixion and resurrection. These conceptions seemed to conflict with one another, and the Fourth Gospel, it is thought, was intended to be a kind of synthesis combining the two, presenting a Christ who was as divine as Paul had taught, and as human as the Synoptics had portrayed. Thus the Christ of the Fourth Gospel was at once the Divine Logos who made the world and also the traveller who was weary, the friend who wept tears of human pity.[1]

This theory may have a good deal to be said for it: but it does not cover the whole ground. The Evangelist's purpose was no mere desire to reconcile divergent theologies; it was rather a desire to universalise the Gospel, to commend and interpret it to a world-wide public who would have been repelled by a Gospel presented in Jewish dress.

Wernle describes the aim of the Gospel and more particularly of the Prologue as being apologetic.[2] This is a half-truth; it would be truer to say that the motive was a missionary one, in the largest sense of the word. The age of apology was not till later. Christianity was not yet on its trial before the pagan world. It was now only striving to propagate itself, to make itself understood, to find an avenue into the Greek circles of thought. Wernle takes also far too narrow an idea of the purpose of the Gospel when he puts forward the view that it was written as an antidote to Gnosticism. The Evangelist, he thinks, lived "at a time when the Gnostics had already

[1] It is surely hard to understand Schmiedel when he flatly denies that there are any human traits ascribed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. *Vide* his discussion of the incident of Jesus weeping at the grave of Lazarus in "The Johannine Writings, pp. 30 *sqq*.

[2] Wernle, "Beginnings of Christianity," II. p. 149 (E. T.).

begun to interpolate their endless genealogies of æons between the purely negative first cause of all things and the existing world. The belief in the existence of intermediary beings between God and ourselves had naturally been strengthened. The Evangelist himself reduced the number of these intermediate beings to one—that one which was most intelligible to the Greeks," namely, the Logos.

The writers who assume the traditional view of the authorship of the Gospel seem to make out the most reasonable account of the Evangelist's motive in taking up the Logos idea. Tradition fits the facts of the case better than the most plausible hypothesis which has been suggested. It alone accounts for the *twofold* character which pervades the Gospel. It is Jewish in its underlying genius, written by one whose mind was saturated with Messianic ideas ; and yet, on the other hand, it is no less anti-Jewish, written by one who was vehemently shaking the dust off his feet against Judaism, and reaching out for a union with the cosmopolitan thought of the Greek-speaking world. It is this mixture of the Jew and the Greek in the Fourth Gospel which makes the question of its authorship such a baffling problem. The sub-conscious mind of the author, if we may so speak, is Jewish: the Greek spirit only affects the top-most stratum of his thought. These facts seem to be most adequately explained by the traditional view that the Gospel was written by one whose life had begun in the midst of Jewish Rabbis, and ended amid the dialectics of Greek philosophers. The Jewish training is the deepest layer, the Greek is super-added.

It seems fairly clear that the Logos is to be regarded as a bridge, across which Christianity was to march into the heart of the Greek world. In a large measure this applies to the whole Gospel as well as to the Prologue: the problem of the one is virtually that of the other.

A very admirable study of the *transitional character* of the Gospel has been given by Dr. Watkins in his Bampton Lectures.[1] He has brought out the peculiar nature of the conditions under which the Evangelist wrote, and their influence in determining the character and purpose of the Gospel. "The key to the Fourth Gospel," he says, "lies in translation, or, if this term has acquired too narrow a meaning, transmutation, re-formation, growth. . . . I mean translation in language from Aramaic into Greek, translation in time extending over more than half a century, the writer passing from young manhood to mature old age, translation in place from Palestine to Ephesus; translation in outward moulds of thought from the simplicity of Jewish fishermen and peasants or the ritual of Pharisees and priests to the technicalities of a people who had formed for a century the meeting-ground and in part the union of the philosophies of East and West."

To understand the Gospel, then, one must analyse the Evangelist's "psychological climate." If we picture to ourselves the kind of environment in which he lived at Ephesus, we shall see how natural an outcome was this Gospel which he wrote. The Evangelist must have lived in Ephesus for at least a quarter of a century. Hebrew though he was by training he must have imbibed much of the surrounding Greek culture. We get a glimpse of the conditions under which Christian teachers must have worked at Ephesus in the passing reference in the Acts to the discussions which were held by S. Paul in the school of Tyrannus.[2] Again, the cultured Alexandrian Apollos cannot have been the only one of his type at Ephesus. S. Paul's Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians also indicate how much Christianity had become permeated with the philosophical spirit; and the

[1] "Modern Criticism considered in relation to the Fourth Gospel," pp. 426 *sqq.*

[2] Acts xix. 9.

warnings against dialectical subtleties and superficial γνῶσις are highly significant in view of the unrestrained speculation so rife in the surrounding world of culture.

The population of Ephesus was made up of the most diverse elements. It has been well called the Marseilles of the Ægean. East and West met in its market places, and argued in its schools. Every variety of Greek and Jew and Syrian was to be found there. In such a mixture of elements it was inevitable that some kind of religious and philosophical syncretism should result. Ephesus was one of the world's Exchanges intellectually as well as commercially.

The Evangelist must have constantly come in contact with this network of influence. He must often have endeavoured to explain Christianity to Greek inquirers; and he must soon have come to discover points of affinity between Christianity and the surrounding systems, and such points of affinity he would no doubt utilise as avenues of approach. Watkins has shown by examples how the current phrases and terms like *Logos*, *Archê*, *Zoë*, and *Monogènes* were woven into the Gospel:—

"In *Archê* was the *Logos*, and the *Logos* was face to face with God, yea, the Logos was God. The same was in *Archê* face to face with God. All things were made by Him and apart from Him was not anything made. That which hath been made was *Zoë* in Him, and the Zoë was the *Phōs* of the *Anthropoi*."[1] Or again—

"Because of His *Pleroma* we all received and *Charis* growing out of Charis. For the Law was given by Moses, Charis and *Aletheia* came to be through Jesus Christ. No man hath ever yet seen the nature of God. *Monogenes* who is God, and who is ever in the bosom of the Father, He hath been the *Exegete*."

In using these current phrases and ideas the

[1] Watkins, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

Evangelist could point to their fulfilment and realisation in Christianity. He could assure his Greek inquirers that Christianity had come not to destroy but to fulfil, that all their problems were solved by the Gospel. Jesus Christ was the Exegete, the Interpreter of the Invisible and Eternal God; what all men were dimly feeling after was now revealed in Christ.

If we accept the traditional view of authorship, we shall also be able to see why the term Logos was one which specially appealed to the Evangelist. The use of the word in the mouths of Greek philosophers must have called up recollections of its use in the synagogue in the days of his boyhood. The Memra would through the Targums be familiar to every instructed Jew. Such a term would readily suggest itself as a bridge to connect the Jewish Gospel with the Greek world, since it had affinities with both.

Considered then from a strategic point of view,—and S. Paul's methods at Athens and elsewhere will show us that it was a point of view not disdained by the early Christian teachers and missionaries—the Logos was invaluable.

It is this composite origin of the Christian Logos-doctrine, its function as a mediatory or synthesising term, which will alone account for the widely divergent views which scholars have taken of it, some holding it to be essentially of Jewish origin, others seeing in its adoption an attempt to cut Christianity free from Judaism, and assert the inherent universality of the Gospel: some again finding it to be of Pauline extraction, others equally convinced that it was imported from Alexandria.

This diversity of opinion points to one conclusion —a conclusion which is equally true of the Gospel as a whole, and the Logos in particular. It is, that Christianity was now passing through its most marked stage of transition, and the Logos, as also the Gospel, is Janus-like, facing two ways, at once

Greek and Jewish. This aspect of the Gospel is well brought out by Watkins: "A Hebrew of the Hebrews, the fundamental purpose of the writer is that men might believe that 'Jesus is the Messiah'; but he is a Hebrew with whom the forms of Judaism have passed away. The temple has been overthrown: Jerusalem has been destroyed. He gazes not upon the sea of Galilee, but upon the Mediterranean, which washes the shores of the civilised world, and upon the great avenues to the East. He looks not upon fishermen's boats, but upon the ships of commerce and traffic which link peoples whom the sea does but seem to divide. The Church has gathered in of all nations, and his Judaism has widened into universalism because he has seen that it was in the providence of God a preparation for a religion of humanity; and the second fundamental purpose of the Gospel is therefore that men might believe that Jesus is the Son of God. It must have had elements of Philo, for Ephesus was as Philonian as Alexandria was. It must have had elements of Paul, for John is the Apostle of the completion as Paul was of the foundation."[1]

Indeed a Gospel written at Ephesus at the end of the first century might almost have been assumed *à priori* to be as many-sided as the Gospel we have. Yet the Fourth Gospel is not syncretism, but synthesis. It is not a chameleon-like many-coloured production. It combines diverse elements, but does so by tracing their underlying unity.

The function of the Logos was briefly this: the Gospel was waiting to be born into the Greek world, and, in Platonic phrase, the Logos was the μαιευτική which brought it to the birth. This aspect of the Logos question is of permanent interest. The Evangelist's problem is one with which in a greater or less degree the Church is continually being

[1] Watkins, *op. cit.* p. 443.

confronted. A new world is always in process of being reformed out of the old one. Some new philosophic or scientific formula revolutionises the established ways of thinking, and the Gospel has to be reborn into what is virtually a new world. Thus the Evangelist, Ephesus, and the Logos are perpetual symbols of the progress of Christian thought. Christianity is no Koran-system; its principle is not static but dynamic.

Historical Parallels.—The same problem of reconstruction was faced by the Christian Church, when the Aristotelian philosophy was incorporated into the great system of scholastic theology. Again, at the Renascence, there was the same work of reinterpretation to be done in order to adapt the mediæval system to the more critical atmosphere of the New Learning.

Again, in the last few generations so many new stars have appeared in the intellectual firmament that we seem in truth to have new heavens and a new earth to deal with. We may find an interesting comment on the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel in the fact that Christian thought has in recent times been using the great evolutionary hypothesis in pretty much the same way as the Evangelist used the Logos conception. And just as at first it might have seemed that the immanent Logos made Incarnation unnecessary, so also evolution was thought at first to make creation unnecessary. But in both cases the apparent enemy was a friend in disguise. And just as the Logos idea was not contradicted, but consummated by the statement that He who was immanent in all things became incarnate in a human life, so in like manner the old idea of creation only received a higher interpretation when we came to see, as a great teacher has said, that God, instead of making all things, had made all things make themselves.

If we turn to another branch of experience, we shall perhaps be able to see the Evangelist's

problem in some degree reproduced in the task which at present confronts Christian missionaries in their work among the older religions of the East. Thus a Christian teacher endeavouring to explain what Christianity was to a nation like the Japanese would readily seize on something which might be used to serve as a bridge between the two religions. He might take up a conception such as *Shinto*, the cult devoted to ancestor-worship, and he might point out that this belief was rendered in the Christian faith by the doctrine of the Communion of Saints. Such translation of articles of belief from the terms of one religion to those of another must accompany all intelligent missionary effort; and in this department the lesson of the Evangelist's Prologue has not yet become obsolete.[1]

[1] *Vide* an interesting discussion from a missionary point of view on the Logos and Hindu philosophy in "The East and the West," Jan. 1909, pp. 99–102.

CHAPTER VI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LOGOS

THE last section of this inquiry will deal with the philosophical significance of the Logos-doctrine, its permanent value as a mode of viewing God and man and the world.

Was the Fourth Evangelist a Philosopher?—In the first place the question occurs: how far did the Evangelist intend his Logos to be regarded as a philosophic formula? Was he a philosopher? Had he any acquaintance with the history of Greek speculation on the subject? The answer to this question will determine for us how far we are to attach to the Evangelist's Logos-conception the value and meaning which it bore in contemporary philosophy.

Dr. Inge (in a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1904) seems to regard the Evangelist as a religious philosopher consciously and deliberately writing with the intention of gradually transforming the primitive Gospel into a system of philosophy. This scholar's view had best be given in his own words: "In S. John the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy which we associate with the name of Philo is assumed throughout with certain modifications—it is not expounded or defended; indeed it is kept in the back-ground so as not to perplex or frighten the *simpliciores*. . . . The whole Gospel is only intelligible if regarded as written from the standpoint of γνῶσις for πίστις, not *vice versâ*. And the object is not to impart γνῶσις—the esoteric teaching is never expounded. The metaphysical basis of the treatise is given very briefly in

outline in the Prologue and afterwards assumed. It is certainly never forgotten, but it is not further explained. The main object is to spiritualise and elevate πίστις quietly by cautiously suggesting the higher meaning in place of the lower at every turn. The Evangelist wished to lay a sure foundation underpinning the fabric which at present rested on the crumbling foundations of thaumaturgic superstition and chiliastic or Messianic dreams. This I believe to be the only explanation, on the one hand, of the deliberate veiling of the Gnosis which nevertheless determines the whole structure and contents of the book, and, on the other hand, of his conservative attitude towards the synoptic tradition which is everywhere assumed."

This theory is not unlike that held by Matthew Arnold, who supposed the Evangelist to be a "theological lecturer," using extant memoirs of S. John as the basis of his speculations.

Such a view as that of Dr. Inge will of course depend on its presuppositions. It could scarcely be reconciled with the traditional view of authorship. It seems to rest on the theory that the Gospel was written by a Christian Gnostic well on in the second century; and that is an opinion which, on other grounds, it would be difficult to maintain. If Dr. Inge considers the Gospel to have been written at the end of the first century his view of its purpose is then antedating history. Such attempts to transform πίστις to γνῶσις belong to a much later date. But apart from this, the whole tone and spirit of the Gospel seem to preclude the idea that the Evangelist wrote with any *arrière pensée*. Dr. Inge's view gives much too narrow a view of the purpose of the Gospel—a view which we cannot but feel to be inadequate and unsatisfying. It was assuredly as an Evangelist, and not as an esoteric philosopher that the author of the Fourth Gospel wrote.

The case for the philosophical character and

purpose of the book has been put forward in more detail by a well-known German scholar, Emil Schürer.[1] This scholar indeed uses the alleged fact of the writer's philosophical education as an argument against the Johannine authorship. He takes for granted that the Evangelist's Logos-doctrine was directly taken over from the Græco-Jewish philosophy of Alexandria. But the Logos-doctrine is not the only point of contact which Schürer finds between the Fourth Gospel and contemporary philosophy. He thinks that a note of intellectuality pervades the whole Gospel. The essence of salvation is represented as consisting in a *knowledge* of the truth, and through it freedom is attained. Thus Jesus is the Redeemer because He brought revelation and enlightenment. Schürer holds that the Evangelist shares this fundamental view with the Gnostics and Apologists of the second century.

As to the Evangelist's use of the Logos, we have seen that this in itself need not presuppose a philosophical training. It was a word in the air, which any "man in the street" might have used. The Evangelist easily caught up the word in its most fluid sense; but this is no more than we might naturally expect from his thoughtful and susceptible type of mind. The Logos was also, as we have seen, familiar to the Evangelist in its Hebrew associations: the term had already been used in the Septuagint. Thus the mention of the Logos does not in itself presuppose a philosophical training. The Evangelist heard men around him discussing the Logos, and we can imagine him saying, "I hear you talking about the Logos; and what you are saying about the Logos is true of Jesus Christ, though He was more than your Logos, for He became incarnate."

As to the alleged intellectuality of the Gospel and the doctrine that enlightenment is salvation, it is

[1] "The Fourth Gospel," an essay written in 1891, pp. 45 *sqq.* (E. T.)

indeed true that the word "know" (*γινώσκειν*) is one of the keynotes of the Gospel. But the Evangelist's idea of "knowing" God is no mere intellectual process. It is the act of the whole man. The Evangelist is in this respect thoroughly modern in his psychology. He does not attempt to break up personality into separate compartments. His sense of the word "know" implies the will and the feelings as well as the intellect: "knowing" God always means loving Him and doing His will.[1] "And hereby know we that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. He that saith, I know Him, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him" (1 John ii. 3, 4). Everywhere with the Evangelist doctrine and life are simply two sides of the same thing. Knowledge of God is ethical rather than intellectual. Knowing God presupposes a likeness to Him. Man can only know God as he becomes morally like Him. "Every one that loveth . . . knoweth God . . . for God is love" (1 John iv. 7, 8). It is not necessary to multiply examples of this mode of thought and expression.[2] But when we put them together and perceive what is meant by this "knowledge" of which the Evangelist speaks, we shall find that it is indeed no exaltation of the intellect at the expense of the spiritual faculty: it has no affinity with the subsequent Gnostic elevation of knowledge over faith. It is also worth noticing that though the Evangelist is fond of using the verb *γινώσκειν*, to know, he never once uses the noun *γνῶσις*, knowledge.[3] Surely this fact is not without

[1] A very recent commentator on the Epistles of S. John (Dr. G. G. Findlay, "Fellowship in the Life Eternal: an Exposition of the Epistles of S. John," 1909) has some very happy remarks on the Johannine teaching on this subject. He says that while "Cogito, ergo sum" is the axiom of philosophical reason, "Diligo, ergo sum" is the axiom of the Christian consciousness, and that of the difficulties of the Christian intellect it may often, in each case, be said, "Solvitur amando."

[2] *Vide* "Stevens' Johannine Theol." pp. 65 *sqq*.

[3] Westcott, "Epistles of S. John," p. 46.

significance. It shows that the Evangelist did not regard the knowledge of God as an esoteric arcanum which could be communicated to the initiated, nor yet as an intellectual result which had been arrived at by demonstration. It was for the Evangelist a living process, an unceasing energy; it could not be imparted by any mystic rite nor communicated by the lips of any philosopher. The knowledge of God was a something which could only be worked out in conduct and character, The Evangelist's conception of the knowledge of God might be summed in the noble words of the Collect for Peace—"quem nosse vivere, cui servire regnare est."

Although Schürer's argument as to the Greek philosophical training of the Evangelist cannot be accepted, yet there are some interesting parallels to the teaching of the Gospel in the writings of the philosophers. Thus in the fragments of Heracleitus, a native of Ephesus by the way, we find the following: "The Logos existeth from all time, yet mankind are unaware of it, both before they hear it and while they listen to it."[1] This reminds one of the words of the Prologue of the Gospel. "He was in the world . . . and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not."[2] Again we find an interesting parallel in Epictetus to Christ's saying at the Supper, "Ye are clean on account of the Logos that I have spoken to you." Epictetus also connects the idea of cleanness with the Logos. "It is impossible," he says, "that man's nature should be altogether clean, but the Logos being received into it, as far as possible attempts to make it cleanly."[3] But the agreement is only verbal. The context in either case will make this clear, as Dr. Abbott[4] has shown. "Whereas

[1] Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ. Recensuit I. Bywater. Frag. II.
[2] *Vide* Inge's "Personal Idealism and Mysticism," p. 41.
[3] "Discourses" IV., 11 (4).
[4] "Silanus," p. 326.

Epictetus makes 'cleanness' consist in right convictions, John makes it consist in a mystical doctrine of sacrifice and service, typified by the Master's washing the feet of the disciples." In none of these cases can any idea of literary indebtedness be maintained.

On the whole, the general consensus of opinion is that the Evangelist had no systematic knowledge of Greek philosophy, though he had caught up a few of its leading terms. Moreover, we are too apt to read into the Evangelist's untechnical use of Logos-phraseology the philosophical significance which it only acquired at a later date in the hands of Justin, Clement, and such writers.

This is the view of such independent scholars as Wernle[1] and Wendt.[2] Drummond has most pronounced opinions on the subject. "If we omit the first few verses, I cannot recall to mind a single passage which suggests the thought that the writer must have been reading Greek philosophy. It is needless to say that direct allusions and quotations are entirely wanting. Where, then, is the evidence of the Greek philosophical training? Simply in the theory which is sketched in such broad outline in the Proem, and in the doctrine of the Logos, which contains some stoical elements but has not a trace of the characteristic stoical vocabulary. This seems to point to a man who had been without philosophical training, but through the necessities of his position had been brought into living contact with the problems of his time and under the impulse of spiritual genius had struck out some grand lines of thought which might be afterwards developed into a philosophy."[3]

We should not, then, be justified in regarding the Evangelist's Logos-doctrine as a chapter in the history

[1] Wernle, "Beginnings of Christianity," II. p. 149 (E. T.).
[2] Wendt, "Gospel according to S. John," pp. 220, 222 (E. T.).
[3] Drummond, "Fourth Gospel," p. 418.

of Greek philosophy. The Evangelist is a prophet, not a philosopher. He does not reason out his themes by the dry light of logic ; his luminous thoughts are struck off at white heat from the anvil of a glowing spirit. The Logos-idea was not his inspiration ; it was only the medium through which his inspiration found expression. As far as the history of Greek philosophy is concerned, the Fourth Evangelist is a Melchizedek, without parentage or pedigree.

The Place of the Christian Logos-doctrine in the History of Thought—a Synthesis.—Though we may not seek for any ready-made system of philosophy in the Fourth Gospel, yet in proclaiming the historical fact that the Word had become flesh, the Evangelist was virtually supplying a synthesis for the contradictions which have always seemed inherent in the constitution of the world. Greek philosophy had worked out these inevitable antagonisms of thought to their farthest point. The material and the spiritual, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal—these stood opposed to one another in the sharpest contrast. Such antagonisms of thought as these are not confined to any one period of philosophy ; they are always with us ; they do not indeed belong exclusively to abstract philosophy ; they emerge in the most simple and common facts of human experience ; the way-faring man as well as the metaphysician is perplexed by their eternal conflict. Thus the formula of the Fourth Gospel—"The Word became flesh"—has its reconciling function to fulfil in the twentieth century just as in the first and second.

But in the age in which the Fourth Evangelist wrote, these antagonisms had come very definitely to a head ; they had become perhaps more sharply defined and more keenly felt than at any other time in the history of human thought. Greek philosophy had been steadily running in two distinct lines of

development; and the farther these lines were produced, the more they tended to divide, though from time to time attempts were made to span the widening gulf. About the beginning of the Christian era these two tendencies had taken shape, on the one hand, in the later Platonism with its idea of a transcendent God, and, on the other hand, in Stoicism with its idea of an immanent God. The schools were practically Deism and Pantheism. How were these to be reconciled? The problem was keenly felt and efforts were made to mediate between these conflicting points of view. Here again Philo acts as a kind of compendium of the manifold tendencies of his time. Philo endeavoured to combine in his system Transcendence and Immanence, Deism and Pantheism. What he succeeded in producing was a philosophic patchwork. The combination which he made still revealed the heterogeneous character of its elements. Philo is continually oscillating between different points of view, and only by the most skilful dialectical acrobatics does he keep the two great trends of thought running side by side in his system. On the one side he had his idea of a transcendent and absolute God—the God of later Judaism as well as of later Platonism. This God is unknowable, and unthinkable; He has no qualities, no attributes. "I am that I am" is His only name; and it is also the sum of our knowledge about Him. Over against this shadowy Being stands the world of phenomena, the sum of material existence. Between God and the world there can be no real connection; between them there is indeed a great gulf fixed. They stand opposed in a hopeless dualism. In Philo's system a third factor is introduced, namely the Logos. But Philo's Logos is too much of a *Deus ex machina*, a stage expedient introduced to meet the philosophic exigencies of a system. The function of the Logos is to connect the two irreconcilable opposites, God and the world. But there is no real

union. Philo cannot get beyond his two Gods, the Transcendent God, and the Immanent God or Logos These cannot be reduced to a unity. As Caird has said, "It was impossible for Philo to explain the nature of this unity [between the transcendent Deity and the Logos] without either giving up the conception of what God is in Himself or reducing the relative independence of the principle that manifests Him in the universe to an illusion. We are therefore left with the idea of an absolute substance which, taken strictly, excludes all difference and relation, even the relation of subject and object in self-consciousness; and, on the other hand, with the idea of a self-revealing Word who manifests himself in and to his creatures. And Philo employs all the resources of symbolism, allegorical interpretation, and logical distinction to conceal from others, and indeed from himself, the fact that he is following out two separate lines of thought which cannot be reconciled." [1] With Philo Transcendence is, however, a more dominant note than Immanence: the Absolute God is more essential than the mediating Logos. Furthermore, the Logos cannot truly mediate between God and the world; for in a true mediation the middle term must not be a mere copula, a mere intermediate; it must be a synthesis, partaking of the nature of both the opposed terms. Here contemporary Greek speculation differed essentially from the Christian view. With the former, the Logos was intermediate between God and man, but neither the one nor the other; in Christianity the Logos is both God and man. It may be said of Philo's philosophy—and Philo may be taken as representative of his day—that it never transcended its dualism. Its syncretism was no real synthesis. It only brought the dualism into sharper contrast by placing the

[1] Ed. Caird, "Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers," Vol. II. Chapter on the influence of Greek philosophy upon Christian philosophy.

warring elements side by side. This conflict—a conflict that is present in the philosophy of all ages—divides philosophers into realists and nominalists, materialists and idealists, and so forth; the titles of such schools of thought ring the changes on what is a permanent underlying antagonism. This conflict finds its reconciliation in the Evangelist's Gospel of the Incarnate Logos, a great synthesis which brought together the two opposite poles between which human thought is perpetually oscillating.

The Evangelist's relation to the world of thought was this: he found current certain modes and terms of thought concerning God and man, and "he brought them out of the clouds into the market place, incorporated, personalised, individuated them. He distinctly saw what the man who had coined the terms had been dimly feeling after—that a solitary Deity was an impotent abstraction without life, without love, void of thought, incapable of movement, and divorced from all reality. But his vision passed through the region of speculation and discovered the Person who realized his ideal. Logos he translated by Son, and in doing so he did two things, revolutionised the conception of God and changed an abstract and purely metaphysical idea into a concrete and intensely ethical person. And then he made this person take flesh and become a visible God; but with supreme audacity he restricted this incarnation to a single individual whom he identified with Jesus of Nazareth."[1]

Thus while the Evangelist was not a philosopher, he was, perhaps unconsciously, giving the answer to the greatest of philosophical problems, the relation of the finite to the infinite. He joined heaven and earth together in the person of Jesus Christ.

The Evangelist's answer—the Incarnate Logos—was the union of the two great leading ideas about God, Transcendence and Immanence. The Incarnate

[1] Fairbairn, "Philosophy of the Christian Religion," p. 455.

Logos is a true synthesis, not intermediate between God and man like Philo's Logos, but sharing the nature of both God and man.

The Johannine Logos, Transcendent and Immanent.

The Transcendence of the Logos.—On the one hand, the Evangelist brings out clearly the idea of the Divine Transcendence. The Logos is pre-temporal, He *was in the beginning*. He exists in a personal relation with the Father; He *was with* God: He shares the Father's nature and is Himself *God*. The Logos has thus an eternal relationship to God, apart from any connection with the world. He is no mere World-soul, and no mere Agent of Creation. He inheres essentially in the being of God. As Liddon has put it, "the Divine Logos is God reflected in His own eternal Thought; in the Logos God is His own Object. This infinite thought, the reflection and counterpart of God, subsisting in God as a Being or Hypostasis, and having a tendency to self-communication—such is the Logos. The Logos is the Thought of God, not intermittent and precarious like human thought, but subsisting with the intensity of a personal form."[1] It was from such statements as that of the Evangelist that some of the Fathers reasoned that since God could never have been ἄλογος or without His thought, the Logos must have been eternal.

The Evangelist starts from the Transcendence of God. All the varied activities of the Logos in the finite universe spring from what He is *in His own absolute and essential* Being, apart from the world. The manifested life of the Logos in creation and in Incarnation is only the illustration, as it were, of forces and principles which dwell eternally in Him. The finite universe is only a stage on which these forces come into play. The Evangelist's method is to start with the nature of the Divine Logos; from

[1] Liddon, "Bampton Lectures," p. 230.

that postulate all His functions are deduced step by step. The Logos dwells with the Father in a relationship of eternal inter-communion ; within the Godhead He is perpetually going forth ; He is essentially self-communicating. It is by reason of this same self-giving impulse that He goes forth in creation ; the impulse which ever draws Him to the Father drew Him to fashion a world, in which to pour forth the fulness of His love. It is the same self-communicating principle realising itself in a new way. The Logos cannot dwell in isolation, self-contained and self-existent. As it is the nature of light to shine, so it is the nature of the Logos to impart Himself. Moreover, having made the world, He is no Watchmaker God to let it go by itself through a bare mechanical process. He sustains, informs, and guides the world-process. But this activity of the Logos in the world springs from the fact that *in His own essential being* He is Life. Again, not merely is He creator and sustainer of the world ; He is also its enlightener — illumining the minds of all men, revealing Himself in human history. But this is because He Himself is Light and cannot help shining. So again with Incarnation ; it is inevitable when we once grasp the nature of the Divine Logos. It will thus be seen how in this unfolding process of the self-communication of God every step is grounded in the essential and absolute nature of God. This is the grand ruling conception which is simply the informing spirit of every part of the Evangelist's theology. He finds the sanction for the most commonplace duties of life in the sublime fact, "God is Love." Without a clear grasp of this fundamental characteristic it is impossible to appreciate the bearing and trend of the Evangelist's teaching. It was with a true instinct that the Fathers called S. John "the Theologian" in the exact sense of the word ; for he traces everything back to its origin in the Divine Being. One may indeed say that according to

the Evangelist's theology, the Divine Immanence is actually a consequence of the Divine Transcendence.

The Logos is no Pantheistic Deity. He is the High and Holy One who inhabiteth eternity. In His absolute nature He is, like the Father, outside the categories of human thought. "No man hath seen God (Θεόν, not τὸν Θεόν, *i.e.* the nature, rather than the person) at any time;" in other words, no man hath seen God *as God*, in His transcendent nature.

Neither is the Logos a "God of Humanity." He is no idealised and magnified man. He is indeed "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God." The Nicene formula is only a summary of the Evangelist's Christology.

It has been well said by some one that the difference between the Johannine Logos-doctrine and pantheistic or atheistic materialism may be put in this way: whereas the Gospel says, "*In the beginning was the Word*," the sentence of materialism is "*At the end was the Word.*" In this respect the Johannine verdict expresses the creed of Idealism since the days of Plato. According to the idealistic view of the Fourth Gospel the evolution of the world and of man was simply an unfolding of what was implicit there from the beginning. The world in the full perfection of its development existed in the mind of God before the time-process began. The artist before he begins to paint has an ideal picture in his mind; his work is simply the projection or expression of this ideal on canvas; in the same way the Divine Artist starts with His ideal; He sees the world perfected before it is begun. In the beginning was the Logos or the Idea. Materialism looks at the world-process from the other end. It starts with the protoplasm, with blind unconscious matter "quick with life at some unknown centre." This living matter has, however, the potency and promise of better things; it slowly evolves into more highly

organised forms of life; it climbs through the realms of the vegetable and the animal; at length it developes into a human brain. "This fine secretion, deposited in a skull, is the last and best organised essence, and out of this come reason and thought." Thus, according to this materialistic mode of thought, the Logos, the living intelligence, is the final product, not the initial cause of evolution. Idealism like that of St. John would, of course, put the Logos *at the end as well as at the beginning:* the Logos is at once the origin and the goal of creation, the Alpha and the Omega. Thus the Evangelist's idea of Divine Transcendence strikes the note of all true idealism.

We are only stating another aspect of the Evangelist's Transcendental Idealism when we say that he was a Realist rather than a Nominalist.[1] The Nominalist regards all abstract or universal notions as mere names, *flatus vocis*, empty generalisations; the Realist regards these universal ideas as the only abiding realities. The Nominalist holds that the individual concrete things are alone real, while the ideas are only, as it were, the ghosts and shadows of reality; the Realist, on the other hand, holds that the idea is alone real, while the concrete individual object has reality only in so far as it partakes of the idea. S. John, it need hardly be added, was emphatically a Realist. It has been truly said of him that "Universalia ante rem" is the guiding thought of all his philosophy. The Idea, the Logos, is for him the source of all the manifoldness of existence; the Idea must be in the beginning, it must precede the concrete world of phenomena. As Haupt has put it, "Ideas—Light and Darkness, Truth and Falsehood—are the true and actual reality, the principle of life out of which individual things emerge; mankind, the individual man, the particular action, have no being otherwise than the idea marked out for their existence prescribes; this is the

[1] *Vide* Schwegler, "History of Philosophy" (E.T.), p. 145.

thing indwelling in them, which moves them as a law, by virtue of which all that belongs to them is fashioned."[1]

Enough has now been said to show the place which the doctrine of Transcendence occupies in the Johannine teaching.

The Immanence of the Logos.—Hegel's doctrine that a God not creating is no God might almost be ascribed to the Evangelist. The forth-going, self-giving impulse belongs, in his view, to the very essence of Godhead. "God so loved, that He gave" is the heart of the Johannine conception of God. God is Love, therefore He must impart Himself; He is Light, therefore He must diffuse Himself. It is almost a necessity inherent in the Divine Being that God should go forth in Creation and in Incarnation. Just as Thought passes into Speech, so the Transcendent passes into the Immanent Logos, the self-communicating aspect of Godhead. Of this self-communication the Evangelist mentions three main stages—Creation, Revelation, Incarnation. The Divine Logos is Life (ζωή), Light (φῶς), Love (ἀγάπη). The Evangelist does not actually put these leading terms side by side, but their co-ordination in this way readily suggests itself. It is important to observe that these stages are all regarded as parts of one process, illustrations of one eternal principle. It is because of what the Logos is in Himself, because o the self-revealing and self-imparting principle bound up in His very being, that He creates the world, dwells within it, and ultimately becomes Incarnate in it. Nothing could be more sublime than this grand conception of God's relationship to man. It gives a comprehensive unity to the many-sided activities of God. It bases all theology on one elemental idea, "God is Love"; all the rest is simply a working-out of this principle into its details. Creation is thus a

[1] Haupt, "First Epistle of S. John" (E.T.), p. 376.

herald of Incarnation; the one is the continuation, the sequel, of the other. In creation God imparts Himself, or looked at in another aspect, He imposes self-limitation upon Himself. He calls into existence beings other than Himself, places them over against Himself, and enters into relationship with them. The same self-imparting, self-limiting movement is only carried a step farther and brought to its consummation in the Incarnation. This noble idea—Incarnation regarded as a sequel to creation, and not as a mere expedient to repair a ruined world—has been finely worked out in the theology of Irenæus.

The idea of the Logos may thus be regarded as unifying and correlating *God's relation to the world.* The Logos is represented as the *Life of the world.* "That which hath been made was life in Him." The Logos is the source of all life; the world-organism is in a sense an emanation from Him. "He was in the world," and He *is* eternally in the world, the Light of all that shines and the Life of all that lives. The Logos is the vitalising principle which diffuses life and movement throughout all creation, "the mysterious force which sleeps in the stone, dreams in the animal, wakes in the man." The Logos is everlastingly going forth from God, and issuing into the world. The generation of the Son from the Father is a continuous process, not a single isolated event in the dim past. There are two luminous utterances, one by Origen and the other by S. Augustine, which may be set side by side as throwing a most suggestive light on this aspect of the Logos-doctrine. Origen's statement is, "The Son was not begotten once for all; He is always being begotten." But S. Augustine is very bold, and saith, "If God were to cease from speaking the Word, even for a moment, heaven and earth would vanish away."

Since we are considering the value of the Logos-doctrine as a mode of viewing God and man and the world, it will not be irrelevant to show what light

this doctrine of the Immanent Logos sheds on the various fields of human thought and experience.

The Logos in relation to Science.—First of all it is the immanence of the Logos that *makes Knowledge possible.* The Logos is not merely the Life but the Light of the world; not merely the principle which makes the world alive, but that which makes it rational. "The Life was the Light of men." The Logos is the Intelligence which orders, informs, and guides the world-process; which makes it a cosmos—a rational order. Divine Immanence in the world may thus be regarded as the presupposition of all knowledge; for knowledge, according to the Platonic mode of thought, is a correspondence between an inner and an outer truth—the marriage of two factors which have a kind of affinity or pre-established harmony with one another. Only like can know like. We can know an object because the Logos which is in the human mind is also in the object, and knowledge is possible because of the underlying unity which connects the knower and the known. According to the Logos-conception Nature is the expression of mind; the Logos by which it is permeated gives it rationality and makes it intelligible. And since the Logos is the power which co-ordinates the forces of the world and makes them move in obedience to rational laws, the Logos is the presupposition of Natural science; it underlies all interrogation of the order of Nature. According to the Logos doctrine, the material universe is no gross substance alien to the Divine. "The Cosmos is a divine speech that never breaks into silence, and so nature is the daily thought of God in concrete forms, the print and copy of the Eternal mind. . . . The universe is the language of God speaking; the old Psalm only rounds out into a sublimer strain, 'Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge.'"[1] We have seen with what a

[1] Sears, "The Heart of Christ," p. 446.

solemn dignity the language of the Prologue invests the study of nature. "All things were made by Him ; apart from Him was not even one single thing made." Thus for those who have eyes to see, the minutest atom may become an Epiphany, and matter be made transparent with the purpose and presence of God. One might indeed fitly apply to the Logos the eloquent words in which Professor Tyndall closes a description of the Cosmic Force—"It rolls in music through the ages; and all terrestial energy—the manifestations of life, as well as the display of phenomena—are but modulations of its rhythm."

There is always a danger of this conception of Divine Immanence lapsing into Pantheism, according to which God would be conceived as merely Cosmic Force, the impersonal power at the back of phenomena. In the view of Divine Immanence set forth by the Evangelist, it is essential to notice that while the Logos is represented as being "in the world," the complementary truth is kept in due balance, namely, that God is not merely in the world, but also beyond the world. The Logos-idea will elevate and ennoble mere Pantheism, for it does not deify blind Force or the Laws of Nature. It gives us Laws, but it also reminds us that laws imply a Law-giver.

The Logos in relation to Natural Religion and Poetry.—The immanence of the Logos in the world-order is not merely the presupposition of science; it is also the spring of all our æsthetic or emotional regard for Nature: it is the subtle suggestion which underlies what we call "the feeling for Nature." The Logos-theology gives a luminous significance to what has been described as the Higher Pantheism, namely, that view of the world which sees the Divine energy permeating the material order, and using the visible world as the expression of the invisible spirit. Such a view will teach us to realise the Divine Presence throughout the multitudinous processes of Nature; we shall find God everywhere at work, "from

the ministering of the Archangel to the labour of the insect, from the poising of the planets to the gravitation of a grain of dust." Nature is no automatic machine, which has been made and then left to go by itself. God is not an absentee, who merely "haunts the lucid interspace of world and world," and leaves the Laws of Nature to act as His deputy. Nature is not a machine, but a living organism instinct with the Presence of God. The indwelling of the Logos in the visible world makes it *sacramental.* In the presence of Nature our spirits are conscious of a mysterious contact with a spirituality within or behind Nature. The material world is the sacrament, the visible medium through which the contact is made. This is a view of Nature which flows from the Logos-idea; and it is a view which has immense significance for *natural religion* as well as for *poetry.* It enriches one's notion of the function of the material order; it opens up a new field for the sacramental view of the world. The harmony and beauty of the cosmos become an apocalypse of God. The poet can say in a very deep and true sense, "I found Him in the shining of the stars; I marked Him in the flowering of His fields." This view is not so much an attempt to see God *in* Nature as *through* Nature. Nature is the transparent veil in which the Invisible has robed His mysterious Being. This conception, in which religion and poetry join hands, has been made more familiar to us by what is known as the Wordsworthian view of Nature. It is the inspiration of "Tintern Abbey"; it imparts to our view of Nature that

> "sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."

In such a view of Nature as this, science and the poetry of natural religion find common ground. Both regard the material world as the expression of intelligence; both are seeking God in Nature, though by very different methods. Both interrogate Nature with a deep seriousness and a reverent insight; both are keenly alive to the inner suggestiveness of what may seem insignificant to a superficial eye. The scientific and the poetic interest in Nature have been happily combined by Tennyson in his lines—

> "Flower in the crannied wall
> I pluck you out of the crannies,
> I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but *if* I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is."

The development of the Logos point of view in the treatment of Nature will lend increased dignity and reverence to the researches of physical science; while on the other hand the poet will find that the world becomes still more full of mystery and beauty when he learns to see in it a sacrament of the Real Presence.

All this is nothing more than a development in detail of the great conception of the Logos shadowed forth by the Evangelist in his prologue. "Without Him was not anything made. That which hath been made was Life in Him." It is the same view which is suggested by the Evangelist's idea of the σημεῖα or "signs"; the material order is conceived of as a vast and varied sacrament of the Divine Logos; the Infinite gleams upon us through the finite symbol; Nature is an acted parable. Perhaps there is no finer exposition of this aspect of the Logos-doctrine than that which we find in a noble passage in the writings of the Cambridge Platonist, John Smith. Indeed no school of thought has ever grasped the inner meaning of the Logos-doctrine with such sympathy and sanity as the Cambridge Platonists. The passage from Smith must be quoted—

"God made the universe and all the creatures contained therein as so many glasses wherein He might reflect His own glory. He hath copied forth Himself in the creation; and in this outward world we may read the lovely characters of the Divine goodness, power, and wisdom. . . . But how to find God here, and feelingly to converse with Him, and being affected with the sense of the Divine glory shining out upon the creation, how to pass out of the sensible world into the intellectual, is not so effectually taught by that philosophy which professed it most, as by true religion. That which knits and unites God and the soul together can best teach it how to ascend and descend upon those golden links that unite, as it were, the world to God. That Divine wisdom, that contrived and beautified this glorious structure, can best explain her own art, and carry up the soul back again in these reflected beams to Him who is the fountain of them. . . . Good men may easily find every creature pointing out to that Being whose image and superscription it bears, and climb up from those darker resemblances of the Divine wisdom and goodness, shining out in different degrees upon several creatures, till they sweetly repose themselves in the bosom of the Divinity; and while they are thus conversing with this lower world . . . they find God many times secretly flowing into their souls, and leading them silently out of the court of the temple into the Holy Place. . . . Thus religion, where it is in truth and power, renews the very spirit of our minds, and doth in a manner spiritualise this outward creation to us. . . . Thus may a man walk up and down the world as in a garden of spices, and suck a Divine sweetness out of every flower. There is a twofold meaning in every creature, a literal and a mystical, and the one is but the ground of the other; and as the Jews say of their law, so a good man says of everything that his senses offer to him—it speaks to his lower part, but it points out something

above to his mind and spirit. It is the drowsy and muddy spirit of superstition which is fain to set some idol at its elbow, something that may jog it, and put it in mind of God. Whereas true religion never finds itself out of the infinite sphere of the Divinity. . . . It beholds itself everywhere in the midst of that glorious unbounded Being who is indivisibly everywhere. A good man finds every place he treads upon holy ground; to him the world is God's temple; he is ready to say with Jacob, "How dreadful is this place! this is none other than the house of God; this is the gate of heaven." [1]

The Logos in History.—The Immanent Logos will also give a new significance to *history.* It will impart unity to its varied phenomena. One increasing purpose is felt to be running through the ages. The Logos ever present in the order of events is unfolding God, evolving the eternal purpose. Yet the Logos works through the resisting medium of human ignorance and selfishness. The Logos-light is thwarted and obscured by the darkness of sin; still the darkness cannot overcome the Light. Moreover, since the activity of the Logos is conditioned by the human medium through which He works, we can see that His revelation must be *progressive,* starting with rude beginnings, with the most crude and primitive notions of morality and religion, and gradually rising step by step to ever loftier and purer conceptions. The Evangelist also suggests that history has been steadily leading up to the Incarnation. The imperfect lights which shone for a time in lives like those of the Baptist were sent to "bear witness" to the coming Light of the World. And at length in the fulness of time—

[1] This extract, together with an excellent appreciation of the Cambridge Platonists, is given in Inge's Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism, Lecture VII.

"the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the creed of creeds
In loveliness of perfect deeds."

This view of history brings order into what seems the chaos of events. In this view, history is no shifting kaleidoscope, endlessly being turned upside down. There is meaning in every movement. History may be a cryptogram to us, but it is an open book to God. God is progressively realising Himself in history: He is writing another Bible. History is thus a living Epistle, alive with the presence and purpose of God. The same thought of the Logos ceaselessly at work in history leads us to look forward to a final overcoming of the darkness which still broods upon the face of the world. With such a faith as that of the Evangelist we must nourish an undying hope in the coming of some "far-off divine event," when the Logos-light shall have finally dispelled the darkness, and all men shall "know" and "receive" the Logos whom in their ignorance they had rejected. Progress is indeed nothing else than the gradual reception and assimilation of the Logos by mankind.

It is also characteristic of the Evangelist's mode of viewing the course of history, that he should always regard events as *illustrations* of eternal principles. Everything that happens is a representation on the world's stage of truths which are timeless and unchangeable. The outward facts are the setting or the drapery in which the inward realities are presented. Thus every historical event in the life of Christ is regarded as a symbol, a type, an illustration of the many-sided character of the Divine Logos. The danger of this mode of viewing history is that we may come to regard it as nothing more than an allegory. This danger became a very real one when the Christian Platonists of Alexandria attempted to apply the Philonic mode of interpretation to the facts of the Gospel. The distinction between the "spiritual"

and the "somatic" (or literal) types of Christianity tended to depreciate the value of concrete historical reality. The Evangelist is, however, free from any such unbalanced exaggeration. His narrative has a clear-cut definiteness, a sharp edge of realism, which betoken no dreamy allegorism but the recording of actual historical facts. The Evangelist does not construct history for the purpose of turning it into allegory ; but, finding the historical facts before him, he pierces with a seer's insight into their deeper meaning, and then arranges them according to the clue which the facts themselves suggest. To one who has grasped the idea of the Divine Logos perpetually working behind and through the outward phenomena of history, events can never be thought of as *accidents;* since they are the language in which the Eternal Logos speaks to the world, they are parables weighted with a meaning beyond their immediate or intrinsic importance. This is to give human life an infinite horizon.

The presence of this eternal background behind the shifting scenes gives a solemn meaning, a profound symbolism to events which in themselves might seem trivial or accidental. The Gospel is full of instances of this dramatic symbolism. Thus Nicodemus comes to Jesus by *night ;* it is stormy weather at the Feast of the Dedication (x. 22) ; Christ goes through the dark ravine to His Agony and Passion (xviii. 1). Again, when Judas leaves the supper-table and goes out to his black deed, we read, in words that crush a whole world of meaning into their brevity, "And it was night." Instances might be multiplied,[1] but one other passage may be selected which is of special interest for our present study. It is that

[1] *Vide* Luthardt, "S. John's Gospel" (E.T.), vol. i. pp. 57–61, 70–74, 77–78, where this subject is very fully and ably treated. Cf. Plummer, "S. John," Cambridge Greek Testament, introduction, xliii. *Vide* also Schmiedel, "The Johannine Writings," pp. 95 *sqq.*, from a rather different standpoint.

passage which speaks of the prophesying of Caiaphas. "Being high-priest that year, he prophesied" (xi. 51). This statement is a stumbling-block to the critics, since the Evangelist, had he been a Jew, ought, they think, to have known that the high-priesthood was not an annual office. The stumbling-block may, however, be turned into a stepping-stone, when once we understand the Evangelist's mode of regarding history. In his view, it was profoundly significant that the man, who by his advice was largely responsible for the death of Christ, should have been high-priest that very year. The advice of this high-priest as to the necessity of Christ's death is actually grounded on a *sacrificial* reason—"It is expedient for us that one man should die for the nation, and that the whole nation perish not." Thus, unworthy though the motive was, Caiaphas was unconsciously discharging his high-priestly office by offering up a sacrifice. In that great year, when all the prophetic types and shadows were fulfilled, it fell to the lot of this high-priest to offer up, unknown to himself, the one great sacrifice of atonement—"the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." The Evangelist was so deeply impressed by this fact that he thrice repeats the statement that Caiaphas was "high-priest that year." The Evangelist's point of view is presented in the significant remark, "*This spake he not of himself;* but being high-priest that year he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation." Thus Caiaphas was the instrument of a Power which was using him for a purpose he himself could never have dreamt of. The great office, which this poor creature now occupied, was still working through him, unworthy though he was. Caiaphas himself was thinking only of the expediency of the moment; but his words, which were not his own, were eloquent of an eternal purpose. Strange it was that this Sadducee, who "believed in no angel or spirit, was compelled to be the spokesman of the Divine Word, even when he was plotting His

death." [1] In other words, Caiaphas was the mouthpiece of the Divine Logos who was speaking through him for a purpose beyond him. This incident of the prophesying of Caiaphas gives us an insight into the Evangelist's conception of history. The Divine Logos is the light that broods over history, guiding, controlling, and overruling: sometimes using men as unconscious or unwilling agents of His purpose, making even the wrath of man to praise Him, bringing good out of evil, triumph out of tragedy.

The Evangelist's symbolic view of history has been well expressed by Haupt, an expositor who has got to the very heart of Johannine theology. "History to S. John is not the sum of individual, free human acts, interwoven with each other and interpenetrating, but it appears to him one great organism —a process the internal law of whose development is as much marked out beforehand, and as naturally flows from it, as the plant springs from its germ. For all the particular is inevitably and immediately, consciously or unconsciously, in the service of a general principle. History is to him the working out of an idea, the body which it assumes to itself; and this body is naturally conformed to the soul which creates it, that is, to the idea: history is the invisible translated into the visible." [2]

The Logos-conception helps us, therefore, to see history as a unity, as a progressive development, and as a representation on a great stage of principles infinitely vaster than the events in which from time to time they are embodied.

The Logos in relation to Personality.—We have seen how the Logos-conception illumines our view of Nature and of History. It remains to show how the personality of the individual is affected by this idea of the Immanent Logos. This is indeed one of

[1] Maurice, "S. John's Gospel," p. 324. The words quoted form part of a very eloquent and striking passage.

[2] Haupt, "First Epistle of S. John," p. 376 (E. T.).

the most distinctive notes of the Evangelist's message, since he has boldly stated that the Divine Logos who is immanent in the world has finally, as the consummation of His indwelling, become Incarnate in a human life. "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." God immanent in nature cannot satisfy the cravings of man's heart; that message, beautiful though it is, still leaves us comfortless. Those deeper attributes of God—His love and forgiveness, His holiness and purity—these cannot "gleam from the stony eyes of a mountain, or plead with us in the tempest's shriek."[1] The heavens declare the *glory* of God, but they do not so clearly declare His *love*. Indeed, to those who are conscious of a violated moral law within, the spectacle of the starry heavens above may bring not a message of reassurance, but a message of helplessness and despair, and outcast man, beholding this terrible inflexible reign of law, is fain to cry out, "Is there no pity sitting in the clouds that sees into the bottom of my grief?" What man craves for in his truest moments is not the cold spectacle of unchanging Law, however solemn and majestic; he wants the living contact of soul with soul; he wants to feel that the Eternal has a heart, or, as the Evangelist puts it, that God is Love. It is only through a personal relationship of God and man that this truth can become for us a reality. The Divine Logos must become flesh, if the personal communion of God and man is to be realised in its fullest sense. Thus the Gospel of the Incarnation proclaims to us that the God whose enfolding love has from the beginning bent over human life even as the sky bends over the earth, that He who has revealed Himself to man at sundry times and in divers manners, who has spoken in the solemn pageantry of the sky and in the myriad sights and sounds of earth, who has shone with His light and truth into every human

[1] *Vide* a striking passage in Drummond's Hibbert Lectures, "Via, Veritas, Vita," p. 310.

soul, and reinforced this inward witness by the voice of lawgiver and of prophet—that this same God has at last bowed His heavens and come down that He might Himself become bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, very God and yet very man. He has stooped that He might lift mankind to the bosom of God. He has become what we are that He might make us what He is. The Eternal has at last spoken out, but His Word is no longer mediated through prophet or priest or scribe. The Word has become flesh; the Divine Message has come to us eloquent with the flesh and blood of our common humanity. In Jesus Christ we behold God manifest in the flesh. This is the grand drama of God and man which the Fourth Evangelist has unfolded for us in His Prologue.

Besides this fact of the Incarnate Logos, the Gospel has emphasised another aspect of the Logos, which is of inestimable value for our conception of personality, namely, the Logos as the Life-giver and Light-giver of every human soul—the source of all truth and strength, the indwelling and inspiring element in all human personality. Unfortunately at present a conception of personality dominates our ordinary modes of thought which makes it difficult for us to see the true bearings of the Logos-doctrine in its relation to the individual. We are apt to take a strongly individualistic view of personality, to regard each personality as an independent self, impervious to other selves. This conception of "rigid impenetrable personality" was first accentuated in the Kantian philosophy; it has since been accepted by Lotze and by the so-called Pragmatists; a person is conceived of as self-conscious, self-determining, self-contained, and an end to himself. In its more extreme forms this mode of thought has tended to represent personality somewhat after the manner of a shell-fish, to use one of Plato's similes. The Logos-theology will hardly fit in with this view of persons as impenetrable spiritual atoms. The *union*

of the individual human soul with the Divine Logos is something more than an "ethical harmony of wills." The Logos-light which flows into every human soul bears the same relation to the soul as the ocean bears to its countless bays and inlets; if the channels are kept open and unobstructed, the Logos will flood the soul, just as the ocean sends up its tides into every creek. The only obstacle to the influx of this Logos-light is not the impervious wall of personality but the darkness which is made by selfishness and sin. This darkness ever resists the Logos and makes for isolation, stagnation, and death. The soul has channels which connect it with the Divine, and along these the Logos may flow into the soul and fill it with strength and life. It is the Divine purpose that every soul should participate in this larger life; the Light which coming into the world lighteth every man is meant to increase more and more unto the perfect day. Yet it is always in the power of the human will to choose darkness rather than light and to cut off the soul from communication with the Divine source of Light and Life.

The relation of the Logos to the individual soul has been worked out with great suggestiveness by those theologians and devotional writers who have drawn their inspiration from the mystical side of religion.[1] Indeed the true spiritual heirs of S. John are not to be sought among the system-builders of Nicæa, but rather among that great body of Christian mystics who in all ages have found the inspiration as well as the justification of their thought in the Logos-theology of the Evangelist. Few of them, however, have shown the same wise and calm restraint as S. John. S. Paul, we may note, has

[1] The account which follows on the relation of the Logos-doctrine to the Mystics is much indebted to Inge's suggestive lectures on "Personal Idealism and Mysticism," and also to his larger work, the Bampton Lectures on Christian Mysticism.

given a classic expression to the fact of the Divine immanence in the human heart when he says, "I live, yet not I; Christ liveth in me." It is not too much to say that this memorable utterance touches the most fundamental note in the Christian religion, and it crystallises into a few simple words the whole practical import of the Logos-doctrine. In the writings of the early Church we meet not infrequently with the idea that the Word of God is perpetually *becoming incarnate* in the hearts of believers. Thus the author of that beautiful little book, the Epistle to Diognetus, says that "Christ is ever begotten anew in the hearts of the Saints."[1] S. Augustine in one of his *obiter dicta* seems to hold the much-abused doctrine that every Christian is a "potential Christ." He says, "Let us rejoice and return thanks that we have been made not only Christians but Christ. Wonder and rejoice! We have been made Christ" (in Joh. tract 21).[2] This is, however, the language of ecstasy rather than of sober theology.

The fact of the immanence of the Logos in the individual soul was the leading thought in the devotional theory of the Mediæval mystics. The idea received very varied expression, sometimes in a very daring form. Thus Eckhart says: "The Father speaks the Word into the soul, and when the Son is born, every soul becomes Mary." The presence of the Divine Logos in the soul is represented as a heavenly spark, which the individual is meant to foster and extend till it fills the entire soul, expelling all the darkness and coldness of the selfish tendency in man. The influx of the Logos is a continual renewal of the soul's life. "Not only to

[1] *Vide* "Epistle to Diognetus," edited by L. B. Radford (S.P.C.K.); note on xi. 4, p. 82.

[2] "Ergo gratulemur et agamus gratias, non solum nos christianos factos esse, sed Christum . . . Admiramini, gaudete, Christus facti sumus."

die daily but to be born daily, was the prayer of these saints." Two characteristic utterances may be selected from those brought together by Dr. Inge. "Hugo of S. Victor sums up the whole creed of psychological mysticism when he says: 'To ascend to God is to enter into oneself and to transcend oneself,' and Richard expresses the same idea by 'Ascendat per semetipsum supra semetipsum.'" The keynote of all such mystical thoughts is that the inflowing Logos is "the life of our life, the core of our being who, if we could but rid ourselves entirely of our false self-regarding self, would be the constitutive force of our personality." When the great central fact is once grasped that God is Love, and that the universe is mysteriously built on the Law of Love, then the conception of personality as an "impervious atom" is felt to be quite unsatisfactory and misleading. The soul is not a fortified castle, standing aloof and solitary; it is a hospitable guest-chamber always ready to receive worthy visitants, sometimes entertaining angels unawares. Plotinus touched a chord in the Logos-doctrine when he said that the highest knowledge would only be attained by the *νοῦς ἐρῶν*—the mind in love, reaching out to a union with something beyond itself.

The Logos-doctrine has received a fine exposition in the teaching of the Cambridge Platonists, a school of mystical thinkers who have kept their heads where many of their predecessors have been led into the most fantastic eccentricities. Benjamin Whichcote might be taken as a good specimen of this school, and there seems to be a real fitness in the fact that the great English commentator on S. John should have also written a fine appreciation of Whichcote.[1] A few of Whichcote's Logos-dicta may be mentioned. In his letters he speaks of reason as "the candle of the Lord, lighted by God, and lighting us to God, *res illuminata illuminans*." Again, he describes

[1] Westcott, in "Religious Thought in the West."

conscience as our "home-God." Again, he says: "When the revelation of faith comes, the inward sense awakened to the entertainment thereof says, Εὕρηκα; it is as I imagined: the thing expected proves: Christ the desire of all nations." "The soul of man is to God as the flower to the sun; it opens at His approach and shuts when He withdraws."

An interesting chapter in the Logos-doctrine is to be found in the dominant thought which runs through Emerson's essays. His essays on the "Oversoul" and on "Spiritual Laws" are full of suggestiveness for one who holds the Logos way of thinking. A few quotations may be given. "Man is a stream whose source is hidden. Our being is descending into us from we know not whence. . . . When I watch that flowing river which out of regions I see not pours for a season its streams into me, I see that I am a pensioner; not a cause, but a surprised spectator of this ethereal water; that I desire and look up, and put myself in the attitude of reception, but from some alien energy the visions come." Again, "The soul in man is not an organ, but animates and exercises all the organs . . . is not a function . . . is not a faculty but a light; is not the intellect or the will, but the master of the intellect and the will; is the background of our being, in which they lie—an immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed. From within and from behind, a light shines through us upon things, and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all. A man is the façade of a temple wherein all wisdom and all good abide." "A wise old proverb says, 'God comes to see us without bell,' that is, as there is no screen or ceiling between our heads and the infinite heavens, so there is no bar or wall in the soul where the man, the effect, ceases and God, the cause, begins. The walls are taken away. We lie open on one side to the deeps of the spiritual nature, to the attributes of God." Again, "The

blindness of the intellect begins when it would be something of itself. The weakness of the will begins when the individual would be something of himself." It may seem a far cry from Emerson to the Fourth Evangelist, yet the religious psychology of both is substantially the same.

The Social Significance of the Logos.—It may be noted in passing that the Logos-doctrine of the Gospel brings out the *social* side of personality with real power and beauty. When Christ is represented as praying for His disciples that they may be one, even as He and the Father are one, it is no mere concurrence of will and purpose that He sets forth as the ideal of union; it is a mysterious solidarity, a fusion of personality, the true meaning of which is best revealed in the allegory of the Vine and the Branches. This is the true ideal of social unity. The branches are united with one another because they abide in the vine; so the individual believers are united with one another because they draw their life from a common centre. It is the same Divine Logos that gives life and light to all, and thus the closer we are brought to Him, the closer we are brought to one another. The Logos is the great unifying and reconciling force in the world; sin is the force that makes for isolation. It is like what one may often see on the seashore; when the tide is out, one may find many little pools among the rocks, isolated and far apart, but when the tide sweeps in, these scattered pools filled with the inrush of a vaster element are lifted and merged into an all-pervading unity. Thus the Divine Logos when He comes with His power into an individual soul lifts it into the larger, grander life of fellowship. Or one may change the simile and liken the world to a circle, within which are scattered the various units of human life. Now, according to the Logos-teaching, the true line of social progress is not that these units should move towards one another, but that they should all move towards the common centre; the

nearer they come to the centre, the nearer must they come to one another. But, indeed, it is a work of supererogation to add to S. John's allegory of the Vine; that picture goes to the root of the matter, and it is worth noting that the unity it portrays is an *organic* unity, a unity which is no mere mechanical juxtaposition of parts; it is a unity not from without but from within, a unity which is no stationary result arrived at, but a living process continually realising itself.[1]

This is a feature of S. John's teaching which must commend itself to the best thought of to-day. We have come to see how inadequate and unworthy is the view which bases our relations to God, or to one another on anything in the nature of a covenant or a contract, or any other such external conception. S. John supplies us with the true basis of unity. We are one not because we happen to be penned within the same fence, but because we draw our life from a common source. The covenant-conception of religion dwells chiefly on the advantage of being within the circumference of the sacred circle, the Johannine view dwells rather on the joy of being near its centre. It is our relation to the centre, not our relation to the circumference which ought to be the determining factor in all real unity.

The Logos and present-day Pantheism.—We have now seen how the doctrine of the Immanent Logos as set forth by the Evangelist affects our view of nature, of history, and of personality. It may be well before bringing our inquiry to a close to recall the complementary aspect of the doctrine we are considering, namely, the Transcendence of the Logos, of which something has been said a little earlier. There is always a tendency to dwell too exclusively on one or other of these truths—the Divine Immanence or the Divine Transcendence; the history of human

[1] *Vide* Dods' "Gospel of S. John," Expositor's Bible, vol. ii., p. 179.

thought presents a kind of rhythmic movement between them, a period of Deism alternating with a period of Pantheism. Immanence and Transcendence are both essential aspects of the truth, and the highest task of religious philosophy will always be that of effecting a synthesis of these complementary aspects of the Divine. "God over us," and "God in us," are facts not contradictory but complementary to one another. Perhaps the tendency of present-day thought is to dwell too much on the Immanence of God, and by isolating this fact to let it lapse into a vague Pantheism. It is interesting, therefore, to observe how the Logos-theology, while setting forth a very profound idea of Immanence, avoids the danger of Pantheism by keeping in view the complementary fact of the Divine Transcendence; these two aspects of the truth are kept in their due proportion as aspects of Godhead, and the Evangelist closes his prologue with a verse in which both sides are presented with well-poised judgment. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."

A clearer grasp of the Logos-theology would serve as a wholesome corrective to the vague Pantheism which is afloat in so much of our current religious thought. This new phase of Pantheism does not concern itself so much with the task of identifying God with Nature, the cosmos; it is rather interested in asserting the identity of God with humanity, and and in proving the divinity of man. Human souls are regarded as simply phases or modes of God at His various depths and levels; man is thus potential undeveloped God, and man in worshipping God is really worshipping himself, perfected and idealised. This view has found expression in an earlier day in some of Emerson's more extravagant speculations. Thus, "I, the imperfect, adore my own Perfect. I am receptive of the great soul. I become a transparent eyeball. I am nothing. I see all. The

currents of the universal Being circulate through me. I am part of God." This phase of religious Pantheism has been reinforced by the philosophic teaching of some members of the Hegelian school, who assert that God without the world is only a potentiality; it is only through the cosmic process that God "finds" Himself and gradually attains to self-consciousness. God the Infinite Consciousness must become limited in order to know Himself. Man is therefore God in the process of arriving at self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Pantheism of this kind is simply the Divine Immanence with the Divine Transcendence left out.

It may be asked, what is the practical objection from a religious point of view to the theory which identifies God and man? It may be said that it is not himself, in his present imperfect state, that man is asked to worship: the God that is set up for our adoration is man in his perfect and idealised condition, man in his infinite and unfathomable possibilities—perfect man. This may be quite true, but it does not alter the fact that the object of man's worship is to be *himself*; and this is enough to paralyse every form of true worship. For worship while it demands, on the one hand, a recognition of our likeness to God and of His immanence in us, also demands with equal force a recognition of God's unlikeness to us, His other-ness and transcendence. As a writer of the Modernist school has well said, "The apprehension of God as Transcendent is, however indirect and implicit, immensely operative in the dynamism of man's multiform deepest life—for it is this apprehension that ever leaves in man, at his best moments, the poignant sense of inadequacy and that dwarfs him before this most real sense or touch of the Infinite."[1]

The species of Pantheism that we are considering

[1] Von Hügel, in a very profound article in the *Albany Review*, Sept., 1907, to which the present writer is much indebted.

appears to assume that we cannot enjoy a sense of union with God without our being fundamentally part of God, identical with Him. This idea apparently arises from that wrong conception of personality which has already been referred to, namely, the conception of personality as an impervious substance, impenetrable by other spirits; if spirits interpenetrate or unite with one another, then it is thought they must be identical. But with a truer conception of personality as a something which can penetrate and be penetrated by other personalities, we can see that we may have a union of personalities without their identity being implied. We can be one with God without being the same as God. If we are to satisfy all the demands of reason and experience we must find some conception of the union with God which will not involve a depersonalising of man and a substitution of the Divine for the human. We want some view of union which will allow an intimate interpenetration of the human by the Divine, and yet will not confuse God and man. The Divine must be recognised as immanent in the human; we must think of the soul as inhabited not only by "Grace, a creature, but by God the creator." On the other hand, we must find a place for the reality of human freedom, the power of the individual soul to receive or to reject the Divine. It is clear that the view which will satisfy that twofold necessity will not be Pantheism, but *Panentheism*, to use Krause's happy term: that is to say, we do not want a view which says that God is all things, but a view which says that God is *in* all things. This view must bring God very near to man: it must make Him "closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet;" yet it must also put God far above us as the Holy One that inhabiteth eternity.

Now it will be easily seen that the Logos-theology gives us the very point of view which we are seeking; it finds a place for the Divine Transcendence as well

as for the Divine Immanence: it puts God within us and yet above us. "In the beginning was the Word," we read, "and the Word was with God." There is the Divine Transcendence. God was not waiting for the world in order to express Himself. In that glory which existed before the foundation of the world God was always realising Himself in the Eternal Word. Again, we have the note of Immanence. God the Word is the Creator, the Life-giver—"That which hath been made was Life in Him." He comes with His Light into every human soul. "The Life was the Light of men." He is the "true Light which lighteth every man coming into the world." So close is God's union with the world that He finally becomes man: "the Word became flesh." Yet this Immanence involves no confusion of the Divine and the human: Man is no part or "mode" of God, though his true life must be in his union with God; man has individuality, freedom, and responsibility; he can resist the Divine Logos, he can refuse to "know" Him or to "receive" Him, or, if he chooses, by receiving Him and believing on His name he can be given the right to become a child of God, to be "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God." The Evangelist did not ignore either man's part or God's part in the process of regeneration. Man "receives" the Logos by an effort of will; God on His side bestows the gift of a new life. Man must co-operate with God. *Qui creavit te sine te, non salvabit te sine te.* Certain of our own poets have put this truth very happily. Tennyson in two lines has put into a nutshell all we have been trying to say about the relation of the human personality to the Divine in the Logos-theology.

> "Our wills are ours, we know not how;
> Our wills are ours, to make them Thine."

The Logos-theology will also find room for a fact

which is ignored in the Pantheistic Immanence of to-day—namely, the reality of sin ; sin is something more than undeveloped good or the necessary concomitant of our expanding finite consciousness ; it is, in the teaching of the Logos-theology, a positive thing, the perversion of man's free will, the deliberate choosing of darkness rather than light, the wilful rejection of the Divine.

Finally, the Logos-theology gives us a conception of man's union with God which is true to the deepest facts of experience. It presents an idea of personality which allows the most complete interpenetration of the human by the Divine, and yet never suggests the idea of man's identity with God. S. John's idea of union is set forth in that simple but wonderfully profound phrase about our "abiding in God." If one will think out all this phrase implies, its recognition of separate personality and yet of most intimate union, one will find in it a deeply satisfying expression of the facts of the spiritual consciousness.

It will be abundantly evident that the Fourth Gospel has a real message for the thought of our own day, and it seems as though the special task which lies before the Church of the next generation is to be a revival of Johannine Christianity. In the Logos-doctrine the Evangelist offers us nothing less than a key to the interpretation of life ; it is a presentation of Christianity which must grow richer and more suggestive with every upward movement of human thought ; it is a generalisation which still gathers up and interprets for us the manifold facts of human experience. "The Word was God." "The Word became flesh." On these two sentences hang all the articles of the Christian faith.

APPENDIX

Cerinthus and S. John

WHILE the preceding pages have been going through the Press, it has been suggested to me that I should give some consideration to the question whether the Fourth Gospel, and more particularly the Logos-doctrine of the Prologue, may not have been influenced by the Evangelist's antagonism to the teaching of the heretic Cerinthus. This question has received very scant notice from the majority of writers, and yet the grounds for believing that Cerinthus had some influence on the Gospel must appear on examination to be considerable. It is not suggested, of course, that the primary purpose of the Gospel was polemical, but merely that Cerinthus' teaching was one of the factors which helped, by way of opposition, to mould the form and phraseology of the Gospel.

In the first place, tradition gives considerable support to this view. We need not lay much stress on the details of the story of S. John and Cerinthus at the baths. The details are obviously doubtful, though the story (reported by Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* iii. 3, 4, and twice quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 28; iv. 14) points to the fact that Cerinthus and S. John were contemporaries. Further evidence on this point is found in Epiphanius, *Hær.* xxviii., where we are told that Cerinthus was the ringleader of S. Paul's Judaizing antagonists at Jerusalem. But

in any case great importance must be attached to the tradition recorded in Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.* iii. 11. This passage is often referred to by commentators, but rarely quoted. It need hardly be said how valuable a witness is Irenæus, on account of his strong conservative tendencies, as well as for his unique position in relation to S. John. We may quote part of the passage referred to: "Hanc fidem annuntians Joannes Domini discipulus, volens per Evangelii annuntiationem auferre eum, qui a Cerintho inseminatus erat hominibus, errorem . . . ut confunderet eos, et suaderet, quoniam unus Deus qui omnia fecit per Verbum suum; et non, quemadmodum illi dicunt, alterum quidem fabricatorem, alium autem Patrem Domini . . . et initium quidem esse *Monogenem*, *Logon* autem verum filium Unigeniti." Irenæus goes through S. John's Prologue clause by clause, and points out how the Evangelist's views are so expressed as to strike at forms of teaching such as Cerinthus represented.

When we consider how tradition has associated the name of Cerinthus with that of S. John, and when we remember the special errors attributed to Cerinthus, and the way they seem to be corrected or repudiated in the Fourth Gospel, we cannot lightly set aside the evidence of Irenæus.

The Bishop of Salisbury (to whom I am indebted for several suggestions on this subject) has mentioned some probable points of contact between Cerinthus and S. John, in one of his University sermons on "S. John, a Teacher of Teachers."

The docetism of Cerinthus is in sharp contrast with the teaching of S. John's First Epistle (iv. 2, "Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," cf. v. 6). Another tenet of Cerinthus is a dualistic conception of the person of Jesus Christ; the man Jesus is separated from the heavenly Christ. Against this S. John explicitly states that his Gospel is written "that ye may believe that Jesus *is* the Christ, the Son of God"

(xx. 31. With this we may compare ii. 22 of the First Epistle, "Who is the liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ?"). Again, Cerinthus taught the *impassible* nature of the Christ. Against this we have in S. John the emphatic physical description of the crucifixion. Again, in contrast with the teaching of Cerinthus that the resurrection of Christ had not yet happened, but was still to come, we have in S. John the account of the doubt of Thomas, and his ultimate conviction as to the physical reality of Christ's resurrection.

Further, perhaps it may not be altogether fanciful to suggest a point of contact between Cerinthus and S. John in their use of the word πλήρωμα. This term became a very fashionable one in the Gnostic systems of a somewhat later date, but its meaning seems to have been still rather fluid in the days of S. John. Irenæus tells us (*Adv. Hær.*, iii. 11) something of Cerinthus' belief on this point; he taught that the Christ, after descending into the man Jesus, *flew back* again into His own *pleroma* ("descendentem in Jesum filium fabricatoris, et iterum *revolasse in suum pleroma*"). Bishop Lightfoot thinks it highly probable that Irenæus is right in saying that Cerinthus made use of the term "pleroma" ("Commentary on Epistle to Colossians," p. 331). It is surely not unreasonable then to think that S. John may have had Cerinthus at the back of his mind when he taught a far more real and fruitful view of the *pleroma* of Christ, not removing it away into some vague transcendental region, far beyond any contact with human life, but rather making it one of the sublime realities which had come to tabernacle for ever in human hearts, and to be felt as one of the living experiences of man's spiritual life. "Of His *pleroma* we all received." With S. John the pleroma is no longer a metaphysical abstraction beyond the clouds; it is brought down to earth, or rather by participation in it all

the children of God are lifted into the heavenly region. The same word may be used by Cerinthus and S. John, but they are worlds apart in the meaning they attach to it. S. John's view seems indeed to be in direct antagonism to that of Cerinthus.

We may also notice how (as opposed to Cerinthus) S. John teaches so clearly the identity of the Creator and the Redeemer. The Logos who brings salvation and redemption to man is that same Creative Power, apart from Whom "not even one single thing was made." This creating Logos is no subordinate agent (as Cerinthus taught), but very God. Here S. John and Cerinthus are in sharp collision.

It has been also suggested that the Evangelist had the error of Cerinthus in his mind in his teaching on the subject of *Life*, which is, of course, one of the great themes of the Fourth Gospel. "These are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have *life* in His name" (xx. 31). By "life" the Apostle seems to mean something more than salvation. It is that same "life" which belongs to the Logos as *Creator*, which He has received from the Father, and which He imparts to the world. "All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that hath been made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men" (i. 3, 4). With this may be compared the teaching on "life" in ch. v. (vv. 25, 26). "The hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself." This Johannine conception of Life would be in direct opposition to the teaching of Cerinthus, who held a dualistic view of the universe, separating the supreme God from the Creator. "Thus in the place of one source of life, simple and identical in its origin, and exhibiting

itself alike in the natural world, in the moral life of Christians, and in the resurrection from the dead, this heresy supposed a distinction between the origin of natural and spiritual life."

It may be also added that if S. John had the teaching of Cerinthus before his mind it might help to account for a remarkable feature of the Prologue, namely, the very abrupt introduction of the term *Logos* in the opening words of the Gospel. The Prologue clearly implies a background; it implies, as we have seen, a circle of hearers already familiar with S. John's oral teaching. (This is borne out by the language of the Epilogue, xx. 24: "This is the disciple which beareth witness of these things and wrote these things: and *we* know that his witness is true;" cf. i. 16, "of His fulness *we all* received.") But beyond this, it would help to explain the form of the Prologue if we could suppose that it had an implied reference to a well-known but erroneous type of teaching like that of Cerinthus. The Evangelist may be defining the true faith in the very terms misused by Cerinthus. It seems on this supposition not improbable that if we had the writings of Cerinthus before us, we should find a good deal in them about the "Logos." Irenæus, indeed, in the passage quoted above (*Adv. Hær.*, iii. 11), ascribes to Cerinthus the use of the word *Logos* and also of *Monogenes*. If this be so, it may explain S. John's abrupt introduction of the term Logos, and also his careful definition of its true meaning in Christian theology.

(Most of our knowledge about Cerinthus comes from Epiphanius, *Hær.*, xxviii. Epiphanius is a somewhat uncritical compiler, deriving his information partly from Irenæus, and partly, as Lipsius (*Quellenkritik des Epiphanios*) has shown, from the now lost earlier work of Hippolytus on heresies. Much information is also to be obtained in Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, i. 26. A very full list of authorities on

Cerinthus will be found in the article in the "Dictionary of Christian Biography." A most admirable account of Cerinthus' teaching is given in Lightfoot's edition of the Epistle to the Colossians (Essay on the "Colossian Heresy")).

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THE END

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